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Summary
Since the mid 1980's it has been unthinkable for white feminist literary critics to neglect
race in their theoretical work. Strong challenges from black feminists have been effective in
placing race high on the critical agenda. No longer is the kind of exclusivity that marked
early (white) feminist literary theory possible. However, despite the evident commitment to
addressing the race question in their work, the black feminist challenge has been greeted
with a considerable degree of anxiety by white feminist critics. I suggest that the main
source of anxiety is a failure to square the pressing need to 'include' race on the feminist
agenda with doubts about straying into what is perceived to be black feminist territory. In
other words, white feminist critics have yet to resolve their relation to the black feminist
project. This anxiety has meant that a concern over the notion of exclusion has given way to
that of appropriation. This has tended to place the white feminist reader in the paralysing
position where there seems little available ground between the twin poles of exclusion and
appropriation. Typical questions that have arisen out of this dichotomy are: should white
feminists teach black women's writing? Should white feminist critics produce critical
readings of texts authored by black women? Can white women readers read black women's
writings without imposing onto them their own critical agendas? Is a non-appropriative
reading relation possible? How should white feminists deal with the fact of their own race
privilege and what bearing does this privilege have upon the readings they, potentially,
might produce?
This project examines some of the ways in which white feminists have attempted to
address their relation to the race question in feminist literary criticism. Over the space of six
chapters I focus on a number of specific reading strategies offered as positive critical
interventions. My main contention is the impossibility of a guaranteed anti-imperialist
theory or reading position. I also argue for the necessity of asking the question: whether the
imperialist can read, as a complement to that of whether 'the subaltern can speak'. Chapter 1
questions the white feminist ambition of arriving at the truth of the black text as a means of
decolonising the text. Through an examination of the Rodney King events some of the perils
of appeals to pure seeing are highlighted. Chapter 2 explores the implications of white
feminist abstention from the race debates. Chapter 3 looks at the issue of identification as a
basis for reading. Chapter 4 questions the identifications that inhere in applying theory to a
text. Chapter 5 challenges the use of contextualisation as a source of textual limits. Chapter
6 examines the limits of self-reflexivity as an anti-imperialist method.
Introduction: 'How to Own Your Own Body and Love Somebody Else'
In an interview with Salman Rushdie Toni Morrison identified the following
question as crucial to an understanding of the acts of violence perpetrated against the
beloved in both Beloved and Jaz/: 'How to own your own body and love somebody
else.,2 In other words, Morrison is interested as a writer in the question of agency in
the light of a life lived 'under historical duress'; in how one, in the aftermath of
slavery and reconstruction, 'inhabits the flesh that now is yours.' In the novels, the
love of both Sethe for her daughter and Joe Trace for Dorcas is devastating and
results in death. Each kills the beloved. Sethe to, paradoxically, protect her 'best
thing'(p. 272), to prevent her from entering slavery; Joe Trace to 'keep the feeling
going' (p. 3). In addition to constituting an important theme of the work/ the phrase
('How to own your own body and love somebody else'), I would argue, is suggestive
as a way of thinking about the critical relation between reader and text
If criticism can be defined as an act of love 4 the question of reading becomes
one of how to read without either surrendering the reading self to the other text,
losing oneself in the specificity of another's discourses (as does Sethe in her
pathological relation with Beloved in the latter stages of the novel. 'The bigger
Beloved got, the smaller Sethe became', p. 250) or else killing the text, freezing it in
a theoretical relation, rendering it the screen for one's own projected critical desires.
As a client of Violet Trace puts it 'Can't rival the dead for love. Lose every time'
(Jazz, p. 15).
But up there on Lenox, in Violet and Joe Trace's apartment, the rooms are
like the empty birdcages wrapped in cloth. And a dead girl's face has become
a necessary thing for their nights. They each take turns to throw off the
bedcovers, rise up from the sagging mattress and tiptoe over cold linoleum
into the parlour to gaze at what seems like the only living presence in the
house: the photograph of a bold unsmiling girl staring from the mantlepiece.
If the tiptoer is Joe Trace, driven by loneliness from his wife's side, then the
face stares at him without hope or regret and it is the absence of accusation
that wakes him from his sleep hungry for her company. No finger points. Her
lips don't turn down in judgement. Her face is calm, generous and sweet. But
if the tiptoer is Violet the photograph is not that at all. The girl's face looks
greedy, haughty and very lazy. The cream-at-the-top-of-the-milkpail face of
someone who picks up things lying on other people's dressers and is not
embarrassed when found out. It is the face of a sneak who glides over to your
sink to rinse the fork you have laid by her plate. An inward face - whatever it
sees is its own self. You are there, it says, because I am looking at you. (Jazz,
p.12).
The frozen image of the dead girl is available for the meanings each looker projects
onto it. Likewise the literary text is potentially receptive to the projected meanings of
the critic.
This question of reading or the relation of reader to text has acquired a certain
degree of urgency within the field of feminist criticism over the last ten or so years.
Following challenges in the early 80's by black feminists it has become increasingly
necessary for white feminist critics to address what has been termed the 'race
question'" in their theoretical work. As Deborah McDowell points out, often it has
been the case that feminist criticism ' ...perpetrated against the Black woman writer
the same exclusive practices they so vehemently decried in white male scholars.Y
However, while the current feminist consensus is that the kinds of Eurocentric
omissions found in 'early' attempts to construct a feminist canon are entirely, to
quote one critic, 'unforgivable's, the black feminist challenge has been greeted with a
considerable degree of anxiety by white feminist theorists. The prime source of this
anxiety being, on the one hand, the pressing need to 'include' race on the feminist
agenda and on the other, doubts about straying into what is perceived to be black
feminist territory. In other words, a concern over the notion of exclusion has given
way to that of appropriation. What is more, the concern over the possibility of
appropriation, or colonialism, or imperialism, to use some of a number of codewords,
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has tended to result in the paralysing position where there is little available ground
between what are seen as the twin poles of exclusion and appropriation. Typical
questions that have arisen out of this dichotomy are; should white feminists teach
black women's writing? Should white feminist critics produce critical readings of
texts authored by black women? Can white women readers read black women's
writings without imposing onto them their own critical agendas? Is a non-
appropriative reading relation possible? How should white feminists deal with the
fact of their own race privilege and what bearing does this privilege have upon the
readings they, potentially, might produce? In short, how to own your own body and
love somebody else.
This project takes as its main concern the relation between the white feminist
reader and the black or race-different woman's text. This was not my original focus.
Rather I set out to examine black women's testimonial writing in the context of the
debates around the status of postmodernism in feminist literary criticism. As my
research progressed it became increasingly clear that my own relation to the texts, as
a white feminist reader, could not be assumed. As there was more than a degree of
self-consciousness apparent in white-authored feminist criticism of 'black' texts it
was inescapable that I would examine my own position. As I progressed in my self-
examination it became more and more clear that I was entering profoundly complex
territory. What began as a part of my introduction expanded into a thesis. In his
entertaining collection of essays psychoanalyst Adam Phillips contends that
obstacles, barriers to comprehension, should be treated 'as the way rather than as
something in the way.' 9 With this insight what began as an exercise in critical
hurdling turned into a sustained examination of the nature of the problems
themselves. The barriers became in themselves interesting.
Outside the Frame: White Feminists and Black Feminist Criticism
In her poem 'Frame,lo Adrienne Rich depicts a scene that resonates with the current
scene of feminist criticism. The narrative of the poem concerns a black woman who,
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waiting for a bus, decides to shelter from the wind in a newly constructed part of the
university she attends to study organic chemistry. She is apprehended by a white
security guard who telling her to move on refuses her explanation for why she is
there. He returns with a white police officer .
. . . Then she starts
to leave into the windraked night but already
the policeman is going to work, the handcuffs are on her
wrists he is throwing her down his knee has gone into
her breast he is dragging her down the stairs
Intermittent in the poem is the voice of the narrator, who, whilst trying to witness the
violence of the scene that unfolds before her, is nonetheless compromised by her
position outside the frame.
I don't know her. I am
standing though somewhere just outside the frame
of all this, trying to see
The poem problematises the position of the white woman as witness: while she is
watching the scene she is also outside of it.
I am unable
to hear a sound of all this all that I know is what
I can see from this position there is no soundtrack
to go with this and I understand at once
it is meant to be in silence that this happens
The Other woman is silenced by the racist male authority figures who construe her as
'trouble', as trespasser. And yet, even as the narrator attempts to amplify the voice of
the black woman, she remains spoken for, silent. The separation between the two
women is manifest.
in silence that he pushes her into the car
banging her head in silence that she cries out
in silence that she tries to explain she was only
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waiting for a bus
[... ]
in silence that in the precinct she refuses to give her name
in silence that they throw her into the cell
in silence that she stares at him
straight in the face in silence that she sinks her teeth
into his hand in silence that she is charged
with trespass assault and battery in
silence that at the sleet-swept comer her bus
passes without stopping and goes on
in silence.
Despite the intensity and insistence of the witnessing voice the omniscient narrator
cannot connect with the subject of the poem. The sense of separation, of the division
between the women is palpable. The poem thus enacts the failure of the frame to
render the Other woman articulate. The objective view cannot allow the subaltern to
speak.
Just as the narrator appears to be witnessing the scene from behind glass so
the position of the white feminist critic often appears to be one of profound
separation from the text she is trying to read. In many ways this division is a
manifestation of the anxiety among white feminist critics about their relation to the
project of black feminist criticism.
How can I read Toni Morrison's or Alice Walker's or Buchi Emecheta's work
without encroaching upon black feminist critical terrain, the argument goes? How
can I take on board the black feminist challenge without appropriating black feminist
space? The white feminist critic it seems is 'just outside the frame', staring through
the glass of black feminist criticism.
There has been some debate as to whether white feminists can participate in
black feminist critique ranging from positions such as bell hooks' which question the
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value of white feminist interpretation of black writing11 to Valerie Smith's which
questions the potential essentialism of a separatist black feminism:
It is not my intention to reclaim the black feminist project from those who are
not black women; to do so would be to define the field too narrowly,
emphasising unduly the implications of a shared experience between "black
women as critics and black women's reality." Indeed, as the following
remarks indicate, I understand the phrase black feminist theory to refer not
only to theory written (or practiced) by black feminists, but also to a way of
reading inscriptions of race (particularly but not exclusively blackness),
gender (particularly but not exclusively womanhood), and class in modes of
I I . 12cu tura expression
The possibility ofa 'welcome'Y contribution to the project of black feminism on the
part of white feminist critics is thus far undecided. That some white feminists have
experienced this critical situation as a dichotomy (how to 'include' race on the
agenda at the same time as respecting black feminist enterprise) is more an indication
of a flaw in their thinking than of black feminist ambivalence. As will become clear
throughout this study, this thinking is founded upon the mistaken view that conflates
the so-called race question with black feminist theory and criticism; that in order to
talk about race you have to 'do' black feminist criticism. This in turn is premised on
the belief that race pertains solely to 'blackness' and that white is not a raced
category. What escapes the formulation race work = black feminist criticism is the
idea that white constitutes a raced identity and to engage in critical work on the
subject of race is not necessarily to appropriate black feminist space. Put differently,
white feminist participation in race work is not conditional upon gaining entry to the
'enclosure' of black feminist criticism14• So-called feminist criticism (Le. feminist
criticism supposedly without race) is always already raced whether this is
acknowledged or not; the absence of any mention of race in white-authored criticism
does not mean that it is somehow free of racial inflection and influence.
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Similarly flawed is the construal of the white feminist task as, necessarily and
singularly, one of 'including' texts by black women as a means of addressing the
black feminist challenge. While it is the case that white feminist practice was often
exclusionary and neglectful of black writing it is short sighted to imagine the answer
as one of merely adding those excluded works back in to the already constituted
feminist canon. Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar have commented:
In arguing that most contemporary feminist theory does not begin to
adequately account for the experience of Black women we have to
acknowledge that it is not a simple question of their absence, consequently
the task is not one of rendering their visibility. IS
The excessive interest in the racially Other woman produced by an 'inclusion'
approach to the race question is profoundly limited as a way forward in that it
perpetuates both the neglect of whiteness as a racial designation and the construction
of the black or race-different text in a permanent relation of otherness to the white
feminist reader." If not accompanied by a critique of the social construction of
Cl~
whiteness the pursuit the race-different text or woman in terms of understanding (the
1\
two are sometimes conflated) serves mostly to consolidate the white feminist self:
'the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the Self s
shadow,17 White feminist thinking about race necessitates some theoretical
consciousness regarding the way in which any knowledge of the Other is framed.
Can the Imperialist Read?
It is with this in mind that the critical attention of some white feminists, recently, has
switched to the reading self. Elizabeth Abel, for example, interrogates specific
reading strategies as a contribution to the task of discerning 'the politics and potential
of white feminists' critical intervention,18 in the race and reading debate, while
Minrose C. Gwin investigates the possibility of a particular reading relation or theory
for the white feminist reader of the black woman's text.19 The question of whether
the subaltern can speak: is considered alongside that of whether the imperialist can
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read, as it were. This turn to critical framings and theoretical methods is one
recommended by Henry Louis Gates Jr. who, in his introduction to 'Race', Writing
and Difference states:
We must determine how critical methods can effectively disclose the traces of
ethnic differences in literature. But we must also understand how certain
forms of difference and the languages we employ to define those supposed
differences not only reinforce each other but tend to create and maintain each
other. Similarly, we must analyze the language of contemporary criticism
itself, recognising especially that hermeneutic systems are not universal,
colorblind, apolitical, or neutra1.20
Likewise, Abel scrutinises white-authored feminist criticism in order to expose the
ways in which 'different critical discourses both inflect and inscribe racial fantasies'
(p. 477). The criticism of criticism would seem to offer a way for white feminists to
contribute to the race debate without compromising black feminist space. Equally,
the focus on white critical activity forces the acknowledgement of white as a racial,
albeit unmarked, identity.
However, although I endorse and practice close focus on critical writing in
this study (following Abel I examine specific white feminist reading strategies in
each chapter) such a project is by no means unproblematic. Richard Dyer is
cognisant of some of the problems of focusing on whiteness in his recent book,
White:
My blood runs cold at the thought that talking about whiteness could lead to
the development of something called 'White Studies' ... I dread to think that
paying attention to whiteness might lead to white people saying they need to
get in touch with their whiteness, that we might end up with the white
equivalent of 'Iron John' and co, the 'men's movement' embrace of hairiness
replaced with strangled vowels and rigid salutes. 21
From encouraging the performance of guilt to using the opportunity to 'talk about
what in any case we have always talked about: ourselves' to the 'me-too-ism'
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produced by the perception of being left out of critical trends that favour the margins,
the focus on whiteness could serve to reinforce rather than dismantle racial
domination: 'The point of looking at whiteness is to dislodge it from its centrality
and authority, not to reinstate it (and much less, to make a show of reinstating it,
when, like male power, it doesn't actually need reinstating).' (p. 10).Nancy K. Miller
has expressed concern over the growing trend of white feminists attacking other
white feministsr'; playing the 'race' card to score political points against each other.
My own reading of this phenomena is that, given the manifest anxiety displayed by
white feminists on the subject of race, the practice of white self-criticism gives the
illusion of safe territory. The spectacle of white feminists accusing other white
feminists could also be read as public displays of political correctness; a way of
signalling to black women that 'we're all right really'.
In choosing the focus of this project I have no intention of either producing a
spectacle of 'right-on-ness' or of contributing to something called white feminist
criticism. In recommending the examination of white-authored criticism there is the
danger of imagining the feminist critical field as dividing neatly along what Spivak
has termed chromatic lines: black feminists and white feminists each doing their own
theoretical thing.23Not only, as Paul Gilroy notes, is it insufficient to reduce race
relations to the binary of black and white, it is also false to attempt to resolve the race
question by founding separatist racial projects. In addition to reinforcing an authority
of experience position (only black women can talk of black experience, only whites
can talk of white etc.)24 such a separation belies the multiple mediations of race
categories. June Jordan remarks in interview with Pratibha Parmar:
I think there is something deficient in the thinking on the part of anybody
who proposes either gender identity politics or race identity politics as
sufficient, because every single one of us is more than whatever race we
represent or embody and more than whatever gender category we fall into.25
What is more, even if the division was adequate, the fantasy of black and white
feminists each working separately with the view of coming together in some utopian
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moment of equality glides over the complex interrelatedness of racial constructions:
the complicity of white and black as ideological forces.
To recommend white self-criticism is less to enforce a policy of separate
development than to begin the project of assuming responsibility in the field of racial
difference. It has been too long the case that black and other 'raced' women have
shouldered the burden of dealing with race alone. Audre Lorde comments:
Black and Third World women are expected to educate white people as to our
humanity. Women are expected to educate men. Lesbians and gay men are
expected to educate the heterosexual world. The oppressors maintain their
position and evade responsibility for their own actions. There is a constant
drain of energy which might be better used in redefining ourselves and
devising realistic scenarios for altering the present and constructing the
future.26
White feminist critical attention to race (both in terms of self and other) is then long
overdue.
To recommend the study of white-authored feminist criticism is not either to
suppose that whiteness and white writing has an essence which is to be finally
understood through close examination. One of the problems of theorising whiteness
is its elusiveness: discussions about white racial identity are renowned for their
ability to slip into discussions about gender, class, culture .27 This has lead some
critics in the direction of a deconstructive approach_28Whereas a deconstructive take
on race, with its emphasis on its ideological constructedness, is helpful in dislodging
biological, essentialist racist discourses.i" in the case of thinking about whiteness,
caution needs to be exercised. The deconstruction of race from the point of view of
whiteness makes whiteness disappear, immaterial. Such a position colludes with the
ideologically dominant notion of whiteness as nothing; the race conversation is
rendered more comfortable for the white critic. Given this, I would argue that
whiteness constitutes 'something else you have to figure in before you can figure it
out'?OAs Ruth Frankenberg puts it ... it may be more difficult for white people to
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say 'Whiteness has nothing to do with me - I'm not white' than to say 'Race has
-30Q,.
nothing to do with me I'm not racist.' White people are too unused to thinking about
their own whiteness to risk dispensing with it in a flourish of poststructuralist logic.
The Benefits of Crisis
None of this is to suggest an already delineated project; a fully determined set of
tasks. Nor is it to suggest a form of critical intervention founded in the ambition of
faultlessness. In examining a range of white feminist reading strategies in no way do
I intend to imply a model of hyper-correction, or final position of 'getting it right'.
The issue that I keep returning to throughout this study is the impossibility, indeed
undesirability, of an automatic or assured anti-imperialist, ~ti-racist theory or
method. One of the problems I identify in white feminist discourse on the subject of
race is the tendency to seek out innocent spaces, uncompromised ground upon which
to situate discussion. In chapter 1 I draw out some of the implications of what I
identify as a dream of the end of reading that haunts white feminist thinking'", The
purging of white critical methodology for traces of racism/ethnocentrism is to
attempt to reinstate innocent ground, to hope to achieve a position where reading is
no longer necessary, where the 'true-text' speaks for itself. The pursuit of this safe
territory, I argue, paradoxically introduces regressive effects into the criticism.
The search for an anti-imperialist reading position also runs the risk of
constituting what Spivak has termed a 'too-quick answer:32 In the place of a
continued commitment to race work in criticism the anti-racist theory represents an
attempt to dispense with what is construed as the 'problem' of race. In direct
opposition to this Spivak recommends that the so-called problem not be 'solved' too
quickly (the solution would be, in any case, illusory) but rather 'kept alive' (p.239)
Indeed the constitution of the 'black' text as a reading problem for the white feminist
critic, whose task it was to find a theory to surmount the perceived racial barrier, is
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itself a problem. Ann Russo details the difficulties that ensued when in her rape crisis
training black women were added on as special cases 'The result was that potential
women-of-color callers were made doubly other and considered 'problems' in terms
of how we white women would approach them,33 The ethnocentrism that inheres
with the construal of 'race' as a barrier to (white) understanding remains
unchallenged. Given the tendency for slippage in white-led discussions on race-
related issues the challenge of keeping them alive should not be underestimated. This
is not to authorise an anti-theory position nor to recommend critical promiscuity, a
thoughtless eclecticism. Instead it is to acknowledge a degree of openness in
theoretical race work. Pierre Bourdieu refers to Wittgenstein's criticism of concepts
that are 'too well-constructed':
Concepts can - and, to some extent, must - remain open and provisional,
which doesn't mean vague, approximate or confused: any real thinking about
scientific practice attests that this openness of concepts, which gives them
their 'suggestive' character, and thus their capacity to produce scientific
effects (by showing things that have never been seen before, by suggesting
research that needs to be done, and not just commentaries), is the essence of
any scientific thought in statu nascendi, in opposition to that completed
science that provides mental pabulum for methodologists and all those who
invent, once the dust of battle has settled, rules and methods that are more
harmful than useful.34
Overly wrought concepts and theories can promote closure, doubt and even crisis.on
the other hand.can break up what can operate as an 'intellectual holding company' (p.
37) Other critics have emphasised the productive nature of theoretical insecurity.
Peggy Phelan, for example, stresses the 'generative powers of doubt and uncertainty'
whereas Paul Gilroy sees 'crisis as a combination of danger and opportunity'. 35 In
light of the propensity for white feminist critics to seek out the too-quick answer this
project stakes its commitment in an attempt to keep the race question alive in
feminist criticism. In examining theories and strategies of reading black women's
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writing I single out those places in the criticism that pose themselves as solutions. If
this study reads as more than a little frustrating, with its persistent undermining of
white feminist readings, this is a deliberate effort to undermine any recourse to
transcendental solutions. I repeat my contention that there is no automatic or assured
anti-racist theory or stance to be had in relation to the 'race-different' text. My self-
assigned task then is more one of drawing attention to, even exacerbating, the crisis
of authority in white feminist criticism than of offering solutions. In doing so my
purpose is not to find fault in each approach in order to produce a list of pros and
cons, a balance sheet or final adjudication but rather to trace through what Trinh
Minh-ha refers to as lines of evasion~6I hope thereby to drive a wedge into the race
question in white feminist thinking thus ensuring its continued consideration.
With this I am by no means exempt from the criticisms I make of others. This
study is as marked by the symptoms of crisis as the texts I expose to scrutiny. In her
essay 'Notes Toward a Politics of Location' Adrienne Rich allegorises her struggle
for critical accountability in terms of a bee 'stunning itself against windowpanes and
sills'
It is looking for what it needs, just as I am, and like me, it has gotten trapped
in a place where it cannot fulfil its own life . . . . And I, too have been
bumping my way against glassy panes, falling half-stunned, gathering myself
up and crawling, then again taking off, searching'j"
Likewise, this study is marked by its own glass partitions: refusals, repetitions, and
errors of thinking. The crisis of white feminist authority that I have identified in these
pages is one that marks my own critical intervention. There are times when the
repetition of the error diagnosed has been unavoidable. To admit this is less to
confess it in advance than to attempt to mark the limits of my thinking at this time.
While this is no cause for celebration (an excuse for studied ignorance) I am in
agreement with Spivak that one of the crucial tasks for the First World or hegemonic
critic is to confront the limits of her knowledge. What follows shares in the crisis as
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much as it attempts to describe it and thereby marks one beginning in the project of
unlearning one's privilege as one's loss. 38 To paraphrase Adrienne Rich
white-authored feminist criticism has got itself trapped in a place where it cannot
fulfil its own life. While the way out may not yet be evident to stay still is not an
option.
I have organised my discussions as follows. In chapter 1 I examine what has
been termed the Rodney King events, and the ways in which they connect up with
issues in feminist criticism. In particular, I highlight the violent potential of white
interpretation, in addition to discussing a recurrent distinction that is offered by many
white feminist critics in their work on race-different texts between reading and
seeing. I argue that this distinction operates not only to foreclose discussion around
race for white critics but also that the ambition expressed by many theorists, to see
texts by black women writers, for example, as they really are, rather than reading and
hence, so the argument runs, distorting them, functions, albeit unwittingly, to
introduce a series of oppressive effects, into their work. However, I am equally
critical of solving this problem through the simple assertion that there are only
readings. In particular, I question Judith Butler's notion of 'aggressive reading' as a
means of countering the jury's verdict at Simi Valley.
Regarding the question 'Should White feminists teach/theorise black
women's writing?', I explore the implications of answering in the negative in chapter
2. Consequently, I examine the proposal that to use Spivak's formulation, 'only the
native can know the scene' in critical and pedagogical terms. I conclude by
challenging the anti-imperialist ambition of this strategy through a discussion of the
nature of cultural authority.
Chapter 3 examines the limits of readerly identification. I argue that the
creation of universal ground on the part of the white feminist/woman reader as a
basis for reading the race-different text acts to construct that text according to white
preoccupations. So that what is produced is less an affirmation of universal
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sisterhood or womanhood than a projection of white desire. My discussion is
structured around the notably difficult subject of female genital mutilation, taking
Mary Daly's Gynecology and Alice Walker's Warrior Marks as examples of
identificatory reading practices.
Chapter 4 takes up the use of theory as a displaced form of textual
identification. Through readings of Toni Morrison's novels I question the simple
application of a theory to a text emphasising the costs of particular framings of the
author's work. Following this I argue that the tensions in the criticism I examine
between the literary and the social, history and the imagination, the semiotic and the
material, for example, constitute an important theme in Morrison's work. I then offer
the figure of the witness as an alternative means of reading.
Chapter 5 challenges the idea that a text's context is readily determinable.
Appeals to context are often used as a means of solving the question of appropriation.
White feminists are implored to respect the context of race-different texts, to take
account of their locations, of where they are coming from. The abiding image is of a
text placed in its correct container or shell, so to reveal its true significance. The
problem with such appeals to context is that questions of representation are jettisoned
in favour of solving what the text is supposed to mean. The question, for example, of
the textuality of the context is glossed over. One of the effects of this
conceptualisation is that it dispenses with the need for further reading, once the text
is put in its proper, original, place any further examination is redundant.
Chapter 6 explores the critical stance of self-reflexivity. In some ways the
gesture of self-reflexivity is an extreme form of contextualisation, in that what is
placed in the interpretative picture is the scene of critical production itself. What is
sought in this mode of criticism is a fuller representation of where the various
meanings attributed to a given text come from. Following the assumption that to be a
white reader is to read from a particular (Le. race-dominant) position attempts are
then made to declare this by way of pushing against or neutralising this dominance.
Various claims are made for self-reflexivity as a means of decolonising the text, my
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point is to emphasise the potentially problematic nature of this enterprise when the
reader is white and the text black or 'raced'.
I conclude by examining the proposal of 'non-innocent' criticism as
articulated by Jane Flax and Donna Haraway.39 While I accept the arguments for the
abandonment of the pursuit of innocent ground in feminist criticism I argue critical
or theoretical innocence, like seeing or essentialism, cannot be dispensed with,
banished, outlawed, through pronouncement or decree. To privilege politics, as is the
case in Jane Flax's essay, is not to automatically counter claims of innocence. Non-
innocence or politics or reading needs constantly to be re-asserted, not merely
declared.
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Chapter 1. Reading and Seeing:Truth, Violence and Rodney King
I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the North, to find persons
who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their
contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake.
Slaves sing most when they are unhappy. I
(Frederick Douglass)
Most white people misread black literature, if they read it at an?
(Catherine Stimpson)
In 1992 a group of twelve people; ten white, one Asian, one Hispanic, viewed
eighty-one seconds of videotape showing a young black man being beaten by a group
of armed, white police. On the night of March 3rd 1991 Rodney King drove through
a set of red lights, broke the speed limit and almost lost his life. King, to borrow
Houston Baker's words, 'suffered the complete weight of the law' which left him
'with a split inner lip, a partially paralyzed face, nine skull fractures, a broken cheek
bone, a shattered eye socket, and a broken leg.,3 One officer was reported to have
administered forty-five separate blows, another to have stepped on King's neck so as
to ensure he remained 'in compliance mode'." Four of the officers on duty that night
stood trial as a result of their actions. And yet, despite what seemed to be clear
evidence of police brutality, the jury found in favour ofthe Los Angeles Police
Department. In a reversal of the testimony seemingly offered by the tape and King's
injuries, the perceived threat on the part of the jury was not the helmeted, upright
baton-wielding members of the LAPD but the unarmed, prostrated, struggling man
on the ground. Rodney King was, as one juror put it, in 'total control' of the
• • 5situation,
Not everyone who saw the tape drew the same conclusions. Both within and
beyond the United States there was widespread, cross-racial, outrage over the verdict.
For those who failed to share the jury's view it was hard to see how, exactly, they
managed to read the videotape evidence in the way they did. After all, wasn't it
obvious what was happening? A black man is being beaten by white police. How
could the man on the ground be seen as being in control; 'choosing' the moment he
'wanted' to be handcuffed, 'directing all the action'?"
In her essay on the Rodney King events, Judith Butler refers to the judgment
as a 'feat of interpretation,' (p. 15) a phrase which suggests a certain perversity of
vision, a willed blindness toward a more reasonable or even obvious arrangement of
meanings. However, even as she uses this phrase, and even as she can write 'without
hesitation ... 'the video shows a man being brutally beaten' ...' (p. 16) Butler's essay
is one among many, in the academic collection published as a response to the King
events, to question the pursuit of the 'real' as a means of countering the jury's
decision. Put differently, in raising questions as to how the jury was able to see (in
that their reading presented itself as a seeing) a threat in a man surrounded by baton-
wielding police, how such an interpretation was made possible, the degree to which
alternative seeings are effective in dislodging the logic of the verdict (a reading
passed off as a seeing now sanctified as the version of events) is itself questioned.
White feminist interpretation
This issue of reading and violence, of radical misreading, finds echoes,
perhaps unexpectedly, in debates over white feminist interpretation. Just as many saw
the verdict at Simi Valley as a further act of violence towards Rodney King and by
extension LA's African-American community, white feminists have become
concerned with the potential for violence within their own acts of interpretation.
Catherine Belsey, for example, explains her decision not to include Toni Morrison in
her study, Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture as coming out of concern about
critical appropriation: 'I have a fear of appearing to colonise her work, or at least of
seeming to pre-empt the work of African-American critics" While some critics
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invest in the idea of a positive outcome, the consideration of which forms the basis of
this project, others are considerably less certain. Nicole Ward Jouve, for instance, in
the preface to her book White Woman Speaks With Forked Tongue, states:
Perhaps every white person should affix an authorial health warning to their
texts. Something like 'white woman speaks with forked tongue'. It's not
because you are aware of a danger, nor because you mean well that your
words or actions do no harm. Hell is paved, etc. Writing is never innocent.
White writing is less innocent than any other. As Gayatri Spivak has said,
every First World woman's book is typed out on a word processor made
cheap by the low-paid labour of a Third World woman. Natalie Sarraute used
to say that the novel was in an 'era of suspicion'. Today, the politics of white
interpretation is in an era of far worse suspicion/'
Following Ward Jouve, there are those who argue that a 'non-appropriative' relation
is impossible, and that given this it might be better to say nothing.I Other feminist
critics, however, although similarly suspicious of the latent violence of white
interpretation, have sought alternative ways out of the exclusion/appropriation
dichotomy. Proceeding from the same premise of white critical vision as distorted
vision, however, the solution to the problem of appropriative reading, for a number
of critics, is seen to lie in getting, somehow, to an uninterrupted view of the text. As
with the case of Rodney King, where the belief that the evidence speaks for itself is
difficult to resist, the critical goal for the white feminist critic, apprehensive of the
distorting effects of her interpretive power, becomes one of seeing the race-different
text as it really is. A distinction is thereby set up between reading and seeing where
reading signifies alongside distortion, appropriation, and white, and seeing lines up
with truth, non-appropriation, and black. The problem becomes one of reading at all,
then, in that reading is appropriation in these terms: white interpretation of the black
(authentic and true) text, for instance, is essentially driven by colonialist impulses.
To dispense with reading in favour of a more accurate seeing is not to
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dispense with the difficulties associated with exclusion/appropriation problematic,
however. In the same way that critics believe grounding discussion of Rodney King's
assault in notions of the obvious to be a mistake I, too, hold the pursuit of the true
'raced' text to be an error. This is not to say, simply, that critics who formulate the
question of racial difference in their criticism in this way are wrong, but rather that
the wish for an uninterrupted view of Toni Morrison's Beloved, or Meera Syal's
Anita and Me, or Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club, can serve to introduce a set of
unwanted effects into the criticism, so undermining its anti-imperialist ambition.
Before turning to some examples of such effects it would be helpful to pause here to
consider the perils of pure vision in relation to the King events.
'Look a Negro!'
To reiterate, on seeing the visual evidence of the violence against Rodney
King (the tape and his physical injuries), it is hard not to resist the idea that somehow
it speaks for itself, and that a sinister manipulation or twisting of the 'evidence' has
occurred in order to produce the jury's verdict. Similarly, Judith Butler's description
of the verdict as a 'feat of interpretation' (p. 15, my emphasis) suggests
interpretations of the event that are more obvious, less wrought. And yet, at the same
time, Butler and others, in drawing attention to the ways in which the video evidence
was interpreted by the defence, offer compelling arguments as to why any appeal to
pure seeing, to the idea that the videotape constitutes a transparent record of a black
man being beaten or that his body constitutes pure testimony of police violence, is of
limited use in resisting the predominantly white jury's interpretation. In Butler's
words:
It may appear at first that over and against this heinous failure to see police
brutality, it is necessary to restore the visible as the sure ground of evidence. But
what the trial and its horrific conclusions teach us is that there is no simple recourse
to the visible, to visual evidence, that it still and always calls to be read, that it is
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already a reading, and that in order to establish the injury on the basis of the visual
evidence, an aggressive reading of the evidence is necessary. (p. 17)
In addition to arguing that every 'seeing' is in fact always a reading, which admits to
the possibility of other readings, other orderings or interpretations of what passes as
'the real', Butler's suspicion of the visual as a foundation for knowledge is equally
attributable to her assertion that 'The visual field is not neutral to the question of
race; it is itself a racial formation, an episteme, hegemonic and forceful.' (p. 17).
Indeed, for Butler, the very fact of the verdict is itself proof of the 'racially saturated'
(p. 15) nature of what we, culturally speaking, claim to see: that it was possible for a
jury to watch the amateur footage and see the police benignly carrying out their duty
can only be the result of the victory of a prevailing racist ideology masquerading as
'common sense', a notion of pure vision, of a reading disguised as a seeing. As
many commentators have pointed out, the defence attorneys were able to make use of
what Butler terms 'a white racist episteme' (p. 22) in order to read the video evidence
in a way that supported their claims. Apart from reproducing the tape as a series of
frozen images, each interpreted singly by experts on prisoner restraint in terms of a
'technical discourse of institutional security+'" which sought to ascertain whether, at
this point, the assailant was in 'compliance mode' (the evidence of King's arm
raised, to some viewers, in defence offering proof that he was not, that he still had
'access to his hands, access to his legs' and a 'visual sight of where the officers
were'<'), the defence drew upon a racist organisation of meaning that renders the
black body as the site of immanent threat. As Butler points out, a passage from
Frantz Fanon's Black Skin; White Masks is explicit in showing the significance of
this ideology, and is therefore worth repeating here:
In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development
of his bodily schema... Below the corporal schema I had sketched [there is] a
historico-racial schema. The elements I had used had been provided for me ..
. by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details,
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anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a
physiological self to balance space, to localize sensations, and here I was
called on for more.
'Look a Negro!' It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed
by. I made a tight smile.
'Look a Negro!' Itwas true. It amused me.
'Look a Negro!' the circle was drawing a bit tighter.
I made no secret of my amusement.
'Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!' Frightened!'
Frightened! Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind
to laugh myself to tears but tears had become impossible.V
For Butler this passage offers ' ...a description of how the black male body is
constituted through fear, and through a naming and a seeing...' (p. 18) What is of
particular significance is the way in which Fanon puts on display the paranoid
structure of the white racist gaze. 'Look a Negro!'; the protagonist is at once named
and contained through a visual reference. Its repetition, signal of the failure of the
racial designation to contain its, from the perspective of the white onlooker, potential,
indeed immanent, threat, gives way to the admission 'I'm frightened': the sense of
threat toward the protagonist becomes transferred /displaced onto the white looker
himself. This recalls a scene from Toni Morrison's Beloved where this structure is
c
even more explicitly drawn.
Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners, under every dark skin was a
jungle. Swift unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping
snakes, red gums ready for their sweet white blood...The more colored people
spent their strength trying to convince them how gentle they were, how clever
and loving, how human, the more they used themselves up to persuade whites
of something Negroes believed could not be questioned, the deeper and more
tangled the jungle grew inside. But it wasn't the jungle blacks brought with
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them to this place from the other (livable) place. It was the jungle whitefolks
planted in them. And it grew. It spread. In, through and after life, it spread,
until it invaded the whites who had made it. Touched them everyone.
Changed and altered them. Made them bloody, silly, worse than even they
wanted to be, so scared were they of the jungle they had made. The screaming
baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums were their own.13
Here, Morrison articulates the intensely circular nature of white racist fear: the way
in which white fear produces, through externalising itself as its own object, a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The 'jungle' of 'whitefolk's' minds is projected out and made
manifest in the external world through an act of reading where the actions of 'colored
people' are constructed, read solely as confirmation of those original fears.To Butler,
this notion of the paranoid structure of whiteness goes at least some of the way to
explain the verdict. Given that the threat was perceived as King's very body ( in
racist terms signifying chaos, disorder etc. ) the 'thin blue line' of the LAPD can be
seen to be doing their duty in offering the white community protection against the
apocalyptic potential his body represents. Some witnesses testify that King leapt out
of his car laughing and dancing, 'grabbing his behind'", an act that, to the racist
viewer, represents a glimpse of that disorder, that chaos, that disrespect for white
values, a glimpse of the 'screaming baboon', the 'red gums' of their own fear. Butler
explains thus:
[King's] body thus received those blows in return for those it was about to
deliver, the blows which were that body in its essential gestures, even as the
one gesture that body can be seen to make is to raise its palm outward to stave
off the blows against it. According to this racist episteme, he is hit in
exchange for the blows he never delivered, but which he is, by virtue of his
blackness, always about to deliver. (p. 19)
Indeed, the terms used by members of the LAPD in the witness stand are revealing in
themselves. King's body was described in terms of weaponry; his leg 'cocked', his
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arm held in 'trigger position', whereas description of the police action was conducted
in a highly euphemised discourse; blows became the 'application' of 'departmentally
approved' baton 'power strikes' for example. IS According to this logic King ceases to
be an individual caught violating traffic regulations and becomes instead a loaded
gun, a violent event waiting to happen, a perception that the violence of the
aftermath of the verdict was read to confirm. The prophecy of black disorder was
fulfilled by the street violence that ensued in response to the outcome of the trial. To
paraphrase Butler, the paranoid vision of the white racist episteme reaches full circle.
The Racist Structure of Seeing
That such a racist organisation of meanings (made in the name of seeing) is
possible is reason enough for Butler to distrust any appeal to pure vision. What is
obvious for white people is not to be relied upon. The hegemony of a white racist
episteme is such that to join in the squabble over who saw what is to compete on
unsafe ground, to enter treacherous terrain. The complicity between white racism and
visibility is total.
For when the visual is fully schematised by racism, the visual evidence to
which one refers will always and only refute the conclusions based upon it;
for it is possible within this racist episteme that no black person can seek
recourse to the visible as the sure ground of evidence. (p. 17)
The history where seeing secures racial knowing is long and pernicious. From
eighteenth century attempts to construct a 'geometry of beauty' '": a highly racialised
enterprise which was based upon lines drawn from nose to ear and upper lip to
forehead, the angle between which constituted a position along what became termed
afacial index running from (black) prognathism to the (white) ideal represented by
Greek statues, to more recently circulated ideas of racial distinction determining
physical or mental aptitude the contract between racial knowedge and vision has been
assured.
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Such manifest distrust of the visual can also be found elsewhere. In her
discussion of the work of performance artist Adrian Piper, Peggy Phelan outlines the
unreliable nature of the visible as a basis for knowledge. As a light-skinned African
American Piper is often mistakenly identified as white. One of Piper's
'performances' involves her handing out business cards to perpetrators of racist
comments addressed toward her. On these cards is inscribed the following message:
Dear Friend:
I am black.
I am sure that you did not realize this when you made/laughed at/agreed with
that racist remark. In the past, I have attempted to alert white people to my racial
identity in advance. Unfortunately, this invariably causes them to react to me as
pushy, manipulative, or socially inappropriate. Therefore, my policy is to assume that
white people do not make these remarks, even when they believe there are no black
people present, and to distribute this card when they do.
I regret any discomfort my presence is causing you, just as I am sure you
regret the discomfort your racism is causing me.
Sincerely Yours,
Adrian Margaret Smith Piper.17
In this performance, Phelan argues, Piper makes explicit the complicity between
visibility and assumptions about race: the common sense idea that race categories
and visual markers such as skin colour should and do line up neatly together. With
its statement 'I am black', when held alongside the 'visual evidence' of its presenters
seemingly white skin, the card explodes the idea of the 'raced' body as transparently
significant, as artlessly holding itself up for scrutiny by whites. In contradistinction
to Fanon, here the look and its presumed knowledge and the racial designation do not
match up. British/Guyanese writer Pauline Melville similarly confounds the notion of
race as immediately readable, or rather as visible, in her essay 'Beyond the Pale,18.
Also light-skinned, Melville 'causes confusion' (p. 740):
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England. Over-eager hostess at dinner:
'Did you know Pauline was black?'
Bewildered silence. Forks poised halfway to mouths. People politely
swallowing the evidence of their own eyes. Explanations. Sometimes they don't
believe me. What am I supposed to do - wear the baptism certificate pinned to my
lapel?19 (My emphasis, p. 740)
As with Piper's calling-card, the visual evidence of Melville's skin colour jars
against that of the statement pertaining to her blackness. And as with the card the
visibility that secures racial knowledge is confounded. Having said that however
there are distinctions to be drawn between the two texts or rather Phelan's reading of
Piper and my reading of Melville.
Describing herself as 'the whitey in the woodpile' (p. 740) Melville depicts
her racial heritage as multiple and various: Anglo-Saxon, on the side of her mother,
African, Amerindian and European on that of her father. Within this confusion over
racial origins and categories, this blurring of supposedly clear boundaries, however,
the intractability of race classification is sometimes stressed and not, as in Phelan's
reading, solely undermined. Having drawn attention to the implications of being 'the
joker in the pack, able to turn up as any card'(p. 741), Melville details the case of a
woman in Louisiana who, 'claim[ing] to be one-sixty-fourth part black', applied to
change her racial status to Caucasian. Her application was rejected. As a response
Melville considers the scenario of 'a visibly black woman replacing myself: 'Did you
know that Charlene was white?' Put differently, the fact of racial markers such as
skin colour refusing to line up with their appropriate designations, white skin =
Caucasian, for instance, is not enough to explode either white power to enforce the
ranking of differences or indeed the will to categorise itself. The securing of racial
differences has long depended upon apparatus, tools, discourses other than skin
colour. Richard Dyer points out in his study of the self-representation of whites in
Western culture that facial features such as 'the shape of nose, eyes and lips, the
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colour and set of hair, even body shape may all be mobilised to determine someone's
'colour,,20 With this it can be noted that both Jewish and Irish people have found
themselves classified as black at various points in the last two hundred years'". And
while these distinctions are still founded upon the idea of visible difference this is not
to say that white supremacy can be explained solely in terms of a pre-occupation with
the visible. Within Phelan's reading there is an over-investment in the political
potential of disrupting the contract between race and the visible . Whereas Phelan
interprets Piper's performance as dramatising the 'failure of the visible to represent
race'(p. 98), and its politics residing therein, Melville's essay points up this failure
('White present, black past, a good position for breaking down preconceptions,
stirring up doubt, rattling judgements, shifting boundaries and unfixing fixities', p.
740) in addition to highlighting other resources used to secure racial difference. The
failure of the visual field to secure 'race' leaves Phelan wondering: 'If racial
difference is not registered visibly, where is it located? Is it a free-floating signifier?
How can one secure it?' (p. 98). These questions remain unanswered in the text. With
this is the implication that the undermining of the visual field is radical per se. This
over-investment in disrupting the visual minimises the complexity of Western racial
discourse(s), and as such over-simplifies the project of any race politics. On the other
hand, Melville indicates, albeit fleetingly, not only the history of human racial
taxonomy but also its reliance upon discourses and tools other than 'sight'. Her great-
great grandmother's baptism certificate, the implication of the persistence of 'one-
drop rule,22 in the case of the Louisiana woman, offer examples of the various
mechanisms of racial oppression that have endured.
Having undermined the idea that 'race is what you look like' (p.740) Melville
still faces the geneticist and cultural constructions of racial difference. Marek Kohn
stresses the surpassing of the expert gaze by genetic science as a means of
'classifying the varieties of man':
External appearances are regarded as an illusion; true wisdom lies in seeing
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beyond them, and beyond the superficial markers of race, to the genetic essence. (p.
47)
Disdaining the visual, genetics are in no way innocent for this. As Melville states the
focus on DNA has multiple associations with 'the most pernicious of racists,
imperialists and nose-measurers whose power rested on such graded distinctions' (p.
740). Kohn, too, is suspicious of the possibility for a benign knowledge based on
genetic evidence. Discussing the Human Genome Project along with its partner study
the Human Genome Diversity Project, an ambitious study which is attempting to map
global genetic diversity, Kohn concludes:
... it may not be long before many of the examples become museum objects
like th~nt skulls in the race galleries; the last traces of extinct peoples,
- )
preservedand organised so as to maintain their scientific utility. (p. 21)
And while Melville finds solace in the idea of cultural difference as a more fluid
place for thinking racial difference, that it allows for a degree of self-determination
'we are more empowered to define ourselves' in that 'appearance matters less', the
presence of 'the real world' nevertheless weighs heavy upon this capacity for self-
determination: 'bureaucrats, civil-servants and form-fillers might choose to define us
differently' (p. 741) All of which is to say that there are limits to which the
highlighting of the disjuncture between racial signifier and signified disrupts the field
of racial distinction. Confounding the visual equation of race and skin colour by no
means exhausts the resources of a white supremacist view.
The 'Negro Exhibit'
The idea of the 'raced' body as silently significant is taken up by Houston
Baker in his essay on Rodney King. Troubled by the fact of King's silence
throughout the events of the trial and the resulting rebellion (the few words he uttered
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in the wake of the riots were supplied by King's lawyer and therefore, to Baker, are
mere ventriloquism) he argues, through reference to Frederick Douglass' 1845
Narrative, that King was effectively denied his own interpretive power. And like the
figure Demby in Douglass' account, King and (by extension) America's black
population are 'scened and not heard' in the present day U.S. Denied a proper
hearing, Baker links the display, the silent testimony, of King's injuries to the anti-
abolitionist use of the black body to testify to the evil of slavery .
. . . the fugitive becomes the 'Negro exhibit.' She silently turns her back to
the audience in order to display the stripes inflicted by the overseer's whip.
Black's in white-abolitionist employ were required always to earn the right -
by silent display - to tell their stories. (p. 41)
The idea that King's injuries speak for themselves, then, inadvertently intersects with
an old cultural script in which the power of interpretation, of signification pertains
solely to whites and the inert matter of signification to blacks. Hortense Spillers
spells out the utility of this arrangement for those involved in the slave trade.
Considered in law as 'real estate', chattels, property, the slave 'is perceived as the
essence of stillness ... an undynamic human state, fixed in time and space' _:J.3
However, as the law attempted to record or describe the order of things it functioned,
simultaneously, as a mechanism for the transformation of 'personality into
property.'(p. 78) This situation, the inscription of slaves in law as fixed and
immobile, although not totalising'", produces a state of affairs where blackness is
deemed to be frozen, essential, outside of the (human) realm of signification which in
turn eases the traffic in human beings. Spillers also points up the persistence of this
discursive arrangement in the notion of 'ethnicity' as it appears in Daniel
Moynihan's notorious 1965 Report: 'The Negro Family: The Case For National
Action,26.
'Ethnicity' in this case freezes in meaning, takes on constancy, assumes the
look and the effects of the Eternal. We could say, then, that in its powerful
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stillness, 'ethnicity', from the point of view of the' Report', embodies nothing
more than a mode of memorial time, as Roland Barthes outlines the dynamics
of myth. As a signifier that has no movement in the field of signification, the
use of 'ethnicity' for the living becomes purely appreciative, although it
would be unwise not to concede its dangerous and fatal effects. (p. 66)
This sense of the black body as transparent text, static matter, that does not
require reading in that its meaning is immediate, can be contrasted with a scene from
Morrison's Beloved, where Paul D reads the testimony of Sethe's scars:
Behind her, bending down, his body an arc of kindness, he held her breasts in
the palm of his hands. He rubbed his cheek on her back and learned that way
her sorrow, the roots of it; its wide trunk and intricate branches. Raising his
fingers to the hooks of her dress, he knew without seeing them or hearing any
sigh that tears were coming fast. And when the top of her dress was around
her hips and he saw the sculpture her back had become, like the decorative
work of an ironsmith too passionate for display, he could think but not say,
'Aw, Lord, girl.' And he would tolerate no peace until he had touched every
ridge and leaf of it with his mouth, none of which Sethe could feel because
her back skin had been dead for years. (p. 17-18)
Reading Sethe's traumatised flesh, 'ridge and leaf, Paul D 'feels the pain her back
ought to' (p.18). A scene which in turn can be contrasted in the novel with that of
Schoolteacher and his nephews recording Sethe's 'animal characteristics'.
Race and Feminist Criticism: Reading in Truth
For white feminist critics who seek to establish a non-appropriative basis for
reading the work of black/race-different writers, the idea of gaining a clear view of
the text is far from uncomplicated territory. Many critics, in addressing their own
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'critical twistings,,27 opt for a manner of interpretation that intends to expose the
truth of the texts they read, that has as its goal seeing the text as it really is. An
opposition is set up between (white) distortion on the one hand, and (black) fact on
the other. Despite the best of such critic's intentions, my belief is that thinking along
these lines constitutes a trap. In appealing to the idea of a final, true-text which lies
obscured, even unseen, by the white reader until she obtains the right, 'politically
corrective' lenses, white feminists introduce a senes of politically
regressive/undermining effects into their critical work. I wish now to tum to the
consideration of two white feminist essays which deal specifically with the relation
of white reader/black text by way of surveying this ground: Catherine Stimpson's
'Black CulturelWhite Teacher' and Minrose Gwin's 'A Theory of Black Women's
Texts and White Women's Readings, or ... The Necessity of Being Other,28
Beginning with the statement 'Most white people misread black literature, if
they read it at all' (p. 1) Catherine Stimpson's essay 'Black Culture/White Teacher'
presents a catalogue of white critical offences against black writing. Briefly, 'the
white ego insists upon control'; white readers 'use' black writing to 'satisfy their
needs and notions'; they use it 'politically ... to earn credit from a would-be
revolutionary future', emotionally 'for kicks, for a primitive energy lost or missing
from their own lives' and finally for 'intellectual capital', to 'dig out information
about an alien culture' (p. 1). Put differently, white ignorance of black linguistic
traditions, African-American history, 'the idiosyncrasies, the idioms, the intricacy,
and the integrity of black experience' (p. 2) produces a series of 'critical twistings'
(p. 1) which pass for literary criticism. Depressing as this may sound, Stimpson does
offer a way out for the white critic. In addition to taking a back seat, so to speak, by
acting as a supporter of autonomous black critical endeavour: reading black
literature; working 'to put black writers on reading lists and in libraries'; supporting
'magazines, publishing houses, and theaters which blacks control' (p. 7). It is
recommended that 'The best questions for white readers to ask themselves about
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black literature are those of fact' (p. 6). If whites are guilty of producing 'critical
twistings' they can at least aspire to reading more accurately.
Minrose Gwin's 'A Theory of Black Women's Texts .. .' proceeds along
similar lines through her examination of the trope of white women as breakers of
promises in black women's texts. And like Stimpson the critical goal is one of
fighting through all of the distortions wrought by 'race' to arrive at a clearer view:
I want to be able to really hear black women and to hear black women I must
confront, and read, my otherness in their texts, however painful that may be.
For, if! am ever able to become other to my own otherness in black women's
texts, I must first be able to read that otherness truly. (p. 23)
Both critics offer a construction of the scene of reading where the white reader/critic,
by virtue of her whiteness, is cut off from the real significance of the black text. For
Stimpson, this significance is reachable in two ways. First, through accepting 'black
authority of interpretation' (ibid), and second, by confining critical comments, if they
are made at all, to the realm of the informal and the personal (ibid). The white reader
must aspire to the achievement of tentative description if she is to overcome the
critical obstruction of her whiteness. For Gwin the obstacle of whiteness is something
to be confronted by the feminist critic. Only by working through the oppressive
significance of whiteness can the critic succeed in granting the black woman's
text/voice a proper hearing. As I take up the particularities of each argument further
on in this project (Stimpson in chapter 2, Gwin in chapter 6) I wil1limit myself here
.
to commenting on their shared ambition of arriving at the black text's true meaning.
In suggesting that white critics confine themselves to matters of fact when
reading writings by race-different women, Stimpson's argument does not consider
the complicity between appeals to fact and the achievement of dominance. As
numerous critics have argued, in the last two hundred years, to say the least, many
highly specific political, economic, cultural interests and investments have been
swept under the rug of fact. Discursive 'transparency' has served to disguise what are
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entirely interested motivations. Pierre Bourdieu puts it succinctly:
... dominant individuals, in the absence of being able to restore the silence of
the doxa, strive to produce, through a purely reactionary discourse, a
substitute for everything that is threatened by the very existence of heretical
discourse. Finding nothing for which to reproach the social world as it stands,
they endeavour to impose universally, through a discourse permeated by the
simplicity and transparency of common sense, the feeling of obviousness and
necessity which this world imposes on them; having an interest in leaving
things as they are, they attempt to undermine politics in a depoliticized
political discourse, produced through a process of neutralization or, even
better, of negation, which seeks to restore the doxa to its natural state of
innocence and which being oriented toward the naturalization of the social
order, always borrows the language of nature.r''
So, in terms of Stimpson and Gwin's ambition to establish fact as the positive
grounds of a non-dominant reading relation, the collusion of transparency, neutrality,
obviousness, innocence, with disguised interest and dominance is highly disruptive
of their political intentions. In accord with Bourdieu's formulation, facts are intensely
political entities which simply disguise or rather repress the always political interest
at the heart of their production. The illusion of transparency serves to secure
discursive authority: acts of description, as with statements of fact, exert an
authoritative effect in that they aspire to show the world as it is.
Having prescribed a secondary, supportive and (by implication), de-
authorised role for the white critic, who is to speak personally and informally with
respect to black literature, Stimpson goes on to make a number of
descriptive/authoritative statements. For instance: 'Nearly all black literature
emanates an unusual energy.' (p. 8) 'Notions of identity are particularly complex in
black literature' (ibid); 'Black poetry offers complex drama, and intricate new
rhythms, syntax and diction.' (p. 9). This is not to say, merely, that Stimpson
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contradicts herself, but more that the very existence of the contradiction raises a
number of epistemological issues that are difficult to resolve. Not only do the
discursive registers of the personal and the informal remain wholly undetermined
(what is it to speak personally and informally about black writing for the white critic,
what is sayable in personal and informal terms?), but also the critical aim of tentative
description emerges as unrealisable within the terms of Stimpson's epistemological
frame.
The strategy of white reader/critics relinquishing their own authority by
confining themselves to statements of fact and description, however tentative,
therefore, cannot succeed in the manner which Stimpson intends. If authority and
transparency are mutually reinforcing, white 'descriptions' of black texts can never
achieve the innocence to which they aspire. The discursive authority bound up with
the notion of description allows that authority to reassert itself unhindered.
Indeed, some of the descriptions offered by Stimpson of black literature and
its concerns can be construed as feeding directly into reactionary racial discourses:
Flexible yet structured, like a blues performance, black literature
organises human experience for the sake of experience, vitality and
consolation. It reflects a sense of ritual which is both sacred, for addressing
the gods, and profane, for addressing the people. In contrast the official rituals
of white America seem metallic. Either they celebrate death (the medal
ceremonies in the Rose Garden) or technology (the rocket launchings). (p 10)
The opposition between, on the one hand, a vital, life-affirming, sensual black
literature and an alienated, morbid, life-denying white literature on the other is a
construction that inheres in many white feminist 'descriptions' of black women's
writing. Susan Willis has been criticised on the grounds of her idealised portrait of
African-American women's novels as 'unambivalent voices of resistance' to
commodity culture.", as sources of a pre-capitalist, unalienated vision, for instance.
Gabrielle Griffin too, makes a similar racialised distinction between black and white
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women's writing: 'The world of white middle-class women's fiction ... presents the
fiction of a mind without a body or of a mind which dominates the body' (p.2S). 'Out
of touch with her body', the work of the white woman writer is contrasted that of
black women and is seen not only as vital energetic but to embody life itself. Richard
Dyer traces some of the history and implications of this association of whiteness and
death in White. Connecting the relation of whiteness and death to transcendence,
spirit and redemption, Dyer stresses the double-edged nature of whiteness as
'nothing'. In a discussion of Melville's Moby Dick it is shown how white, with its
connotations of blank and empty, is the source of a profound fear which like its
object is boundless: ' ... to be white is to be a thing of terror to oneself CP. 212). It
is this double-edgedness that is precisely connected to the construction of black as a
source of life and vitality. As Morrison puts it in Playing in the Dark:
There is no romance free of what Herman Melville called 'the power of
blackness', especially not in a country in which there was a resident
population, already black, upon which the imagination could play; through
which historical, moral, metaphysically and social fears, problems and
dichotomies could be articulated'! .
Black life pays for white death. In giving responsibility for matter and the body to
blackness, whiteness achieves, indeed secures, transcendence, whilst maintaining a
connection to the matter of life through a vampiric relation. This is an explicit theme
of the film of Anne Rice's Interview with the Vampire (1994). Strong parallels are
drawn throughout the film between the slaveholders of New Orleans and the vampire
Lestat feeding off the blood of the living. Morrison identifies a similar phenomenon
in the literature of (white) America: that of minstrelsy:
In minstrelsy, a layer of blackness applied to a white face released it from
law. Just as entertainers through or by association with blackface, could
render permissable topics that otherwise would have been taboo so American
writers were able to employ an imagined Africanist persona to articulate and
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imaginatively act out the forbidden in American culture. (p. 66)
In other words, literary whiteness is accompanied and paid for by the shadow of
blackness, an abiding Africanist presence that is the locus both of white fear and
loathing and longing and desire.
A similar textual economy to Stimpson, (i.e.the race-different text as fact) can
be seen to be enacted in the first feminist issue of the journal Critical Inquiry. Edited
by Elisabeth Abel this feminist edition, entitled 'Writing and Sexual Difference,32
included a short story by Bengali writer Mahasveta Devi, translated by Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak. As Gallop, in her critical response contained within the
collection, points out, 'Draupadi' is said to represent the transition in the collection
'from West to East, ...from implicit to explicit political perspective' as well as 'from
metaphor to fact. 'Draupadi' lays bare the physical violence sublimated in metaphors
of textual production.' (p. 6). The story is, then, seen as representing a moment of
materiality in the metaphoric atmosphere of the critical essays that precede it:
'Draupadi' offers the immediacy of explicit political fact. This construction is
readable in terms of white feminist critical longing. Elizabeth Abel suggests a
number of possibilities:
. . . white feminist restlessness with an already well-mined white female
literary tradition; ... the internal logic of white feminism's trajectory
through theoretical discourses that, by evacuating the referent from the
signifier's play, fostered a turn to texts that reassert the authority of
experience, that reinstate political agency, and that rearticulate the body and
its passions. (p. 478)
In short, Abel argues that' ...white women turn to black women to articulate a politics
and to embody a discursive authority that are either lost or not yet found.' (ibid).
By the mid 1980's the feminist critical agenda was dominated by questions
generated by poststructuralist interventions into the literary field.33 The concern over
positive images that shaped critical activity in the late 1970's and early 80's had
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largely been superceded by debates around the issue of textuality and women's
relation to language. In light of the crisis over representation, the incursion of
postmodem discourses into feminist literary debates and the clear anxieties that have
ensued in their wake, Abel's suggestions intimate that black/raced women's writings
offer the fantasy of a space untroubled by any such issues. In a universe where all
that seemed solid increasingly melts into air, where signifier and signified part
company, work by black women writers is seen as the point where everything joins
up, stabilises, levels out. The disruption brought to the feminist 'order of things' -
loss of ground, stability, and authority - is healed by appeal to the steadying
influence of black women's writing.
This construction of black women's texts is rendered deeply problematic
when it is considered that the kinds of representational difficulties that, today, are
attributed to postmodem philosophy, were around long before questions of language,
representation, and subjectivity preoccupied feminist thinking. The point where
appeals to universal sisterhood was undermined was not, as it would appear, with the
incursion of poststructuralism, but rather with challenges from black and other
feminists not 'included' in the original feminist remit. In 1980Audre Lorde wrote:
By and large within the women's movement today, white women focus on
their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual preference,
class, and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of experience covered by
the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist.34
The extent to which these issues were placed on the feminist map by black feminist
critique is largely disavowed, and hence are made difficult to address. Jane Flax
takes this thinking a stage further in that she suspects the degree of hostility directed
at postmodem theories to be displaced ' ...anger at the "others" for disturbing the
initial pleasure and comfort of "sisterhood"'. She continues:
Since directly attacking women of color or voicing our resentment of them (in
public) would be politically unthinkable, is it easier and more acceptable for
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white women to express our discomfort with different discourses and the
politics of knowledge claims by categorically rejecting postmodemism and
branding it politically incorrect?36
Pushed further, the preoccupation with thinking difference through the postmodem
allows for a more comfortable engagement with race for white women. First, because
it is rendered simply one in a universe of differences competing for our attention, and
second, through certain deployments of deconstruction (where race is declared a
'fiction'), it furnishes a space for thinking about race which avoids a confrontation
with the social fact of one's whiteness.
Unlike Stimpson, as opposed to pursuing a direct connection to the realm of
fact, Gwin acknowledges the idea of a reading Itheoretical process: 'I am not sure
what the next step will be in this process of reading ourselves through one another. I
only feel that this may be our beginning.' (p. 23). For Gwin, then, reading from the
position of the black women's texts 'other' is a strategic move with the aim of
'working through' the legacies of being socially positioned as a white woman.
Having thus 'confronted' the full extent of white women's otherness to black women,
Gwin is then in a position to listen to black women's articulations of biracial female
experience. However, though the critical journey proposed by Gwin differs
significantly from Stimpson's, the destination is the same, and no less problematic.
The aspiration of truly hearing black women runs into similar difficulties to
those accrued by Stimpson's pursuit of factual description, in that the achievement of
discursive transparency, were it possible, would not necessarily dispense with
questions of appropriation. The inherent non-innocence at the heart of appeals to
innocent, objective meaning undermines any appeal to an anti-imperialist relation to
the text based on pure seeing. In addition, issues of textuality are placed firmly to one
side, if not ignored altogether, in the effort to attain an unmediated hearing of black
women. This is not simply to castigate Gwin for failing to think through these issues
but rather to register the effect of asserting an unproblematic vision of black women
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as a theoretical goal, in the light of the availability of critiques around representation
(in contradistinction to Stimpson, who writing in 1970, was competing in a wholly
different critical/discursive universe)37 In a conversation with Sneja Gunew, Gayatri
Spivak refers to the way in which the words of the 'Native Informant' are granted a
literalness that elsewhere is subject to question:
... his stuff was unquestioningly treated as the objective evidence for the
founding of so-called sciences like ethnography, ethnolinguistics,
comparative religion, and so on. So that, once again, the theoretical problems
relate only to the one who knows. The person who knows has all the
problems of selfhood. The person who is known, somehow seems not to have
a problematic self. These days, it is the same kind of agenda that is at work.
Only the dominant self can be problematic; the self of the Other is authentic
without a problem, naturally available to all kinds of complications. This is
fri h . 38very ng temng.
The 'Native' text is granted authenticity while the (white) self that reads is in
representational crisis. The radical movement that Gwin attributes to her own reading
position, one of considerable pain and upheaval, can be contrasted with the supreme
stillness that is conferred upon her chosen texts. What is more, in Gwin's case, the
goal of hearing leads to a total collapse of author into text, so that literary
considerations are entirely missing from her discussion. By aiming to really hear
black women, through reading herself as other in their texts, Gwin is in danger of
undermining any engagement by black women writers with literary politics. Rita
Felski comments:
... it is clear that fictional works are shaped by relatively autonomous
aesthetic structures which mediate the text's relationship to ideology. A
reflectionist understanding of literature as authentic reproduction of authorial
. . d . h iznif I' '3g~expenence pays ina equate attention to t e way texts sigm y as iterature.
As such debates that are burgeoning elsewhere in the feminist literary field fail to be
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'applied' to the race-different text in Gwin's formulation. While it can be said that
the relative unavailability of discourses concerned with expressly literary political
issues of representation and language explains Stimpson's neglect of textual matters,
the same cannot be said for Gwin. An effect of this omission is to suggest a model of
black women's writing based on the documentary, or the sociological.
Marvellous recordings: black writing as sociology
This idea of black writing as an immediate presentation of 'black reality', is
far from new, as this now infamous review of Toni Morrison's Sula indicates:
Toni Morrison is far too talented to remain only a marvelous recorder of the
black side of provincial American life. If she is to maintain the large and
serious audience she deserves, she is going to have to address a riskier
contemporary reality than this beautiful but nevertheless distanced novel. And
if she does this, it seems to me that she might easily transcend that early and
unintentionally limiting classification 'black woman writer' and take her
place among the most serious, important and talented American novelists now
ki 39wor mg.
More recently, in the context of her Nobel award, Morrison was referred to as a
'feisty chronicler of black America.t''" Both comments are interesting in that they
seek to establish a distinction between what is properly literary and what is not. For
Blackburn, an opposition is set up between (white) American literature and black
recording, a binary which operates as a code for other divisions such as
universal/particular; whitelblack; metropolitan/regional; important/irrelevant;
serious/provincial; talented/untalented. The disruptive term in the review's attempt at
classification is talent. The admission of Morrison's talent breaks open the neat
division of black writing as untalented, as mere writing down", or passive recording
on the one hand and serious, creative, white, literature on the other. By way of
restoring equilibrium, Blackburn is obliged to urge Morrison to become 'universal',
43
to transcend her 'blackness', to become American, to relinquish her role as black
recorder and enter the serious realm of the literary. For Johnson, however, the
intention behind the remark is a good deal more sinister. In his consideration of the
prize committee's decision to name Morrison as Nobel Laureate, his assessment of
her as feisty chronicler forms the basis of an argument designed to question her
award. Turning on a distinction between literature and politics Johnson asks:
. . . has the Swedish Academy, which awards the prize, allowed the
silver currency of literary judgment to be adulterated (not for the first time)
by the baser metal of politics?
Morrison's designated status as chronicler, together with what Johnson sees as her
eschewing of the European literary tradition in favour of' American Africanism' puts
her, quite literally, beyond the pale of literary consideration. The alignment of
European (with its repressed significance of white), silver (meaning pure), and
literary judgment as opposed to 'American African' or BAF (a term borrowed from
the discourses of political correctness signifying Black American Female), politics,
base metal (contaminant), chronicling, is an arrangement of meaning intended to
expel Morrison from the literary enclosure. Confined to 'minorities', or to interested
whites who perhaps want a 'taste' of a minority culture, Morrison's work (and by
extension that of all black writers, which according to this logic is simply
representative of one another) is deprived of its potential for disrupting the orthodox
literary order of things: the disguised particularity and political interests of the
European tradition for one, the wholly gendered and racialised nature of what passes
for the pure currency of literary judgment, for another42• If it is considered that
'systems of domination find expression in virtually all areas of cultural practice and
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symbolic exchange' the political debate about whether black or other raced writing
counts as literature cannot be ignored. Designed to protect disguised interests, the
frontier of the literary field itself is a crucial location for the exercise of domination.
One of the major issues at stake in the literary or artistic field is that of its limits or
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legitimate participation: 'Saying of this or that tendency in writing that 'it just isn't
poetry' or literature means refusing it a legitimate existence, excluding it from the
game, excommunicating it. ,44 Such expulsions serve the interests of those who
dominate the field: 'it is the rule of the game which will favour the trumps that they
hold which tends to be imposed on everybody'; the dominant definition imposes
itself on everyone 'as a more or less absolute right of entry'(p. 144). Literally beyond
the pale of the literary, 'black' 'chronicles', 'sociology', 'recordings' , however
marvellous or feisty, find themselves cast outside the bounds of literary consecration,
and hence outside an important sphere of symbolic production and influence. ,45
Black women's writing and literary politics
The effects of representing the stable term in another's discourse, or in Sara
Suleri's words, material for another's epistemology, are multiple. One of the more
worrying is the way in which white feminist constructions of black women's texts (as
embodiments of vitality; human spirit, endurance, authenticity, French feminisms, the
postmodern) function to screen out texts that do not conform to the critical 'house
style'. In other words, this idealisation of writings by what gets constructed as
'black' women becomes a fixing of those texts, an essentialising which masks the
sheer range of texts, not to say meanings, that circulate as writings by racially
different women authors. Sneja Gunew comments, with reference to the Australian
context:
... they choose the parts they want to hear, and they choose what they then
do with this material; and what seems to happen in very crude ways, within
the context of multiculturalism, is that certain people are elevated very
quickly to those who speak for all immigrants: in terms of funding, and in
terms of the dissemination of their work, and so on. As a result, you don't get
to hear about the rest, because 'we have covered that,' and those few token
fi functi libi 47gures tion as a very secure a l.
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In the feminist critical field, the question of reading and race for white critics has
been posed in relation to a notably limited range of texts. The overdetermination of
writings by African-American women writers and the corresponding lack of attention
paid to British black and Asian women's writings in criticism by white feminists is a
case in point. Indeed, works by African-American women writers have tended to
operate synechdocally, as standing for black women's writing. Following Gunew's
point there is a real danger of tokenism here; of believing that by 'including' Toni
Morrison or Maya Angelou black women's writing has been addressed. Or even that
'race' has been addressed. The dynamic complexity of racial categories is screened
off, denied in favour of a construction or taxonomical arrangement based upon
representative examples. The beginnings of a literary race gallery can be discerned.
Reading not seeing?
The problem of seeing the text is far from solved by simply appealing to
reading, however. Faced with the critical problem of 'seeing' Judith Butler stresses
the need to acknowledge the process of reading as relentless and continued. Adopting
a permanent position as self-conscious reader of an event, as opposed to viewer or
observer, Butler attempts to avoid the traps of appeals to pure visibility. If seeings are
merely disavowed or disguised readings, 'contestable construal[s], (p. 16) their
contestability is assured through the assertion that there is only reading. If there is no
possibility of avoiding reading then the question of interpretation is transferred from
one whose goal is accuracy and truth, to one based upon strategy and politics.
Butler authorises her own reading of the Rodney King events, then, not in terms of
better or more accurate view but in those of strategy. In a footnote she states:
I do not mean to suggest by 'white racist episteme' a static and closed system
of seeing, but rather an historically self-renewing practice of reading, which
when left uninterrupted, tends to extend its hegemonic force. Clearly, terms
like 'white paranoia' do not describe in any totalizing way 'how white people
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see,' but are offered here as theoretical hyperboles which are meant to
advance a strategically aggressive counter-reading. (p. 22)
In a characteristic move, Butler dispenses with the problems of referentiality even as
she attempts to intervene critically in an event marked by referential violence. At
once suggested as part-explanation of the King events and a discursive counter
Butler's argument refuses to deal with the question of 'real' whiteness. Furthermore,
the use of the term hyperbole, with its denoted significance of exaggerated,
extravagant meaning, ' ...not intended to be taken literally' (OED) to describe her
theoretical work, acts to introduce a fundamental difficulty in Butler's reading. One
of the more intractable problems with her reading of the trial is her refusal to account
for the ways in which her diagnosis of the existence of a white racist episteme
connects with how actual white people see or read. By contrast, Gwin admits both
the problematic nature of the distinction between black and white women, and the
discursive nature of the signifier 'white women' but attempts to hold onto the
concrete privileges that are consequently made available to actual white women in
the world (p.22) through reference to racist cultural scripts, Butler can only
emphasise their separation.
In asserting the figurativeness of white racism, Butler empties of referential
content the very episteme she identifies as bearing the responsibility for leaving King
bloody and beaten. Butler thus evades any discursive responsibility for what she
writes. By stressing the gap between world and discourse in this way Butler leaves
entirely unexamined the most important of the questions that the King event raises.
To use her own words how is such a feat of interpretation possible? How does her
identification of the paranoid structure of whiteness relate specifically to the brutality
of the LAPD? And how was it made possible for those twelve members of the jury to
conclude what they did. Was it simply that the Simi Valley court selected twelve
paranoiacs that day? What bearing does Butler's reading have on the verdict if it is
intended merely as a strategic counter to that verdict? While whiteness as
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pigmentation is by no means automatically consonant with discursive productions ,
and skin and meaning do not readily line up, it follows equally that they cannot be
said to never coincide. There is no easy separation between race as a lived, material
condition or designation and racial discourse.
Butler's assertion of extreme strategy or even fictionality, of her formulation
'white racist episteme' serves equally to evacuate any consideration of power from
her argument. By detaching her discourse so emphatically from the situation she uses
it to describe Butler avoids the issue of power that her suggestion of aggressive
reading opens up. If the answer is to provide aggressive counter-readings the
question of decidability is also effectively glossed over. It is hard to imagine a more
aggressive reading of the evidence in the King case than that offered by the defence.
What is it about Butler's reading, given this, that is preferable as a version of events?
What is there to stop a simple reversal of Butler's view in favour of the racist
reading? Whose reading wins the day?Who has the most power to make a reading
stick? These and other questions like them, questions which are essentially ethical
issues, are evaded by Butler's assertion of theoretical hyperbole and aggressive
reading.
The white paranoia is asserted by Butler not as 'a static and closed system,
but rather an historically self-renewing practice of reading'. Nevertheless, it is the
case that the history of this self-renewal is neglected. Butler's 'white racist episteme'
relies on a profoundly ahistorical psychoanalytic (Lacanian?) narrative, of
disavowal, projection and repetition compulsion and as such presents a closed loop.
The 'circuit' of white paranoia is constituted, hence, as 'the projection of their own
aggression, and the subsequent regarding of that projection as an external threat' (p.
19) which projecting 'the intent to injure that itself enacts then repeats that projection
on increasingly larger scales, a specific social modality of repetition compulsion' (p.
22). Having diagnosed 'social' paranoia Butler cuts her argument loose from its
signifying ground by denying its social application. Thus producing her own closed
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circuit of reasoning, the beauty of her reading is protected from the question of
critical and social responsibility. After all, it's only a reading, it~ not about 'real'
white people, the question of how to break the circuit of white paranoia is thus
suspended. The repetition compulsion, albeit in its social modality, is set and left to
run like clockwork, and is thereby uninterruptable. The power of Butler's model, as
an alternative way of thinking about the King events, in disdaining history, is
significantly underdeveloped and hence, weakened. It consequently has little
purchase as a means of intervening in the defence's aggressive construal of Rodney
King's role in the events of March 3rd 1991 and its aftermath.
Despite her profound distrust of appeals to the visual, to how things are,
Butler cannot resist grounding her own authority in that which she seeks to jettison as
a legitimate basis for argument. So Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, for example,
offers 'a description of how the black male body is constituted through fear....' (p.
18, my emphasis). The evidence (Fanon) for the prosecution (Butler) is deemed to
speak for itself. Here Butler appeals to the ability to see:
To claim that King's victimization is manifestly true is to assume that one is
presenting the case to a set of subjects who know how to see; to think that the
video 'speaks for itself is, of course, for many of us, obviously true. (p. 17)
Such a claim is surprising in the context of Butler's sustained attack on the visual
field as a basis for knowledge. This persistence of 'seeings' is less a matter of
Butler's theoretical inadequacy, a gap in the fabric of her argument, but more one of
the inevitability or perhaps, irresistability, of appeals to immediate vision, or innocent
meaning. Both Butler and Phelan act as though seeing can be avoided, as if seeing
were a theoretical/philosophical error that can be corrected, through the assertion of
reading, or in Phelan's case, blindness". This is a point which is related to the
question of essentialism in feminist theory. Like essentialism, the issue of seeing
cannot simply be dispensed with, marked as contaminated, by dint of its
colonialistiracistlEnlightenment structuration, and subsequently, abandoned. Indeed,
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it has been argued that there is no possibility of a pure anti-essentialist position:
If one sets out to do a critique of metaphysics, there is no escape from the
metaphysical enclosure.You cannot simply assert, 'I will be an anti-
essentialist' and make that stick, for you cannot not be an essentialist to some
degree. The critique of essentialism is based on essentialism49•
Rather, the question of essences should be thought around, according to Spivak,'a
persistent critique of what one cannot not want.' (p. 9) Similarly, with the
reading/seeing division, marking the impossibility of visibility for feminist criticism,
the impossibility of innocent, or essential readings (appeals to how things are,
descriptions etc.); is needfully more than the simple assertion of non-innocence, anti-
essentialism or reading.
Self-consciousness with regard to reading cannot be endlessly sustained. The
slippage between what is decoded, read, and what is merely seen, is in many ways a
difference between what is unfamiliar and familiar. Which is to say that the act of
decoding may be disguised through the fact of familiarity. 50 Butler does not pause to
consider the extent to which her own familiarity with psychoanalytic ideas structures
her reading of the King events and subsequently blinds her to alternatives. The point
at which readings slip into seeings cannot always be detected, even as a permanent
disposition of reading is asserted. Rather than constituting a philosophical limit,
however, Butler's aggressive counter-reading reads as theoretical defensiveness. It's-
only-a-reading-its-not-about-real-white-people seems less about answering difficult
questions such as those of power and authority than of offering self-protection from
critical responsibility.
Conclusion
In giving 'raced' women the task of carrying the burden of the real, the
responsibility for stability in an otherwise chaotic, unpredictable universe, white
feminist critics are ensuring that any debate around the question of race is foreclosed
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upon. Silently articulate, artless bearers of authentic significance the black woman's
novel/poem or play has no need of being read. All that is left is to collect its various
examples to furnish the glass cabinets of women's writing courses and feminist
journals. In the place of any engagement with race-different writings white feminists
simply curate a postmodern race gallery. White feminist criticism becomes an
exercise in information collecting. But it will neither do to simply assert continuous
reading . Dispensing with the materiality of race in favour of an emphasis upon
figuration raises its own problems. This is precisely the neglect of referential
violence that the King events can be seen to represent. It is far from adequate to
simply to install a transcendental equation where seeing is oppressive and reading is
radical. In pushing against the idea of seeing, there is a danger of reifying the idea of.
I
reading and evading critical responsiblity for the meanings that are produced
~
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Chapter 2. Better to Say Nothing: White Feminist Authority, Reading and Race.
When I finished (and gave!) the piece 'on race' -let's just say it created more
problems than it solved - 1 began to wonder whether there was any position
from which a white middle-class feminist could say anything on the subject
without sounding exactly like that .... The rhetorical predictability of it all.
The political correctness. Just like 'men in feminism.' In which case it might
be better not to say anything.'
Nancy Miller is not the first feminist critic to suggest that white feminists
may be ill-equipped to write, to use her phrase, 'on race.' As 1note in the previous
chapter, Catherine Stimpson, writing in 1970, called for the resignation of the white
teacher of black culture, on the grounds of what she saw then as the inevitability of
white misreading and appropriation. In 1976 Patricia Meyer Spacks wrote how she
felt unqualifed to comment upon black women's texts on the grounds of her racial
difference. Utilising a quote from white psychologist Phyllis Chesler: 'I have no
theory to offer of Third World female psychology in America ... As a white woman,
I'm reluctant and unable to construct theories about experiences 1 haven't had.'
Spacks defended her decision to exclude black women's writings from her feminist
literary survey The Female Imagination? More recently, Catherine Belsey has
written of her decision to refrain from analysing Toni Morrison's work and 'Third-
World or African American' texts in terms of her project Desire: Love Stories in
Western Culture:
And if all this seems ethnocentric, as it is, 1 want to draw attention to the
dangers of imperialism inscribed in anthropology. Just as feminists want men
to take us seriously, but not to speak on our behalf, so it is not for me to speak
for other existing cultures, whether Third-World or African-American. My
job here, I believe, is to listen,"
As has previously been noted, Spacks' reasoning occasioned strong protest
from black feminist critics such as Alice Walker and Deborah McDowell. 'Spacks
never lived in nineteenth century Yorkshire, so why theorize about the Brontes?'
remarked Walker, a comment which puts into question the presumed base from
which any reader reads with acuity, not to say wit. McDowell criticised the
normative judgement at the heart of the text, arguing that white feminist critics were
guilty of perpetrating ,against the Black woman writer the same practices they so
vehemently decried in white male scholars,4
Given the force of both critiques it was at first surprising to find arguments
for not reading black or Third World texts still being made. However, on closer
reading there is a distinction to be drawn between Spacks' and the other's arguments.
Whereas Spacks makes her case in terms of an essential racial difference, albeit
founded upon experience ( her whiteness prevents comment on the text's perceived
blackness) Stimpson and Belsey assert the idea of critical abstention as an anti-
imperial stance; as a deliberate, political option on the part of the white critic,
signalling their respect toward the autonomy of black feminist criticism. Belsey, in
particular rejects the idea of experience as a foundation for reading, insisting that
'The problem of writing on Morrison is political.' (p. 92) It is to this - saying nothing
as a political move - that I wish to turn my attention.
In this chapter I argue that, despite the best of intentions, the act of saying
nothing on the part of white feminist critics succeeds mostly in reinscribing a relation
of dominance to black women's texts. Briefly, the handing over of responsibility for
'dealing with' race to black women/feminist critics and writers not only reaffirms a
notion of the authority of experience that elsewhere in the feminist critical field is
subject to considerable scepticism; it also adds weight to the idea that race refers
solely to what is perceived as blackness; that whiteness is not a racial designation.
Contrary to the insistence on the politics of not commenting on black women's
writings there is an unwitting essentialism operating in the critical decision to not
write. Gayatri Spivak refers to the idea of refraining from comment on the grounds of
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one's gender or skin colour as, respectively, genitalism and chrornatism' In what
follows I investigate the implications of adopting , in this case, a chromatic relation
to texts. With this I make two main points: first, that deciding not to read, write or
comment on texts that are perceived as 'raced' forecloses a debate that has been key
to feminist literary criticism, namely that of reading positions, i.e. the relation of the
reader's subjectivity to the text and the implications of this relationship to the
meanings produced; and second, more crucially, that the ideas of dominance and
authority are not dispensable with in the manner that these critics suggest.
Consequently I dispute the inherent equation of speaking/visibility/voice with
authority and silence/invisibility with its lack. Given that whiteness operates by
virtue of its unmarked relation to blackness, to say nothing about race is hardly to
relinquish authority; it is instead to leave the relation of white supremacy wholly
unchecked.
'Just like men in feminism'
It is interesting that both Belsey and Miller appeal to the idea of men in
feminism as a reason not to participate in the reading and race debate. The political
argument put forward by Belsey is founded upon an analogy between the situation of
the white feminist reader faced with The Bluest Eye and men 'advanc[ing] their
careers by writing about feminism and feminist criticism' (p. 92). Miller, likewise,
implies if white feminists are to 'race' what men are to feminism, to say nothing at
all might be preferable. Through this analogy each critic constructs the critical scene
in terms of its predictability. Just as men cannot help but appropriate feminism, the
white feminist reader/critic cannot but colonise the race-different text. It is this
inevitability of appropriation in Belsey's case, or of causing more problems than one
solves in Miller's, that constitutes grounds for abstaining from comment altogether.
The racial equivalent of Elaine Showalter's 'Critical Cross-Dressers'", white feminist
critics of black women's writings are seen as in danger of transgressing the
57
boundaries of what is perceived as black feminist territory.
Such arguments present a depressing scene: an unwelcome, critically
intrusive, profiteering, presence in the field of black women's writings, the position
of the white feminist seems irredeemable. For the hopelessly appropriative critic the
logical move would seem to be not to read, to leave it to those who are thought to
know best, black writers and critics themselves. However, it is precisely this
inevitability, the 'rhetorical predictability of it all' to quote Miller, that I wish to
question.
First, the extent to which the parallel of men in feminism is helpful is itself
debatable.
With this Belsey and Miller misrepresent what is a complex, above all unresolved
debate around gender and reading. Both critics present the formulation 'men in
feminism' as a transparent illustration of appropriation, and as such foreclose an area
of ongoing discussion. While many feminist critics have expressed anxieties over the
potential for male critics to master feminist criticism, recuperating its challenges to
patriarchal, canonical constructions of value, it is equally the case that establishing
secure grounds for feminist work, for instance through reference to female biology or
experience, is fraught with problems'. Identifying what is distinctive about feminist
criticism along with establishing criteria for membership is then by no means clear.
So far there has been little to guarantee that which is seen to bind a class of men, or
indeed of women, reading. There is effectively less to suggest that the relation of men
to feminism is automatically governed by appropriative motivations. While itmay be
true to say that we always read from somewhere, the locus of that somewhere is very
much open to question. As Diana Fuss has indicated the debate over gender and
interpretation, and hence, men in feminism, is in many ways a struggle betweem
essentialism and deconstruction; briefly, establishing a secure basis from which to
read on the grounds of gender runs the risk of essentialism, while deconstructing that
basis is seen to open feminism unilaterally to men, and is consequently a burgeoning
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political issue.
Even placing this problem to one side, however, the effect of setting up a
correspondence between 'men in feminism' on the one hand, and 'white feminists
and black writing' on the other, is no less intractible. Analogies, on the grounds of
their assumptions of sameness, can function to obscure the complex cultural history
of relations between the respective groups, or entities under comparison. So, this
case, the particular histories of relations between black and white women, in the
feminist critical field and beyond, becomes obfuscated by those of something termed
'men and women'. The parallelism effectively reduces consideration of the respective
specificities (between various racialised categories of women in the feminist critical
field not to mention gender relations in the said field) to that of a universalised
structure: an abstract equation pitching dominant against dominated replaces
consideration of material differences between the particular racialised configurations
of identity. The specific issue of the varying histories of white women/feminists
encounters with ' black writing' not to mention 'black people' is translated into a
more universalised narrative of oppression. Debate, thereby, is construed in terms of
a struggle between oppressor and oppressed. The question to be asked, and by
extension answered, is, consequently, one of how, or indeed whether, members of the
dominant category are able to read the work of the dominated. The implications of
abstracting or universalising in this way are that the matter of appropriation is
deemed inevitable; the over-identification of white women with dominance, through
analogy to the obduracy of patriarchal dominance, renders change difficult to
imagine. The dominant cannot help but dominate; men cannot but take over or
master; white women cannot but assume authority. The day that Belsey looks
forward to, the day she gets to publish her reading of Morrison's 'subtle, lyrical
account ofpostmodem love' (p. 93) is hard to foresee.
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Speaking For Oneself
Both Belsey and Stimpson, however, can be seen to be supporting black
critical autonomy, conforming to paradigmatic feminist ideals regarding speaking for
oneself, as opposed to being spoken/or, in recommending white critical abstention.
Asserting the moral unacceptability- (p. 7) of a white authored criticism, Stimpson
advocates that whites quit the critical scene to allow space for an autonomous black
theoretical project:
Only blacks can create such a theory.... Since a common principle of black
revolutionary politics is the need for black self-determination, it would be
obviously inconsistent for a white person to make critical, authoritative
comments. (Ibid)
Stimpson also calls for the resignation of the white teacher of black culture: 'White
people at the moment have neither the intellectual skill nor the emotional clarity nor
the moral authority to lead the pursuit of black studies' (p. 2). With white critics
wholly lacking in ability and authority, critical reading of black writing is best left to
the experts: black critics. White critical abstention enables black self-empowerment.
Belsey, similarly, justifies her decision to refrain from commenting on Morrison's
work in terms of respect for black feminist critical endeavour, in addition to a
concern about appropriation:
... I have a fear of appearing to colonize her work, or at least of seeming to
pre-empt the work of African-American critics .... what she writes about
includes the white expropriation of black experience and I am afraid to repeat
that process. To make her fiction work for me, to get it to define desire on my
behalf, might well be one form of such expropriation; to analyse Toni
Morrison, who writes about black experience, is to advance into an area
constructed in the first instance by those pioneering African-American
feminists who have done so much to put black women's writing on the critical
agenda. (p. 92, my emphasis)
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Although the struggle for self-definition is central to feminist politics across 'race',
there is a sense in which speaking for oneself has a particular currency in black
feminist theory. Patricia Hill Collins explains:
Why this theme of self-definition should preoccupy African-American
women is not surprising. Black women's lives are a series of negotiations that
aim to reconcile the contradictions separating our own internally defined
images of self as African-American women with our objectification as the
Other. The struggle of living two lives, one for 'them and one for ourselves'
creates a peculiar tension to extract the definition of one's true self from the
treatment afforded the denigrated categories in which all Black women are
placed.'
This dual consciousness, the living of two lives, one public, one private, gives an
urgency to black women's self-definition. If the securing of autonomous space has
been of great importance to black feminism, white feminist respect for that space is
politically crucial. Stimpson's and Belsey's decision can be seen to take on political
significance when read in the light of this search for black critical autonomy. Indeed,
both critics recommend a secondary supportive role rather than total silence. In
advocating critical abstention by whites, Stimpson, nevertheless, restates her
commitment to reading black writings: 'I want to keep reading black literature,
though. What matters is reading it accurately. And doing that demands a new,
practical, literary theory for white people' (p. 2). This new 'theory' begins with
accepting 'black authority of interpretation' (p. 7). Critical comments, if they are
made at all, are to be confined to the realms of the informal and the personal. Belsey
likewise states that her perceived task is that of listening, of withholding her analyses
until a more appropriate time: 'I conclude that at this stage of history I ought to feel a
certain inhibition about setting out to substantiate in a detailed analysis the case I
should like to make about Toni Morrison .... Perhaps one day.' (p. 93).
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'Is anyone, is anyone white, preparing to listen?,9
Posited as an alternative to what is seen as the imperialist, anthropological
stance of speaking for Third-World or African-American cultures, listening is
politically significant in Belsey's argument. As a strategy for undermining the white
dominance of feminist theory the act of listening appears compelling, and is not
without support in the wider feminist field. Suggesting, for instance, ways of 'doing'
theory 'That Is Not Imperialistic, Ethnocentric, Disrespectful', Maria Lugones and
Elizabeth Spelman remark:
It may be that at this particular point we ought not even try to do that [Le.
'create feminist theory jointly'] - that feminist theory by and for Hispanas
needs to be done separately from feminist theory by and for Black women,
white women, etc. But it must be recognised that white/Anglo women have
more power and privilege than Hispanas, Black women, etc., and at the very
least they can use such advantage to provide space and time for other women
to speak. to
As with Stimpson's suggestion of a supportive, back seat role, a prescription of white
feminist silence is seen to offer a means of correcting the hitherto asymmetrical
relations between white and, here, black and Third World feminists. White feminists,
by adopting a more quiet position than they may be used to, are urged to use their
racial privilege to secure spaces for racially non-hegemonic women to speak. That
said, listening is not without problems as an anti-imperialist strategy.
Chandra Mohanty and Biddy Martin, for instance, are critical of the
'assignment of fixed positions' where the woman of color is 'educator/critic' and the
white woman is 'the guilty and silent listener', arguing that: 'The dynamics set up
would seem to exempt both parties from the responsibilities of working through the
complex historical relations between and among structures of domination and
oppression.' IIAudre Lorde makes a related point in Sister/Outsider:
Women of today are still being called upon to stretch across the gap of male
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ignorance, and to educate men as to our existence and our needs. This is an
old and primary tool of all oppressors to keep the oppressed occupied with the
masters concerns. Now we hear that it is the task of black and third world
women to educate white women, in the face of tremendous resistance, as to
our existence, our differences, our relative roles in our joint survival. This is a
diversion of energies and a tragic repetition of racist patriarchal thought. 12
The act of listening on the part of white women then can function not only to drain
the energy away from black feminist critical endeavour but also to obscure the
complexity of race relations between black and white feminists and women. In
obscuring this complexity in this way, by assuming too permanent a stance of
listener, white feminists absolve themselves from taking an active role in
transforming racial politics in the feminist field. Rather than thinking about
whiteness, the critical goal becomes implied as one of understanding blackness. Vron
Ware remarks:
... white feminists have managed to avoid dissecting these cultural and racial
componants of white femininity, although they have become eager to hear
what black women have to say about their racialised and gendered
identities.13
Listening can operate, then, to trap white feminists in what Trinh T. Minh-ha refers
to as 'the mold of permanent schooling ... wait[ing] for the delivery of knowledge as
a consumer waits for his/her suppliers goods'l", This relation of white
consumerlblack text is precisely what concerns Hazel Carby in her essay 'White
woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood':
In arguing that feminism must take account of the lives, herstories and
experiences of black women we are not advocating that teams of white
feminists should descend upon Brixton. Southall, Bristol or Liverpool to take
black women as objects of study in modes of resistance. We don't need that
kind of intrusion on top of all the other information-gathering forces that the
63
State has mobilized in the interest of 'race relations' .... Instead of taking
black women as the objects of their research, white feminist researchers
should try to uncover the gender-specific mechanisms of racism amongst
white women'".
Objects of study, something to be comprehended, understood, mastered, the lives and
texts of black women in terms of this construction offer white feminists protection
from having to reflect upon their own denied yet implicitly racialised position. This
state of affairs has led Helen (charles) to ask:
. . . white women have listened and in some cases have become experts at
listening to the voices of Black and/or Asian women, but how has this
listening affected their own voice and understanding? Can 'white women' in
politics and/or in academia only see the colour of their skins in relation to
women of colour?!6
Which is another way of saying that listening, for the white feminist critic, has limits
unless it is accompanied by reflection upon one's own relation to the racial order of
things. Thinking about whiteness is, then, a crucial part oflistening to the Other.
'What would I do white?'
I would do nothing.
That would be cnough"
Electing to stay silent as a contribution to any debate around race fails on the grounds
that it is a strategy that is only available to white feminist critics. Obliged to carry
the burden of race as a marked identity, silence on the subject of race is a luxury not
available to black women/feminists. In the context of the British colonial project
Vron Ware comments:
While white feminists with colonial backgrounds may not feel it necessary or
desirable to talk about this aspect of their personal histories, the majority of
black women living in Britain are in an entirely different position. Depending
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on the specific history of their country of origin, they are visibly and
personally connected to the British Empire whether they wish to recognise
this fact or not. (p. 228)
Given the means by which racial identities are culturally structured in Western
thinking, with the dominant designation enjoying unmarked status, whiteness
maintains its dominance precisely because it gets to say nothing about its racialised
nature, or as Diana Fuss puts it: 'As a self-identical, self-reproducing term white
draws its ideological power from its proclaimed transparency, from its self-elevation
over the very category of 'race'.' 18Choosing silence becomes, itself, a marker of that
privilege: 'The claim to a lack of identity or positionality is itself based on privilege,
on a refusal to accept responsibility for one's implication in actual, historical or
social relations, on a denial of one's own personal history and the claim to a total
separation from it.,19Such thinking perpetuates the myth that race refers solely to
'blackness'; that only black, i.e. non-white people 'have' something called 'race.' As
a consequence, whiteness is denied and remains unseen as a racial category, and
hence the structure which shores up white domination stays intact. This sense of
whiteness as nothing permeates Ruth Frankenberg's findings in her study of its social
construction. Interviewee after interviewee makes the point that whiteness is hard to
grasp as a specific racial category. Cathy Thomas, for example, describes:
... the formlessness of being white .... If I had an ethnic base to identify
from, if I were even an Irish American, that would have been something
formed. But to be a Heinz 57 American, a white, a class-confused American,
land of the Kleenex type American, is so formless in and of itself. It only
takes shape in relation to other people.i"
Here the structure of whiteness as an empty signifier, as absent centre, as othering, as
forming rather than formed, is made explicit. Its perceived relational quality belies
the extent to which it demands form of the Other. That the ethnicity so desired,
,even' Irish Americanness, is itself a function of a white supremacist order of things.
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The absent centre insists upon the definition of the margin; whiteness demands of the
'ethnic' identity, form, definition. Or in Helen (charles) words, ' 'white' assumes a
place of control out of which all 'others' are categorised' (p. 32). Similarly, Zora
Neale Hurston's essay 'How It Feels to Be Colored Me' exposes the racialising
nature of the white gaze21• Remembering the day she 'became colored', Hurston
narrates the change from when racial difference, in her early childhood, functioned
geographically: 'white people differed from colored to me only in that they rode
through town and never lived there' (p. 152) to when it became essential. Leaving
'the little Negro town of Eatonville', Hurston was no longer 'Zora of Orange County'
but instead 'a little colored girl'.(p. 153)
I found it out in certain ways. In my heart as well as in the mirror, I became a
fast brown - warranted not to rub or run. . . . I do not always feel colored.
Even now I often achieve the unconscious Zora of Eatonville before the
Hegira. I feel most colored when I am thrown against a sharp white
background. (pp. 153-4)
The other side of the racial coin so to speak, here it is the racialised category,
'colored', and not whiteness, that is revealed as unstable, relational. Hurston's
racialised identity takes shape in relation to white people. It is following her
separation from Eatonville that Hurston's ethnicity becomes fixed, essential even,
'fast brown - warranted not to rub or run'.
This demand for ethnic definition can be seen to operate in instances where
white people register shock when they are confronted with formations of whiteness
in the black or 'raced' imagination. While similar constructions of whiteness as
nothing inhere in what bell hooks refers to as 'the black imagination' it is by far a
less benign nothingness than in white-authored accounts. Ghostly, associated with
death as in Beloved's 'men without skin' who command the slave ships, whiteness
assumes a terrifying form in black representation. bell hooks comments upon the
confrontation of white students with these images in her classroom:
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Many [white students] are shocked that black people think critically about
whiteness because racist thinking perpetuates the fantasy that the Other who
is subjugated, who is subhuman, lacks the ability to comprehend, to
understand, to see the working of the powerful. Even though the majority of
these students politically consider themselves liberals, who are anti-racist,
they too unwittingly invest in the sense of whiteness as mystery.2Z
In light of all this it is interesting that Nancy Miller's concern over the 'race
question' was expressed not in terms of being perceived as an imperialist or as racist
but of sounding like a 'white-middle class feminist'. Richard Dyer refers to the shock
registered by Jean Paul Sartre, who, writing an introduction to an anthology of
negritude poetry, finds himself being seen as a white man.22"rn terms of hooks'
argument these responses can be attributed to racist thinking, the failure of the white
imagination to grant critical intelligence to black people.
However, I would argue that least some of this shock comes from belief in the
the myth of whiteness as nothing, rather than malign thoughts about the capacity of
the Other for critical thought. Talking or thinking about whiteness is a conversation
the majority of white people are not used to having. Active thinking about whiteness
is a recent development in anti-racist work. The topic of whiteness will appear
strange, unfathomable, at least for those outside fascist, white supremacist
organisations who until now have the monopoly on thinking self-consciously about
being white. The implications of not reflecting upon whiteness as a white person in a
wholly racialised universe are multiple but this is not the same as intentionally
promulgating racist thinking or ideology.
A further dimension of the shock of discovering one's own whiteness may be
due to the denied connection of the designation 'white' to other ethnic
categories. The realisation that whiteness as a racial designation is not, as it pretends
to be, innocent and elevated above something called 'race', and is instead intensely
connected to the racialisation or marking of the Other is profoundly shocking, not
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least for whites involved in anti-racist politics. Helen (charles), again , asks:
Could it be that it is far easier for some 'white women' to speak of racism
from an assumed Black woman's point of view? What happens to the 'white
woman' who feels more confident about anti-racist strategies than her own
place in the dominant whiteness that we live in? (p. 30)
To speak of 'race' as anti-racists is a far more comfortable position than to inhabit
the privileges it accords to those of us with white skin. Taking up a position as the
victim of racism overlooks the everyday, mundane workings of a racially-stratified
universe which confers privilege upon white people, whether it is wished for or not,
whether it is noticed or not.
The paper that Miller refers to as the source of all the trouble, 'Dreaming,
Dancing, and the Changing Locations of Feminist Criticism', takes as its subject the
problematics of locating 'political agency for feminist subjects. ,23 A meditation on
racial and cultural difference, Miller's paper sought to relinquish critical authority
through presenting a montage of quotes. Through juxtaposing 'voices that don't
normally address each other' (p. 75) Miller intended to surrender the authorial
control that usually inheres with the critic, in addition to foregrounding feminist
intertextualities, a process of reading through, rather than toward. Stepping out of the
critical spotlight, Miller uses italics to 'mark the shift of attention to the quotations
themselves' (p. 75). She continues:
My own dream does not appear here, but it was of course the invitation to
dream, to think about dreams that lured me into the writing in the first place.
Dream passages from seminar readings pressed themselves forward; the shape
of the paper rapidly took form from the quotations which seemed to lead each
other, against each other, without me.(p. 76)
Although expressly concerned with agency, Miller's agency in the production of her
paper is effectively denied. Far from giving up its authority the essay simply hides or
rather displaces it. Peggy Kamuf comments upon the concealed authority that inheres
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in arranging conversations between theories, positions and authors:
... one might wonder about the posture that ... stands outside 'the conflict of
interpretations and overviews' without proposing to adjudicate among them,
but merely so as to give them a stage upon which to disagree. There is no
assurance, of course, that such exteriority to the conflict has been or indeed
can be reached."
Miller's involvement in her essay's conversation is merely disguised and not
dispensed with, or reversed. 'Dreaming, Dancing ... ' succeeds mostly in erasing
Miller's social and textual positioning as a white woman. The foregrounding of
blocks of quotation mainly by black women writers does not succeed in the reversal
of authority Miller intends. Rather it provides a convenient hiding place for the white
critic, who, by not including her own dream, by denying her role in the production of
her paper (which took form 'without me') disappears from view.
Miller's anxieties over finding a position from which to speak about race
without sounding like a white middle-class feminist are, then, misguided in that it
would be far better to try to speak precisely as white, as middle-class, whatever that
may entail, however problematic an enterprise that may be, to attempt to let these
aspects of her identity speak, to bring them into signification, instead of disappearing
into the white spaces between quotations. Given the entrenched nature of racist
structures of thinking, being and feeling, sounding like a white middle-class feminist
may not be a bad place to start.
Always black
It is in this regard that the stance of listening/saying nothing serves to position the
other-text as always black or 'raced'. By including the voices of black women
through largely unincorporated quotes, as in Miller's case, or simply listening in
Belsey's, it is implied that black and raced writings are fixed in significance. Miller,
in the context of her Jewishness, questions this determination of the raced text/voice:
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Did being Jewish really mean I always wanted to speak 'as a Jew' and be
spoken as one? The short answer is no, I have not found a way to assume that
rhetoric of identity (although I am both, I cannot lay claim to 'Jewish
feminist'); it is not a ground of action for me in the world, nor the guarantee
of my politics - or writing.(p. 95)
For Miller, then, the assumption on the part of the reader that her race is of
permanent priority in her writing and political work is oppressive. This fixing denies
the potential for their texts to signify in ways other than that of race, its agenda
becomes determined as paramount by the white reader as being always about race.
To take the point further, do Toni Morrison or Joan Riley or Buchi Emecheta or
Maya Angelou wish always to be spoken of as black women writers? Morrison in
particular has expressed a degree of ambivalence about the racial classification of her
writing. Put differently, the formulation white readerlblack text has the effect of
simplifying a considerably more complex configuration of social categories that
intersect at the meeting place between reader and text. As Miller puts it, 'What gets
left out of Black and White, Black or White? What is the relation of difference to
plural? Sexism to Racism? Feminism to Racism? Race to Theory?'(p. 77) The stance
of listening to black women's writing can therefore serve to fix those texts in a
permanent relation of otherness to white critical endeavour, whilst simultaneously
functioning to repress or mask the points of connection that are textually available.
The relation between reader and text is less determinable than this equation (white
reader-listenerlblack text-speaker) supposes, in that texts provide varying potential
for identification and/or distance. In the juncture between text and reader there are
possibilities for identificationlothering as limitless as there are configurations of
identity in the text or indeed in the reader. In Spivak's words:
. . . when the card-carrying listeners, the hegemonic people, the dominant
people, talk about listening to someone 'speaking as' something or the other,
I think there one encounters a problem. When they want to hear an Indian
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speaking as an Indian, a Third World woman speaking as a Third World woman,
they cover over the fact of the ignorance that they are allowed to possess, into a
kind ofhomogenisation.P
In addition to fixing the Other as Other, in what threatens to solidify into a permanent
relation, the intended redistribution of power brought by listening is undermined. The
reversal of authority is rendered problematic by the complex relation of knowledge to
power. While the assumption of the role of listener seemingly operates to acknowledge
both the hitherto delegitimated/subjugated knowledges of black women and the lack of
knowledge on the part of white women, such a scenario relies upon an overdetermined
equation of knowing with power and lack of knowing with lack of power. In the context
of the emergence of the discourse of true sex, Michel Foucault comments how:
the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who
is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who
knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know.26
The silent listener is, then, by no means in a necessarily powerless position. This can be
demanding and insistent. The Other disappears into the shape of the demand. Allowing
the Other to speak, to inhabit the silence of the dominant self, giving voice, can achieve
the reverse of redistributing power. Rather it can strengthen the dominance of the listener.
The Problem of Authority
Following this, the strategy of white reader/critics relinquishing their own
authority by giving voice to. black writers and texts cannot succeed in the manner
intended. If, as I have argued in chapter 1, authority and transparency are mutually
reinforcing, white 'descriptions' of black texts can never achieve the innocence they
aspire to. The discursive authority bound up with the notion of description allows that
authority to reasssert itself unhindered. Furthermore, to conceive of authority as
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something which simply can be refused is to misapprehend the nature of authority as
a social force. It is also to allow its influence to proceed uninhibited in the very act of
attempting its restraint.
As Pierre Bourdieu argues in Language and Symbolic Power, authority is less
a matter internal to a particular person, group or indeed language, than a force
external to it, a pressure exerted from without :' authority comes to language from
outside'<'. Authority is, then, conferred and institutional rather than inherent or
personal.
The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the
spokesperson, and his speech - that is, the substance of his discourse and,
inseparably, his way of speaking - is no more than a testimony, and one
among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is vested in him. (p. 107)
Following this, authority can never be constituted as a personal possession to be
relinquished at will. Indeed the very act of construing authority as a decision to be
made, that is whether or not to have it, or as personal property to be donated to a
more deserving case, is itself an authoritative act and can be read as what Bourdieu
refers to as a 'strategy of condescension': ' ... which allow[s] one to push the denial
of social definition to the limit while still being perceived through it. (p. 124) In other
words, in order to refuse authority one has to be availed of the authority to do so. To
refuse privilege is itself a privilege.' ... the condescending and consecrated person
chooses deliberately to transgress the boundary; he enjoys the privilege of privileges,
that which consists of taking liberties with his privilege. (Ibid)
Put differently, the idea of authority as something to be refused denies the
extent to which it conferred and is hence, in part, the property of a reader. In her
discussion of Jennie Livingstone's documentary Paris Is Burning, Judith Butler has
commented upon the ways in which the dominant culture reserves the right to refuse
self-authored determinations of identity. Referring to the death of Venus
Extravaganza, a black male to female transsexual who transgresses gender and racial
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boundaries to live as a white woman who has relationships with men, Butler remarks:
As much as she crosses gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the
hegemony that reinscribes the privileges of normative femininity and
whiteness wields the final power to renaturalise Venus's body and cross out
that prior crossing, an erasure that is her death.28
Venus' transgressive self-identification as a white women nonetheless contains
within it the potential to be read in ways that she did not intend: in normative terms
she is black, male and gay. In the words of Gayatri Spivak: 'A subject position is a
hard place, and we cannot read it ourselves; we are given over to others even as we
make inevitable public attempts to read our subject position.v". The self-determined
refusal of white authority can, at any time, itself be refused. My decision, then, to
forgo the authority that inheres with whiteness can never totally negate the fact that I
will be perceived through the delegated power of a racist culture that confers
authority upon me whether I wish for it or not. Skin privilege is not dependent upon
wanting it: to believe it as such is to overestimate the one's own performative power
(that is, the power to bring about a situation by saying it, to refuse authority by
saying so), to mistake the power of the delegation for personal merit or authority.
Indeed, as Bourdieu points out, it is precisely this mistake that secures the authority
of the discourse of authority:
[the] specific efficacy [of which] stems from the fact that they seem to
possess in themselves the source of a power which in reality resides in the
institutional conditions of their production and reception. (p. 111)
The refusal of authority, consequently, on the part of one who is institutionally
endowed with authority is an illusion, an epistemological sleight of hand which
serves to disguise an essentially authoritative act.
Turning on ideas of accuracy, fact, truth, morality, Stimpson's 'Black
Culture/White Teacher' is unable to complete the exchange of authority that is
deemed necessary for an end to white critical dominance. As such the political
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division installed between black and white critical projects threatens to solidify into a
chromatic or essential division. Even overlooking the intractibility of the issue of
white authority, the appeal to an automatic, unproblematic black authority of
interpretation to be unconditionally accepted by white critics renders change difficult
to imagine. Although it is implied that the whitelblack critical relations she
prescribes are historically determined (for example. speaking of her class composed
of nineteen white and six black students she remarks 'History has made geniality
improbable', 'white readers, at the moment, have...the moral authority to lead the
pursuit of black studies', p. 2). the reliance upon transcendental notions such as
authoritative truth and accuracy makes it difficult to imagine the possibility of
change.What began as a strategic division of the critical project along racial lines
hardens into one more rigid: political segregation soon becomes chromatic. Despite
the sense that her essay looks forward to a time of more favourable relations between
white readers and black writers Stimpson's theoretical assumptions render this
obscure. If the critical goal for the white reader is to be one of reading black writing
accurately ('I want to keep reading black literature, though. What matters is reading
it accurately,' p. 2) Stimpson is unable to make theoretical provision for its
realisation.
'I am not a Rock': Reading and Transference
I am not a Black Goddess
I am not a Rock
I am not a Photograph
I am not a picture in your mind
I am myself struggling toward myself"
A further consequence of assuming too permanent a stance as listener,on the
part of the white feminist critic, can be seen with reference to psychoanalytic ideas.
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Allowing texts to speak for themselves through the use of unincorporated quotation
or adopting a stance whereby the black woman/text is the unequivocal knower to
white woman's lack, white feminist critics can be said to be enacting a transference
relationship to those texts/voices. Jane Gallop explains the concept with regard to her
relationship to the dictionary:
According to Lacan, transference occurs in a relation to a 'subject presumed
to know'. In transference one considers the other as the Other (capital 0). The
Other means what s/he says and does what s/he means. The Other's language
is not alienated and the Other knows what the subject's own discourse means.
At one point, Lacan calls the Other, 'the locus of the signifier's treasure'
(Ecrits, p. 806). The gesture by which we go to the dictionary, the gesture of
trying to find out what a mysterious word 'means', is the attempt to go to the
place of the signifier's treasure ... The dictionary can function as the Other,
and in that way, it is not surprising that it produces certain effects of
transference.t"
In construing the black text as a site of authentic truth and meaningfulness, white
critics
produce the kind of extreme idealisations of Black women and their texts that form
the content of Donna Kate Rushin's poem 'Black Goddess'. Elaine Jordan, for
example, comments with respect to her experience of teaching black women's texts:
One of the reasons why white women have responded so enthusiastically to
writing by Black women is because it so often offers such uncompromising
identifications with women who are tough and enduring, often humorous.41
Refusing such a construction, the poem's images of stillness highlight the freezing,
ossifying nature of the transference relation - 'I am not a Rock', 'I am not a
Photograph' - whilst at the same time refusing the essential, the authentic as grounds
for self-definition: 'I am myself struggling toward myself. Likewise, the
protagonist of Grace Nichols' poem, 'Of course When They Ask for Poems About
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the 'Realities' of Black Women', objects to being 'the location of the signifiers
treasure' thus refusing the transference:
they want a little black blood
undressed
and validation
for the abused stereotype
already in their heads
Or else they want
a perfect song
,
Here Nichols exposes two related constructions of black womens subjectivity, as
victims of racism, and as culturally authentic and strong. The poem sounds a warning
to those who invest in these images:
Touch a black woman
you mistake for a rock
and you feel her melting
down to fudge
cradle a soft black woman
and burn fingers as you trace
revolution
beneath her woolly hair42
Some critics have argued the effects of transference to be an inevitable part of
reading and, therefore, the solution to lie in its exposure, and consequent working
through or interpretation, rather than its eradication43. In this line of thinking, to
foreground desire in critical practice is to work against repressive systems of
meaning, in that letting desire speak draws attention to 'the fact ... that no reading has
access to the meaning of the story and that all readings are stories of readerly
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desire. ,44Such a positive claim, nevertheless, needs to be set against the problems
that are created when white feminist desire constructs a black woman's literary work
as its object.
Readerly Desire
Catherine Belsey's text stresses the importance offoregrounding desire in writing:
It is important to do that: to write in a way that keeps desire in view for the
reader, not just as an object of knowledge (though it is that) but as a lived
condition, so that it is possible to see not only what but how much is at stake
in the stories Western culture tells about desire. (p. )
Making desire visible then is the suggested means of exposing the stakes of the
West's self-narrations. Given the critical importance attributed to the connections
between nations and narrations, to refer to Homi Bhabha's edited collection of
essays, these stakes cannot be underestimated: 'To study the nation through its
narrative address does not merely draw attention to its language and rhetoric; it also
attempts to alter the conceptual object itself.,45. In other words, exposing the West's
investment in its own narratives on desire is a deeply political enterprise whose goal
is to shift those investments as it analyses them.
Building on a politics of desire, Belsey's text simultaneously recommends a
political silence with regard to reading Toni Morrison's and other Third World
writers work. However, the manner in which Belsey inscribes her political silence
into her text can be read to undermine the 'welcomeness' of this intended anti-
colonial gesture. Far from being quiet, Belsey's silence, with respect to Toni
Morrison's work, is a peculiarly noisy affair. The texts critical/political silence takes
the form of a page and a half description of what would have been said but for the
matter of 'appearing to colonize [Morrison's] work.' (p. 92) The following extract is
exemplary:
I should dearly have liked to consider how The Bluest Eye (1979) records the
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cultural construction of the object of an unattainable but obsessional desire,
and to discuss the brilliant account in Beloved (1987) of the imbrication of the
deadly past of slavery in a present which cannot in consequence realize the
possibilities of life. (p. 92)
An effect of this abundant supply of detail regarding what is, after all, not to be
included, is to push against the claim to silence. In this sense, Belsey gets to have
her critical cake and eat it: her argument is made, albeit sketchily, and at the same
time not made so preserving the theoretical protocol she sets up in the first instance.
This is not the only means by which Belsey has it both ways. Perhaps the
most serious problem with the argument for critical abstention, as it is presented in
Desire, is that in deferring analysis of Morrison's work there is a sense in which it is
reconstituted as the site of desire in the text. Full analysis deferred, Belsey's
explanation is marked by an escalating and urgent desire: 'I should have liked to... I
should have liked to ... I should dearly have liked to ... (p. 92-3). What is more, the
definitions of desire subscribed to in the text further confirm Morrison's novels as its
prime location. Privileging LacanianlDerridean modes of analysis, desire is made to
signify as:
elud[ing] final definition, with the result that its character, its nature, its
meaning, becomes itself an object of desire for the writer. (p. 6)
Desire is what is not said, what is "hollowed within the demand" as Lacan
puts it (pp. 17-18)
With 'absence' signifying 'as desire's recurring figure'(p. 15) the self-conscious
withholding of what appears to be fully worked out analyses of Morrison's works
serves to mark those works as the very embodiment of desire in Belsey's text. With
this there is also a sense in which Belsey's own (withheld) analysis is simultaneously
constructed as an object of desire, which is then held before the reader who is left
presumably wanting more. This appears to be a self-conscious strategy of the text:
... one feature all these texts have in common, including Lacan's, including
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Barbara Cartland's is that by citing, by evading, by teasing, they elicit the
desire of the reader, thus demonstrating the degree to which desire is an effect
of the signifier. (p. 19)
A strategy that is undercut by the fact that within the terms of her own frame Belsey
reinscribes the very relation that she sets out to avoid: 'To make her fiction work for
me, to get it to define desire on my behalf, might well be one form of such
expropriation ... ' (p. 92). In refraining from such an analysis Belsey only succeeds in
expropriating (to use her term) Morrison's texts as the site of Desire's desire. If the
other texts in her study are explicated theoretically in terms of desire, Morrison's
texts embody desire in their partial and absent explication.
With this there is a further point to be made with regard to the textual location
of Belsey's comments on Morrison. Appearing at the end of the chapter 'Postmodern
Love,' this non-reading of The Bluest Eye etc. takes place at the end of the first
section 'Desire now'. In addition to constituting the site of desire for the critic,
Morrison's texts also mark the limit of the thinkable/sayable, the point at which the
text itself hollows out, where discussion fades into Desire's absent centre. The
section on Morrison marks the transition from the first to the second half of the book
'Desire at other times', a point which occurs, coincidentally, almost at the centre of
the text. The race politics of this are questionable. As numerous postcolonial critics
have indicated, the alignment of the colonial subject/territory with unspeakability,
not to say unreadability, has a long and pernicious history. Elleke Boehmer discusses
the manner by which colonial anxieties, regarding the inadequacy of scientific
paradigms of knowledge to the Enlightenment project of mapping the colonised
lands, become displaced onto the native.
Especially where they were resistant to his requirements, the European
represented colonized people as unruly, inscrutable, or malign. Crowd
imagery came in handy to suggest a lack of character and individual will ...A
little differently, displacement in its more pronounced forms is characterized
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by its appeal to the Romantic Sublime. Here the unreadable subject is
transformed into the sign of its own unreadability.:What happens, typically, is
that description admits defeat, submitting to the horror of the inarticulate. The
native or colonized land is evoked as the quintessence of mystery, as
inarticulateness itself.46
Within the textual territory of Belsey's discussion, Morrison's work constitutes the limit
of what is articulable; the effect of which is to undermine Belsey's anti-colonialist claims
further still.
To pick up the point about the radical potential of making the transference visible,
Elizabeth Abel discusses Jane Gallop's self-confessed transference relationship to
African-American feminists. Gallop has stated:
I realize that the set of feelings that I used to have about French men I now have
about African-American women. Those are the people I feel inadequate in
relation to and try to please in my writing. It strikes me that this is not just
idiosyncratic.t?
As Abel indicates, Gallop prefers to make the transference visible, '. . . rather than
positing alternatives to it' (p. 473) Questioning the limits of mere displays of readerly
desire she states: ' ... by simply transferring the transference, [Gallop] reenacts the process
of idealisation that obscures more complex social relations.' (p. 472) In exposing the fact
of the transference Gallop stops short of doing anything about it. This is odd, given her
commitment to working through and interpreting the transference in other contexts, for
instance, in her readings of the philosophy of Luce Irigaray, for instance.sf Again a
critical debate that has currency in feminist criticism is bracketed off from consideration
in the context of race. Similarly, the flirtatious relationship that Desire sets up with the
reader, with its veilings and evasions, its teasing aesthetic, may have radical potential in
certain contexts, its radicalness with respect to offering a way of rethinking race politics is
far less certain.
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Conclusion
All three critics under discussion in this chapter place emphasis upon the inevitability
of reading equating with imperialism. This sense of inevitability permeates Miller's,
albeit tentative, reasoning. Saying nothing becomes an option in light of the damage
that is seen to be caused by her attempt to say something about race: the piece 'on
race' does more harm than good, better to say nothing than add fuel to the fire.
However, saying nothing is by no means the critical innocence that each critic
intends. To say nothing is both to perpetuate the idea that whiteness is nothing in
racial terms, and to belie the fact that there is plenty to say on the part of white
feminist women who, whether she wishes to recognise it or not, and indeed whether
she desires it or not, is the beneficiary of a white supremacist set of racial
designations.It is interesting, then, in this light, that both Stimpson and Belsey seek
to restrain the significance of their respective critical silences. Neither critic opts for a
literal silence in the reading and race debate, instead both offer a figurative notion of
'not speaking' that turns on ideas of authority and its distribution in the critical field.
In attempting to make their silences readable, however, both critics run into troubled
territory.
This is.not to say that the ambition of listening is any less problematic. Belsey
fails to realise her self-assigned task of listening to Third World and African-
American women; listening remains a wholly rhetorical gesture in her text,. The
redistribution of authority through opting for silent listening ultimately fails. While
it is tempting to buy into what could be termed a logic of regret - choosing silence as
means of renouncing authority or as an exercise in damage limitation - saying
nothing not only causes no less damage, it leaves the issue of white dominance
unchallenged. As Spivak has remarked 'Unless one is aware that one cannot avoid
taking a stand, unwitting stands get taken,49
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Chapter 3. 'One of Us': Feminists Reading and the Politics of Identification
And do we not, after all, easily recognise one another?'
If some white feminists have stressed the difficulties of reading black women's texts
to the point of doubt over whether they can read at all, others have remarked upon the
relative ease that accompanies reading. Far from being 'other', the race-different text
are greeted with nods of recognition, as in Eva Lennox Birch's classroom.
Despite the differences between our own and the autobiographers' social and
cultural backgrounds, we found ourselves nodding in agreement and
recognition at the articulation of experience we shared as women, irrespective
of colour.i
Alison Light notes how, whilst studying The Color Purple, students identified very
strongly with aspects of Alice Walker's novel:
Our readings began instead from a position of identification rather than of
difference ... we all talked about the power and appeal of such writing in terms
of recognising, identifying with, and desiring such affirmation as women, as
white, working-class, middle-class, feminist or not.'
Rather than being overwhelmed by difference, such readers proceed from a sense of
connection based upon recognition. In both cases texts are perceived as speaking to
their readers 'as women'. Shared, as opposed to disparate, experiences form grounds
from which to read. While Light goes on to problematise such identifications, Birch
affirms identification as a basis for reading writings by black women. So, the work of
British writer Buchi Emecheta is described, for example, as 'recreat[ing] a female
experience that was recognisable by women irrespective of their colour. ,4 Elsewhere,
Birch asserts how black women's writings inscribe a notion of oppression that
reaches beyond that of race: 'In examining racial prejudice black women writers
expose the cultural constraints of class, gender and religion with which white women
can also identify." Race oppression then, speaks to other oppressions which are in
tum 'recognisable' to white women readers.
The notion of a reading position based upon recognition or identification has
an important history in feminist theory/literary criticism. Christina Crosby describes
the process of readerly identification as constituting a 'founding moment of a certain
feminist self-consciousness' which heralds 'the discovery of an identity common to
all women, woman's identity as 'the other.' ,6 Indeed feminism in its second wave
can be said to be founded upon on a notion of global gender oppression; the idea that
gender relations were organised fundamentally in terms of male domination was
axiomatic to early feminist theorists. However, this history of identifying on the
grounds of a shared gender oppression, 'as women', is simultaneously problematic.
As has been shown in chapter 2 a number of black feminist critics have questioned
the basis for white women's assumption of universal sisterhood. From Barbara
Smith's observations as to the unwitting Eurocentrism of early investigations of
'women's' writing to Audre Lorde's concern that, 'There is a pretense to a
homogeneity of experience covered by the word sisterhood which does not in fact
exist'7 , many critics have challenged the use of 'universal woman' on the grounds
that its foundation, far from being all inclusive, is one of exclusion. Trin T. Minh-ha
explains further:
Just as 'man' provides an example of how the part played by women has been
ignored, undervalued, distorted, or omitted through the use of terminology
presumed to be generic, 'woman' more often than not reflects the subtle
power of linguistic exclusion, for its set of referents rarely includes those
relevant to Third World 'female persons'."
The incursion of feminist postmodern critique has further undermined the
basis for universal sisterhood with its relentless questioning of the category 'woman',
not to mention the nature of SUbjectivity itself. Privileging difference over sameness,
postmodern feminists raise doubts as to the usefulness of identification as a basis for
reading and political organising", Carla Kaplan suggests, for example, that
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proceeding from a position of identity reduces texts to little more than self-indulgent
mirrors'". Unable to take account of the text's differences, identificatory reading
reproduces what is already known. So, in the case of the white feminist identifying
with The Color Purple' J, for instance , she is said to find what she is looking for:
herself. The 'raced' text is reconstituted in her own (white) image. Called universal,
the text is reduced to the reproduction of the self-same. Alison Light points up this
effect in the marketing of Spielberg's film of Walker's novel. 'It's about life. It's
about love. It's about us' proclaimed the promotional trailer, a statement which,
Light argues, denies the film's sexual and racial specificity 12 in order to increase its
marketability (p. 89) This erasure of racial difference is also borne out in Birch's
identificatory reading practice.
Stressing the recognisability of black women's writing for white feminist and
women readers, Birch's universal reading is, nevertheless, undermined by its
inattention to race. In both texts Birch relies upon notions of transcendence and
translation as means of rendering the racial content of her chosen texts legible to
white readers. It is argued that through 'examining racial prejudice' black women
writers simultaneously raise issues with which white women 'can also identify'(class,
gender and religion). Furthermore:
The examination of racial and sexual oppression in their writing inevitably
starts with, but crosses the bounds of race, and emphasises the universality of
women's sense of the constraints with which a socially constructed gender
position burdens them. (1994, p. 7)
Put differently, if race is the (particular) starting point for the majority of black
women writers it is soon transcended in favour of the universal story of gender. The
specific (that is, not-universal) script of 'race' in the text is then rendered legible
through the translation of its particular codes into the general, universal script of
women's oppression. Racial difference is seen, then, to interrupt the process of
id if . 131 enti ication as a woman
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Because I am not black I cannot have complete identification with the body of
black feminist critics such as Barbara Christian or Barbara Smith who have
successfully encouraged the development of black feminist theory. (p. 4)
Here Birch is more explicit: stressing the 'truth of [Barbara] Smith's observation that
'When white women look at black women's works they are of course ill-equipped to
deal with the subtleties of racial politics'" she comments: 'This is a self-evident truth
but will only become an impassable barrier to understanding if the only way of
looking at that work is from the viewpoint of race.' (p. 2). The argument is that ;
white women, despite being self-evidently ill-equipped, can read black women's
writing, not only because it offers other reading positions to that of 'race', it speaks
also to all forms of women's oppression.
While these remarks seem intended as a means both of relinquishing any
claim to a totalising representation/authoritative statement regarding black women's
texts and of acknowledging ongoing tensions between the projects of white and black
feminist criticism, they nevertheless present problems. First, in attributing self-
evidence to Barbara Smith's comments about white women's (in)capacity for dealing
with race politics, Birch involves herself in the kinds of difficulties outlined in
chapter 1: by freezing Smith's significance in the field of feminist interpretation there
is an unwitting rehearsal of the discourses of ethnicity which rely upon the fixing of
the ethnic as a category. Second, the translation of race into gender, of illegible into
legible, is a colonising gesture. In a discussion of Walter Benjamin's essay 'The
Task of the Translator' Diana Fuss writes of the colonial potential of the act of
translation:
The theoretical move to banish history from the realm of translation operates
to conceal, and ultimately to preserve, a colonising impulse at work in
translation; Benjamin's 'great motif of integrating many tongues into one true
language' [77] represents an imperialist dream, a fantasy of linguistic
incorporation and cultural assimilation.i"
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Birch's invocation of the universal operates in such a way; the many tongues of black
women's writings are translated into the one true language of sisterhood/gender
oppression. The 'particular' discourse of race is translated into the 'general' of
gender. With this Birch perpetuates the fantasy that white women are un-raced, that
they are simply women; if black women read and write, irrevocably, as black women,
white women do so as women. The feminist dream of a common language is revealed
here as an imperialist fantasy. Rather than constituting unknown territory, in this
view, black women's writing offers confirmation of something that is already known.
Reading becomes less a matter of decoding something strange and unfamiliar than of
affirming a set of knowledges that are already, in advance, in the possession of the
white reader. Reading becomes then an acknowledgment or recognition of these facts
as opposed to a confrontation with difference. The perceived gender script wins out,
that of race being relegated to the realm of the particular. This is a familiar scene.
Again to recall chapter 1, black writing generally has often found itself interpolated,
like Jade in Tar Baby, at the centre of an exasperating opposition: 'She was
uncomfortable with the way Margaret stirred her into blackening up or universalling
out, always alluding to or ferreting out what she believed were racial
\4-'1.
characteristics.' In marking race as a particular script, dividing it from the universal
story of gender, Birch's analysis flips erratically between these two poles:
'Universalled out', 'blackened up', 'ours' and 'theirs'. For all the attempts to respect
the traditions of the literature she and her students read by maintaining a position as
universal woman Birch only succeeds in othering her texts. As Gayatri Spivak puts it
in the context of First World readers and Third World writers: ' ... in order to learn
about the Third World women and develop a different readership, the immense
heterogeneity of the field must be appreciated, and the First World feminist must
learn to stop feeling privileged as a woman.' IS Patricia J. Williams, in a recent
lecture, speaks of the 'false luxury of a prematurely imagined community', a place
where racism, disharmony is spirited away with a supreme act of the imagination.
89 I
To put it another way, it is a dangerous if comprehensible temptation to
imagine inclusiveness by imagining away obstacles .... We must be careful
not to allow our intentions to verge into outright projection by substituting a
fantasy of global seamlessness that is blinding rather than just colour-blind. IS"~'-
For Williams, the assumption of community is to be replaced by the 'difficult work
of negotiating real divisions' among women, 'of considering boundaries before we
go crashing through, and of pondering our differences before we can ever agree on
the terms of our sameness' (p. 4)
Given these problems, it is not surprising that feminist criticism has moved
from saying that we have everything in common as women, to a position of suspicion
regarding any form of identification. Proceeding from a Lacanian model of the
subject where, to recall, the subject discovers itself, as it were, through self-
identification with the image reflected in the mirror, an identification which is
nevertheless based upon misrecognition, many critics have placed emphasis upon the
fictionality of identity and therefore identificatory acts, such as 'seeing oneself in a
text or social category. While the exclusions produced by readerly identification
need, somehow, to be accounted for, it is also questionable whether it is possible to
dispense entirely with identification as a basis for reading. The emphasis on the
denial of difference or the manifest inability to account for differences in
identificatory reading practice has tended to produce an overinvestment in difference
itself. There is also an attendant danger in writing off identificatory reading as little
more than a necessary error or a naive aspect of the feminist past.
In the light of this, in addition to rehearsing some of the arguments against
identification as a basis for reading, I suggest a re-examination of their assumptions.
Most importantly, I challenge the thinking that conflates identificatory reading with
the establishment of universal ground from which to read. In short, to identify with a
text is not necessarily to universalise it. To recognise themes and issues from one's
own life in a given text is not automatically to explain that text in terms of a
universal story. With this I also suggest a re-examination of the universal itself: a
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questioning of the ways in which it operates as a code word for
authoritarianism/conservatism etc. in feminist postmodern discourse.
I explore these ideas in relation to two modes of identificatory reading:
between self and text and in the following chapter between theory and text. The first
section of this chapter focuses on two feminist readings of the 'Third World'event of
female genital mutilation: Mary Daly's Gyn/ecology and Alice Walker's Warrior
Marks16• I have chosen to discuss this issue precisely because of its reputation as site
of profound difficulty for Western feminists. This difficulty can be seen to manifest
itself in the extreme polarisation of responses in whiteIWestern feminist discourse:
on the one hand, there is a view that cultural difference renders the event unreadable,
producing a 'we cannot say anything' approach, and on the other, genital mutilation
is seen as but one manifestation of a universal plot or story which centres on the
abuse of women. A common feature of the depiction of this global war against
women is the tendency to reduce the various oppressions endured by women the
world over to a single structure. This structure then enables white Western women to
identify with their Third World sisters on the grounds of a shared experience.
The implications of abstaining from comment have been raised In the
previous chapter. I will confine myself in this chapter to an examination of what
happens when white feminist readers choose to identify with events from different
cultures. The main reason for choosing Daly's text is that it is, in many ways,
paradigmatic of a 'First World' approach at its most problematic and provides a
good rehearsal of the debates around 'First World' reading and the 'Third World'
text. In addition, although the position Daly presents in her text has been, in many
ways, theoretically superseded, its historical status in the feminist canon justifies its
examination. This is particularly the case when it is considered that little advance has
been made in terms of the issues of reading and appropriation that the text is
instrumental in raising. However, while I agree that the majority of responses by
white feminists have been at best unsatisfactory and that the fear of being charged
with racism is all too pervading, I question the automatic assumption that the issue of
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appropriation is irrelevant to Alice Walker on the sole basis of her blackness. In
looking at the work of both Walker and Mary Daly I am interested first in disrupting
the arrangement of meanings where white and First World and black and Third
World are assumed to stand neatly next to one another. That it is, necessarily, the
province of a black woman to deal 'properly' with an issue such as genital
mutilation. Second, I am concerned with how identificatory reading practice renders
intelligible a culturally different act/text/event, and I wish to assess the gains and
losses of this intelligibility for the both the Third World and the white/Western
feminist critic. Finally, I discuss my own identifications with Jackie Kay's collection
of poems The Adoption Papers, in order to highlight the shortcomings of arguments
that seek to dispense with identification as a basis for reading.
The Hag's Liberation: Mary Daly's Cosmic Voyage.
Published in 1978 Gynlecology is an important landmark in feminist critical history.
Uncompromising in tone, Daly's text proclaimed itself as a wake-up call to women
across the globe. Gynlecology assembles a formidable collection of acts of woman-
hatred, of' gynocidal' activity. Everything from the wearing of stiletto heels to witch
burning to foot-binding to rape to twentieth-century gynaecology is held up for
scrutiny in a work that is massive in its scope. In gathering together these hitherto
disparate acts of oppression Daly's self-stated ambition is the ' ...discovery and
creation ofa world other than patriarchy.' (p. 1) Given that, first; 'Patriarchy appears
to be 'everywhere' , and second, ' ... this colonization ... is also internalised,
festering inside women's heads, even feminist heads.' (p. 1) the feminist endeavour
is one of confronting in full the distortions and perversities that bear the Name of the
Father. This confrontation is described by Daly as nothing less than an exorcism:
The Journey, then, involves exorcism of the internalised Godfather in his
various manifestations (his name is legion). It involves dangerous encounters
with these demons...Our journey involves confrontations with the demonic
manifestation of evil. (pp. 1-2)
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Having become their 'own exorcists' feminists are then able to cut through the
'maze/haze of deception' so 'springing into free space which is an a-mazing
process'(p. 2), thus entering ' ... the wild realm of hags and crones' (p. 3).
In addition to charting the course of the hag/crone/feminist's liberation, Daly
asserts the universality of patriarchal oppression. While the specific acts of
'Goddess-murder' are admitted to be various Daly not only views 'the phenomenon
[as] planetary' (p. Ill) but also identifies an underlying structure common to all such
acts. The 'Sado-Ritual Syndrome' is said to have seven distinguishing features.
Briefly: I) 'an obsession with purity'; ii) 'a total erasure of responsibility for the
atrocities performed through such rituals'; iii) 'a tendency to 'catch on' and spread';
iv) 'women are used as scapegoats and token torturers'; v) 'a fixation upon minute
details, which diverts attention from the horror'; vi) 'behaviour which is at other
times unacceptable becomes acceptable even normative as a consequence of
conditioning'; vii) 'legitimation of the ritual by the rituals of "objective" scholarship'
(pp. 131-3). Each particular oppressive event is then translated into the frame of the
Sado-Ritual.
Stressing the essential sameness of patriarchal abuse throughout the world,
through recourse to the Sado-Ritual, permits Daly to criticise different cultures, on
the grounds that the West's record is no better regarding its treatment of women.
Arguing that 'accusations of racism... serve only the interests of males' Daly
continues in a footnote:
... it is in the interest of women of all races to see African genital mutilation
in the context of planetary patriarchy, of which it is but one manifestation. As
I am demonstrating it is of the same pattern as the other atrocities I discuss.
Lest Westerners feel smugly distant from these rituals it would be best
to recall some fact of' our' culture. (pp. 154-5)
These facts include clitoridectomy as a so-called cure for 'hysteria', gang rape, and
the use of the chastity belt in medieval Europe. Daly then appeals to a universal
sisterhood-in-suffering, so to speak, precisely as a counter to any potential
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accusations of critical imperialism or, to use her term, racism. Daly's universal, her
pursuit of a common identity or structure to patriarchy's oppression of women, is
then intended to be inclusive, as opposed to exclusive, to unite the world's women
under the banner of the Sado-Ritual Syndrome. Universal sisterhood is predicated
upon recognition of the essential sameness of our condition as women worldwide. If
the underlying structure of patriarchal oppression is the same problems of
imperialism seem to disappear in that we can all recognise one another's experiences;
we can all identify with each other on the basis of shared victimhood. 'We' in the
'West' experience, in essence, the same things as 'you' in the 'Third world'; we are
in this together, united against a common enemy. 'We' wear high heels; 'you'
are/were foot bound; 'we' Europeans were burnt as witches; 'you' Asians as widows.
However, despite these intentions there remain serious problems with Daly's vision
of a feminist universe which undermine her anti-imperialist aims.
In claiming to identify a single common form to women's oppression
Gyn/ecology runs up against the kinds of problems that inhere with structuralist
approaches. In presuming to identify a deep structure to women's experience in
'patriarchy' Daly's analysis can only fail to account for the particular 'workings of
gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those
contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been 'to find 'examples' or
'illustrations' ofa universal principle that is assumed from the start,)7 The imposition
of a predetermined frame ensures that Daly finds no more than what she set out to
look for. One of the more serious consequences of this neglect of the specific context
of gender oppression is the manifest inability of the text to provide any specific
engagement with issues of race.
In her essay' An Open Letter to Mary Daly' Audre Lorde states: 'The
oppression of women knows no ethnic nor racial boundaries, true, but that does not
mean it is identical within those differences.i'j Put differently, in reducing women's
oppression to a single structure and in creating a fundamental opposition along the
lines of gender, Daly's analysis is unable to address the most crucial aspects of black
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feminist critique. Namely, that for non-white women gender is not automatically the
privileged site of oppression; that black women are by no means always able to choose
their gender over their race in the fight against oppression. In Daly's textual universe
there is no accounting for the differential power relations between black and white
women, or between white and non-white women, or even within women themselves.
Laura Donaldson elaborates the problems in thinking internal differences:
For example, describing the position of a white, middle-class woman either as
oppressed or oppressive might vary in terms of her racial or economic status;
indeed, she can sometimes be both simultaneously - in a patriarchal society, her
femaleness dictates her subjection as a sexual object, and in a racist society, her
whiteness dictates an often unwitting participation in sustaining a system of
white supremacy. Another way of saying this is that sometimes women can be in
the men's room and not even know it.19
In using a fixed hierarchical model of universally opposed men and women, class and
race distinctions get lost along the way or else added onto the foundational model of
gender difference. A further manifestation of this problematic division can be seen in the ,
very different meanings that accrue for black and non-white women around certain
universal 'women's issues'. Audre Lorde suggests the following as a place to start:
...for nonwhite women in this country there is an 80 percent fatality rate from
breast cancer; three times the number of unnecessary eventrations, hysterectomies
and sterilisations as for white women; three times as many chances of being
raped, murdered, or assaulted as exist for white women. (op cit., p.70)
As Angela Davis wrote in Women, Race and Class (white )feminist campaigning around
the 'universal' issue of reproductive rights neglected to notice that for black
women/women of colour there was a very different agenda at work. For black women the
facts of sterilisation abuse, along with the administering of Depo Provera, an injectable
contraceptive with proven side effects, did not sit well alongside white
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women's campaigning for abortion on demand'". The racism of the Family Planning
services had ensured that black women ' ...had always been given abortions more
readily than white women and are indeed encouraged to have terminations [they]
didn't ask for:21 A woman's right to choose takes on a very different set of meanings
when these issues are taken into account.
In reducing gender oppression to a monocausal, culture-neutral model
Gyn/ecology implies that 'escaping' that model, liberating oneself from the 'world
religion' that is patriarchy is the same for all women. Daly's analysis is unable, to
borrow a phrase from Teresa de Lauretis, to distinguish between: 'women who wear
the veil, women who 'wear the mask'(a metaphor by Paul Lawrence Dunbar often
quoted by black women writers) and women who masquerade (Joan Riviere).'22
Indeed, in Gyn/ecology there is no distinction to be made between such practices in
that they are all aspects of the state of false consciousness engendered by the
patriarchal thought police. In this extract Daly uses the veil as a metaphor for the
condition of women in the State of Possession that is male supremacy:
It isn't enough for women who can see the State of Possession merely to
'escape.' The problem is not merely one of escape from the religious,
technological, and medical Mafia. So long as we are only escaping, we are re-
acting. The etymology of the term escape is enlightening. According to
Merriam-Webster, it is derived from the Latin ex, meaning out, and cappa,
meaning head-covering, cloak. Thus, as the word literally says, we are
slipping out from our head-coverings or cloaks (ex-caping). In other words, as
long as we are just escaping, we are simply un-veiling ourselves. Indeed, this
is necessary for the Journey. It names the important process of women
throwing off such alienating ideological '-hoods' as 'womanhood.' Yet so
long as the Voyager is only or primarily escaping, re-acting, she is still
haunted by the messages of the agents who spook in the Passive Voice. (p.
339)
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Here, the veil is granted a fixed significance: it is a part of the apparatus of the
oppressor, something to be cast off; an obstacle to clear feminist vision. What is
more the very act of un-veiling is said to be necessary for the feminist Voyager;
without un-veiling there can be no entry into the Third Passage, no final liberation.
While Daly is admittedly deploying the veil as a metaphor, there is evidence to
support a more literal reading. Throughout the text Daly conflates material, psychic
and social practices. For instance, the wearing of cosmetics is seen as the acting out
of a set of oppressive practices designed to obscure or distort woman's true nature,
erasing their true Selves. This act is then metaphorised, taken to imply something
essential about the women's condition. Such women are termed 'Painted Birds' (p.
334), a condition which enacts in microcosm the position of women in the
Phallocracy. Thus the token torturers (the mothers who bind their daughters feet, the
female circumcisers etc.) or token women (agents of male supremacy: male-
identified women, Daddy's girls, pseudo-feminists), become 'doubly or triply
Painted Birds' (p. 335):
... the multiply Painted Bird, functions in the anti-process of double-crossing
her sisters, polluting them with poisonous paint, making them less and less
real in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. For unknowingly, she is
herself a carrier of the paint disease, an intensifier of the common condition
of women under patriarchy. (p. 336)
In short, a material practice is taken to signify as a transparent symptom or
manifestation of the ideological oppression of women by men. Women who wear
veils or make-up (the one amounts to the other in Daly's world) are then simply
performing a set of rituals that guarantee their own subordination.
This fixing of significance rehearses the same problems encountered earlier in
the division of oppressor from oppressed strictly according to gender. Again, there
seems to be no accounting for cultural differentials in the meanings of what are
termed, unequivocally, patriarchal acts and institutions. For instance, in her study of
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male-female relations in Muslim society Fatima Mernissi explains how the meanings
around the issue of cosmetics differ fundamentally for Western and Muslim women:
It is interesting that while Western women's liberation movements had to
repudiate the body in pornographic mass media, Muslim women are likely to
claim the right to their bodies as part of their liberation movement. Previously
a Muslim woman's body belonged to the man who possessed her, her father
or husband. The mushrooming of beauty salons and ready to wear boutiques
in Moroccan towns can be interpreted as a forerunner of women's urge to
claim their own bodies, which will culminate in more radical claims, such as
the claim to birth control and abortion.r'
Here, the meanings that accrue around the matter of personal appearance for Muslim
women cannot be incorporated into Daly's interpretive frame. In the textual universe
of Gyn/ecology Muslim women are simply victims of false consciousness, Painted
Birds, 'token women...acting in complicity with the Possessors' (p. 318), exchanging
one veil for another. Daly's feminism unwittingly enacts its own complicity with the
discourses of colonialism. With regard to Muslim women's relationship to the veil,
there is more to consider than simply its role in the control of female sexuality.
Mernissi details the complications arising from the fact that 'the first gesture of
'liberated' Arab women was to discard the veil for Western dress, which in the
thirties, forties and fifties was that of the wife of the colonizer.' (p. 167) The
adoption of Western clothes in the context of colonialism can never mean an
unequivocal victory for feminism. Put differently, there is more than a degree of
privilege at work if the only identifiable source of oppression is that of gender. For
non-white/working-class/lesbian and other non-hegemonic groups issues of
dominance are always about more than gender alone.
From identifying a fundamental structure of oppression Daly identifies a
structure of liberation or escape from the clutches of patriarchy. The journey to
freedom is divided into three separate stages or passages. These passages are inter-
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related in that it is through the work of the first two passages that access to the third
is achieved:
Gyn/ecology is the proper name for The Third Passage, for it names the
patterns/designs of the moving female-identified environment which can only
be heard/seen after the Journeyer has been initiated through the First and
Second Passages. (p. 316)
The First and Second Passages are described, respectively, as a breaking through the
barriers of patriarchal myth in order to perceive woman's true nature and a
confrontation with the atrocities perpetrated by the Unnatural Enemies of Female
Be-ing. This spiral dynamic of discovery and confrontation is what allows entry into
the Third Passage: 'the Otherworld - which is her own time/space.' (p. 32) This
movement between passages is simultaneously a movement through exorcism to
ecstasy, from myth to naming, from falsehood to truth. By confronting the distortions
of the Foreground (Patriarchy) Daly and her fellow Amazon Voyagers are able to sail
deeper into the Background: the location of women's truth, the 'Treasure Trove of
symbols and myths that have been stolen and reversed by the patriarchal thieves' (p.
xxviii).
Spinning deeper into the background is courageous sinning against the Sins
of the Fathers. As our senses have been tricked by their texts. We begin by
unweaving our winding sheets. The process of exorcism, of peeling off the
layers of mindbendings and cosmetics, is movement past the patriarchally
imposed sense of reality and identity. This demystification process, a-mazing
The Lies, is ecstasy. (p. 6)
Despite the text's insistence upon the accessibility of The Voyage to all women,
transglobally, transculturally, the extent to which this is the case is questionable. In
other words, some women are in a better position to buy a ticket to the Otherworld
than others.
Daly's text partakes of a romantic fantasy in that it invests far too heavily in
the notion of individual self-determination. The text recommends that liberation is a
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matter of will, of individual strength. The contradictions that this throws up for its
thesis notwithstanding, Gyn/ecology renders culture/ideology (the two are entirely
coincident in the text) to be little more than a set of restrictive or ill-fitting garments
that can be cast off at will. Daly's Journey is then envisaged as mainly a psychic and
linguistic adventure: confronting lies and rescuing truth nowhere does Daly consider
the complexity, or to be more precise the supreme embeddedness of the cultural
practices she examines. In The Hidden Face of Eve Nawaal El Sadawi specifies the
nationalist and economic context of the practice of female genital mutilation and is
critical of Western feminists who presume to know without reference to the
2.3a
relationship between First and Third worlds. In presuming identity through reference
to the Sado-Ritual Gyn/ecology can be said to enact a form of_'imperialist cross-
. ,24 , hi I" ,25referencmg or w ite so ipsism ie the tendency to unwittingly organise
meanings around the (white) self, according to specifically white interests as if they
were the interests of all.
Furthermore, the Voyage itself is highly problematic in terms of its race
politics in that the structure of Gyn/ecology's feminist Journey serves to reinforce the
unwitting privilege of its First world participants. Arriving at her ecstatic destination
is wholly dependent upon the Voyagers ability to face up to or confront the atrocities
of the Sado-Ritual Syndrome.
Despite - and because of - the terrors and tragedies that must be faced in this
part of the Journey, the Voyager senses a growing integrity of vision and
purpose. As a consequence of her courage to see, she finds the focus of her
anger, so that it fuels and no longer blocks her passion and her creativity.
Thus this exorcising Passage gives her the right of passage into the
Otherworld, the world of her own Enspiriting, Sparking, Spinning Ecstasy.
(p. 112)
Having confronted the spectacle of the foot bound, the genitally mutilated, the
incarcerated woman, the Voyager gains entry into Ecstasy. Rather than help her
mutilated sister, the Voyager makes use of her to purify herself spiritually, to unblock
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her creativity. In her work on the ethical obligations of 'First World' to 'Third
World' women/texts Spivak asks that the First world reader ask herself persistently
'who is the Other woman' as a way of ensuring critical accountability. In other
words, how am I consolidating myself/my reading/my text? What assumptions am I
making about the Other woman? These are questions that are conspicuous in their
absence from the text, whose 'Other' woman remains silent and stuck on the outside
of the gates of Ecstasy. In Gyn/ecology Daly has effectively constructed a feminist
theme park, complete with its chamber of horrors. Entrance into the Otherworld of
Ecstasy is reserved for those strong enough (or rather privileged enough) to stomach
its spectacle.
Alice Walker's Blindness
I remember when the issue of female circumcision was raised and all these
western women were saying, 'We don't like it. But we don't want to judge it
through white imperialist eyes.' It took a black woman, it took Alice Walker,
to say this is not an issue of culture, this is an issue of'humanity"
With white, First World feminist critics floundering it has seer£d to many that the
1\
issue of female genital mutilation is rightfully the province of black women. As
Meera Syal's words (above) suggest, the problems that dominate white First world
approaches to the subject are able to be swept aside by black feminists. Alice
Walker's high profile campaign against the continued practice of female genital
mutilation has taken a number of forms. The novel Possessing the Secret of Joy
brought the subject to an unprecedented audience", as did the film Warrior Marks
made in collaboration with feminist filmmaker Pratibha Parmar. Walker also
promoted the film with an accompanying lecture tour, an event which stimulated still
more media attention for the campaign. This work has an origin in the author's sense
of debt to a character who appears briefly in The Color Purple and The Temple of My
Familiar. 'Tashi ... stayed with me, uncommonly tenacious, through the writing of
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both books, and led me finally to conclude she needed, and deserved, a book of her
own. ,28 This debt is marked in the text of Possessing the Secret of Joy by the
inclusion of an extract from The Color Purple as a preface. The book can then be
read as a problematisation of what in The Color Purple is presented as a an act of
cultural preservation in the context of imperialism; 'It is a way the Olinka can show
they still have their own ways ... even though the white man has taken everything
else' (n.p.).
My discussion will concern itself, however, mainly with Walker and
Parmar's journal published as a companion piece to the film, also entitled Warrior
Marks. An assemblage of diary entries, letters, interviews and additional material
(including diagrams of female genitalia; descriptions of the various types of genital
mutilation; addresses of contact organisations and advocacy groups; and further
reading), the text offers a kind of witness to the motivations that inform Walker and
Parmar's involvement with the campaign. It is here that Walker establishes the
grounds for her work most explicitly, hence my interest in this particular text above
the others. In particular, I question the grounds on which Walker establishes her
authority in presenting herself as a commentator/campaigner against the practice.
While it is indisputable that the writer's presence has had a significant impact on the
campaign in this country, there are, I believe a number of hidden problems in the way
in which Walker relates herself to the project, particularly in the ease with which
Walker assumes sisterhood and identity with both the genitally mutilated and their
African campaigners. The main contention is that the categories black and Third
World, and the corollary, white and First World should not be assumed to always line
up together. The precise status of these problems is also subject to discussion.
The first clue as to the potential problems of Walker's epistemological
assumptions can be gleaned from the text's cover. Subtitled 'Female Genital
Mutilation and the Sexual Blinding of Women' Warrior Marks as text and film
establishes close identity between Walker and its subjects from the outset. Following
the written text's dedication to 'the female child in Africa', a statement from Walker
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appears explaining the 'special significance' of the girl in the photograph that
accompanies the dedication. The child, standing alone with her back against a tree,
captivates Walker. Having arranged for her to be photographed Walker is approached
by Parmar:
'Look at that little girl,' I said. 'I am very drawn to her and haven't managed
to take my eyes off her since we arrived.' Pratibha took one look and laughed.
'But, Alice,' she said, 'she's a little you.' At that moment I could see it too. It
was exactly as if I were looking in a mirror but seeing my three year old self.
Only one photograph of me used to exist - I don't know where it is now - and
suddenly I was able to remember it. (n.p.)
The identification set up here between Walker and 'the female child of Africa'
continues throughout her journal entries. It is at its most sustained, however, in
Walker's introduction to the film which is reprinted in the journal text. Entitled
'Like the pupil of an eye', it begins with a narration of the events that culminated in
the author's loss of sight in one eye (she was shot by her brother with an air rifle).
The shooting was effectively ignored by her family and Walker grew up feeling
'completely devalued. Unseen. Worthless.' (p. 16) As a 'consciously feminist adult'
though, Walker comes to the realisation that 'What [she] had ... was a patriarchal
wound', a 'warrior mark'(p. 17). She continues:
It is true that I am marked forever, like the woman who is robbed of her
clitoris, but it is not, as it once was, the mark of a victim. What the woman
warrior learns if she is injured as a child, before she can even comprehend
that there is a war going on against her, is that you can fight back, even after
you are injured. Your wound itself can be your guide. (p. 18)
Initially this reads not unlike Daly's attempt to establish global sisterhood. Elsewhere
in the text both Walker and Parmar attempt to link the practice of genital mutilation
to other Western practices. Parmar writes of ' ... the psychic and physical
mutilations that women in the West undergo are equally devastating: unwanted
hysterectomies, endless facelifts, liposuction, bulimia, anorexia, silicone breast
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implants .. .' (p. 109); Walker describes the 'mutilation of hair' and skin bleaching
(pp. 13 -14). In appealing to the woman warrior, Walker seems to be establishing
sisterhood as grounds for challenging genital mutilation as a practice. However, what
ensues is a narrowing, and not a broadening of the text's focus, in that Walker
refracts the issue entirely through herself. Her childhood injury is construed as
lending a privileged perspective upon her subject: 'It was my visual mutilation that
helped me 'see' the subject of genital mutilation'(p. 18). The identification continues:
I was eight when I was injured. This is the age at which many 'circumcisions'
are done. When I see how the little girls - how small they are! - drag their
feet after being wounded, I am reminded of myself. How had I learned to
walk again, without constantly walking into something? To see again, using
half my vision? Instead of being helped to make this transition, I was
banished, set aside from the family, as is true of genitally mutilated little girls.
For they must sit for a period alone, their legs bound, as their wound heals. It
is taboo to speak of what has been done to them. (pp. 18-19)
Here the parallels are explicit: from the age of both victims of patriarchal violence, to
their being cast outside the family circle, to the taboo upon speaking of their
experiences. These connections are intensified further:
No one would think it normal to deliberately destroy the pupil of the eye.
Without its pupil, the eye can never see itself, or the person possessing it,
reflected in the eye of another. It is the same with the vulva. Without the
clitoris and other sexual organs, a woman can never see herself reflected in
the healthy intact body of another. Her sexual vision is impaired, and only the
most devoted lover will be sexually 'seen'. And then, never completely. (pp.
18-19)
Identity is thus presumed between organs of the body; the eye and the clitoris are
precisely equivalent. At the introduction's close the conflation of Walker with her
subject is complete:
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Those of us who are maimed can tell you it is possible to go on. To flourish.
To grow. To love and be loved, which is the most important thing. To feel
pleasure and to know joy. We can also tell you that mutilation of any part of
the body is unnecessary and causes suffering almost beyond imagining. We
can tell you that the body you are born into is sacred and whole, like the earth
that produced it, and there is nothing that needs to be subtracted from it. (p.
19, my emphasis)
Any division, even that between equivalences, gives way to total identification; 'I'
collapses into 'we'. Walker's interest in installing herself in the category of 'we the
mutilated' is far from clear. Aside from attempting to disrupt the smug division that
often inheres with that of First World/Third World, that is, civilisedlbarbaric, and
establishing international sisterhood, Walker's intentions are hard to read,
particularly given the intensely personal way in which she inflects the issues.
What is clear is that the extreme focus on identity denies or at least
suppresses a number of crucial differences between Walker and the subjects of her
film. First, in seeking to disturb the First World/Third world division Walker does
not account for her own, albeit complicated, First World position. While her location
is far from straightforward, it is nevertheless the case that there are important
differences to be acknowledged. Lata Mani notes how in an academic context:
There is ... a problematic logic of substitution in many academic conferences
whereby people of color from the U.S. and of the third world diaspora are
assumed to occupy identical locations and to be interchangeable. This posits
an equivalence which must be resisted, eliding as it does differences in the
relationships, both historically and and in the present, between third world
groups and the U.S. power structure. 29
From her stated attraction to Ghanaians (' ... perhaps my African self is Ghanaian',
p. 29) to these remarks in Possessing the Secret of Joy: 'I do not know from what
part of Africa my African ancestors came, and so 1 claim the continent' (p. 268),
Walker assumes an unproblematic, almost essential, African identity throughout her
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project. This in itself is not cause for concern, as Margaret Busby has pointed out,
since re-establishing connection throughout the African diaspora has been and
continues to be politically crucial:
Tradition and history are nurturing spirits for women of African descent. For
without an understanding of where we have come from, we are less likely to
be able to make sense of where we are going.... The legacy of the slave trade
confronts us daily in the very existence of the diaspora .... To rehearse again
the traumatic facts is not to wallow in victirnhood but to ensure an
understanding of what our foremothers had to survive. ,30
What is problematic is Walker's denial of her difference in establishing such a
connection. Not to mention the extreme visceral differences between genital
mutilation, on the one hand, and being shot in the eye, on the other. In choosing
Daughters of Africa as the title for her anthology of black women's writings, Busby
warns of the dangers of overlooking 'our differences' (p.xxx). Likewise, June Jordan
questions her identity in relation to the hotel maid where she is staying in the
Bahamas:
My 'rights' and my 'freedom' and my 'desire' and a slew of other new World
values; what would they sound like to this Black woman described on the
card atop my hotel bureau as 'Olive the Maid'? 'Olive' is older than I am and
I may smoke a cigarette while she changes the sheets on my bed. Whose
rights? Whose freedom? Whose desire?"
In this different context Jordan confronts her cultural and class differences, a
confrontation which Angela Davis also faced in Egypt whilst attending a conference
to celebrate the end of the UN decade of women.32Explaining her presence to her
audience Davis details her research topic, 'Women and Sex', at which 'pandemonium
erupted':
'Angela Davis in the Third World,' said Dr. Latifa Zayat ... 'Your name,
your personality, is known because of your struggle. You can be used by your
society, a wealthy society, which is trying to exploit our country. (p. 124)
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Clearly positioned by her audience as a First World researcher, a potentially
imperialist scholar hailing from a capitalist country looking to observe and assemble
data according to hers and their own interests, Davis is forced to realise her own
relational privilege. Reflecting upon the incident she conjectures: 'Perhaps I had
begun to feel a bit too relaxed. After all, I had slipped into a cultural continuum
whose acquaintance I had previously made through mental excursions alone'(p. 123).
So, Davis' imported agenda of sexual equality is deemed as failing to address the
indigenous issues of economic dependency not only between men and women, but
also between Egypt and the West. Despite Parmar's assertions that 'as women of
color we have not absorbed acritically the Western feminist paradigm, which
assumes a universal sisterhood where none exists' (p. 108), Warrior Marks' global
ambition (,Together we will produce a film that serves the world', p. 9) and
identificatory focus threaten to compromise its politics.
Having said all of this, however, there is a great extent to which I remain
uncomfortable with this analysis, or rather with its status. Alice Walker's work on the
subject of female genital mutilation has a political significance that is difficult to
quantify. As is the case with the emotional power of her texts. What, then, is the
status of my analysis, if, as Walker herself hopes, her work shields just one girl from
the circurnciser's rusty blade? What use is an argument about what amounts to little
more than literary politics in this urgent context? How do we, as feminist critics,
account for the power of ideas that 'misbehave', epistemologically speaking? I
cannot pretend to have the answers to such questions except to say that to dismiss
Walker's work purely upon grounds of its shaky assumptions is itself a mistake. Jane
Gaines puts it thus:
I would suggest that we have overemphasised the ideological function
of 'signifying practice' at the expense of considering other ideological
implications of the conflicting meanings in the text. Or, as Terry Lovell puts
it:
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· .. while interpretation depends on analysis of the work's signifying
practice, assessment of its meanings from the point of view of its
validity, or its ideology, depends upon comparison between those
structures of meaning and their object of reference, through mediation
of another type of discourse.r'
Walker's signifying practices may well be suspect in the light of prevailing feminist
discourses but this cannot account for their efficacy in the campaign against female
genital mutilation, nor can it totalise the force of an emotionally demanding text.
Rethinking identification.
Some critics have questioned the value of identificatory readings per se. Carla
Kaplan, for instance, proclaims a 'postidentitarian, postidentificatory' epoch for
feminism in the 1990's, and wonders 'what place is there, finally, ... for an
enterprise [Le. the recuperative paradigm] tacitly founded on both identity and
identification?,34 Jane Gallop equates identification as a basis for reading with the
search for the 'good mother' of object relations theory, and is suspicious of it for
precisely that reason. For both critics to pursue a relation of identity with the text is
to privilege sameness over difference and hence to screen out or deny textual
difference. Rather than prohibit identification I would argue that to do so is a
mistake in that identification, the assertion of sameness or like with like, as
impossible to avoid. With this I advocate a rethinking of identification that is both
more process-oriented and provisional than fixed and permanent.
Kaplan's essay provides a relentless account of the costs of identificatory
readings of feminist canonical texts. Through the mechanism of identification
feminist critics are seen to be guilty of fixing the meanings they create and so
prohibiting further arrangements of meaning. This is particularly the case in which
texts are claimed to allegorise issues of feminist reading itself. Kaplan argues that,
for example, in insisting that A Jury of Her Peers, The Blank Page or The Yellow
Wallpaper be read as standing for feminist criticisrrr", as paradigms for the feminist
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critical act, the potential for rereading is foreclosed upon. In establishing these texts as
founding moments in feminist critical history there is a danger of ceasing to read, instead
transmuting them into feminism's theoretical edifice. Arguing that such texts are 'over-
read' whilst at the same time not read thoroughly enough (p. 172), Kaplan seeks to
disrupt their status as paradigms for feminist recuperative action. Briefly, it is contended
that feminist recuperative work, 'revisionary rereading', the retrieval of women's lost
voices/texts/experience, with 'its grounding in sameness and identification' (p. 169) is
exclusionary, 'theoretically single-minded', and politically suspect. In reading texts as
mirrors for female experience or feminist critical activity, as in the case of Gilman,
Dinesen and Galspell's short stories, the text's differences are repressed, and the need for
further interpretation forestalled. As a counter to this freezing of the stories significances
in the field of feminist criticism Kaplan attempts to activate their differences. In a series
of close readings the critic shows how each text, far from asserting a straightforward
allegory of feminist interpretation, simultaneously problematises the critical act.
They both practice and parody feminist recuperation. Each warns against the very
politics it seems to endorse, suggesting dangers, impasses and problems inherent
in any "fantastic collaboration" grounded in a politics of identification.(p. 178).
For all its emphasis upon difference and its attending disdain of identification
Kaplan's argument cannot dispense with identification for its formulation. In her reading
of the readings, she too relies upon sameness as a basis from which to proceed. The
disruption of feminist canonical readings, insofar as it depends upon rereadings of the
said texts (the texts provide their own evidence, and hence justify internally Kaplan's
reading), is incomplete; Kaplan succeeds merely in recuperating her texts for difference.
The Yellow Wallpaper, The Blank Page, A Jury of her Peers, instead of appearing as
allegories for feminist identity are now co-opted for difference. The text's disruptions are
identified with a theory of difference; matched with patterns of dissonance to borrow Rosi
Braidotti's phrase.35a
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Likewise Jane Gallop, whilst being suspicious of identificatory readings
cannot resist their ground. Troubled by 'the assumption, here readerly, that good
mothering is mirroring and that what we demand from a text is an image of
ourselves', she nevertheless incorporates her own identifications through a series of
bracketed off, self-reflexive gestures. As I deal specifically with the issue of self-
reflexive criticism in chapter 6 I will confine myself here to merely pointing up the
seeming unavoidability of identification as a way of reading texts, in addition to
asserting that the fact of Gallop's undermining strategy, of confessing her own
potential transferences, does little to disrupt her authority in diagnosing the
'unseemly narcissism' (p. 54) of the first feminist edition of Yale French Studies.
36In her essay 'Playfulness, 'World' Travelling and Loving Perception'
Maria Lugones, offers a different way of thinking about identification and its effects.
Whilst remaining critical of, in her terms, 'white/Anglo' interpretations of 'outsider'
culture, Lugones suggests that white/Anglo's need to pursue identification with non-
white women as a counter to arrogant perception or cultural imperialism.Taking up
Marilyn Frye's formulation 'loving perception/arrogant perception' Lugones argues
that there are a series of connections to be made between perceiving arrogantly,
failing to identify with, and failing to love women of colour on the part of
white/Anglo women. So, whereas Kaplan views identificatory readings as self-
reproduction, and hence as imperialistic, Lugones regards the ability 'to see oneself
in other women who are quite different from oneself (p. 393) as crucial to
white/non-white relations. In other words, Lugones foresees the potential for a
positive basis for identifications between race-different women. A tentative
definition of 'loving perception' is formed through Lugones thinking around her
relationship to her mother:
Seeing myself in her through travelling in her 'world' has meant seeing how
different from her I am in her 'world'. This is the form of identification that I
consider incompatible with arrogant perception and constitutive of a new
understanding of love. (p. 402)
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For Lugones, perceiving her mother lovingly entails leaving 'home,' the secure world
of the self, and entering the world of the (m)other, thus seeing herself through the
eyes/terms of her mother's world/discourse. It follows from this that the task of the
white/Anglo feminist is one of leaving home, of leaving the familiar secure ground of
the norm or universal in order to perceive herself as other. Relinquishing the
normative space from which the other woman/text can only be read as either
concurrence or deviation is then the precondition for loving perception.
Read in relation to Kaplan's argument, Lugones' notion of arrogant
perception seems coincident with Kaplan's concerns about identificatory reading per
se. The self that reproduces in Kaplan's thinking is a self that seldom leaves home in
the pursuit of textual meaning. It is a self that is solid and reliable as grounds from
which to proceed. It is a self that remains unaware of the means by which it achieves
consolidation. It posits a centre from which all meanings radiate. The text literally
impresses the self that reads at those points where it matches up with what is seen as
its own, in fact self-authored, experience. It is in this sense that arrogant perception is
self-confirming as a textual relation, in that what is taken from the text is those
aspects or themes which serve to confirm or consolidate what has already been
decided as belonging to the authentic self.
A further helpful intervention can be gained from Sarah Ahmed's notion of
'identificatory practices,37 In contrast to both Kaplan and Gallop who seem to
presuppose a fully-formed subject in search of her own likeness in their accounts of
identificatory reading, Ahmed conceptualises identification more in terms of
ambition or aspiration.38Recommending a shift away from theories which 'assume
the singularity of "the subject" (p.IS9) Ahmed, through examining a racist incident
from her own life, traces the various identific ations and disidentifications involved
therein. Concluding that identifications are never fixed and complete, but rather
ongoing structured processes, the active creation of identities and positions, the
equation of identity with sameness/fixity/conservatism is thus avoided.
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Reading Jackie Kay's The Adoption Paperi9
In discussing The Adoption Papers, an autobiographical poem sequence which tells
the story of a black girl's adoption by a white Scottish couple, I face, first, a
fundamental difficulty in that my identifications with the text are such that I ; still
struggle with making the initial break necessary to begin to speak of it as literature.
Neither can I objectify the poems as text, nor offer any insight into their
constructions of identity or sexuality. I remain as inarticulate as when I attended a
reading of the poems by the author, and instead of taking the opportunity to join in
the informal discussion that spontaneously arose at the session's end I sat apart
speechless.
In terms of Kaplan's and Gallop's positions I am stuck in the mirror stage, an
example of arrested development, wanting the text to reflect me back, wanting it for
my mother, self-indulgent . What is more, and both critics point up the politically
suspect construction of the 'black' text as 'good' mother, the text's author is black
and this reader is white. The fact of my response to Kay's text then would seem to
place me in difficult territory. And yet for all my merging with her poems I am fully
cognisant of my racial difference, I know that I am white and the poet is black. I
know that ram not Jackie Kay, I know she is not her text despite its autobiographical
nature. The extent of my mirroring does not occlude textual differences. Furthermore,
I identify with the poems not because I want to be black or Scottish but rather
because I, too, am adopted, and it is in this context that my lack of differentiation
becomes readable.
The issue of mirroring is particularly acute for adopted people, who grow up
without seeing their likeness reflected anywhere in their family. I have the features of
nobody in particular. I 'take after' no-one.
I don't know what diseases
come down my line;
when dentists and doctors ask
the old blood questions about family runnings
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I tell them: I have no nose or mouth or eyes
to match, no spitting image or dead cert,
myface watches itselfin the glass. (p. 29, my emphasis)
In finding myself mirrored in the poem, however, I am less confirming something
that is already there than actively constructing a place of identity, shifting and
temporal, that, hitherto lived mostly wordlessly, is coming into being as I read. I am
engaged, then, in a form of identificatory practice and not narcissistic self-
affirmation. Becoming not confirming. The state of merging should be recognisable
in terms of that moment when we read or hear articulated what has been until then an
unnamed experience or condition. 'Words wreak havoc' Jean-Paul Sartre has stated
'when they find a name for what had up to then been lived namelessly'I'', In many
ways this raises the question of identity politics, of what has been seen as the need to
assemble along the lines of a perceived sameness. As opposed to the Lacanian model
that often underpins the identity politics debates41 Elspeth Probyn prefers to think of
identity in terms of belonging:
Surface belongings and desiring identities refuse to stand still; in between
being and longing, they compel connections, producing themselves as other.
Such belonging is formulated in neither exclusionary nor inclusionary terms
but in its sheer perplexity and yearning bypasses the meanness of
individualised identities.42
An 'identity' as an adopted person is one marked by perplexity and yearning, and as
such escapes categorisation as an identity enclosure. The issue of belonging too has a
specificity for the adopted person, whose relation to their family, in a world obsessed
with blood and genes, is seen as somehow not real.
I could hear the upset in her voice
I says I'm not your real mother,
though Christ knows why I said that,
If I'm not who is, but all my planned speech
went out the window (p. 21)
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While I have spent most of my academic life problematising subjectivity, blood and
genes still exact their hold,
All this bother, certificates, papers.
It is all so long ago. Does it matter? (p. 20)
I have my parents who are not of the same tree
and you keep trying to make it matter,
the blood, the tie, the passing down
generations.
We all have our contradictions,
the one's with the mother's nose and father's eyes
have them;
the blood does not bind confusion,
yet I confess to my contradiction
I want to know my blood. (p. 29)
Investments in identification do not necessarily originate with a failure to recognise
difference. The question of blood takes on racial significance elsewhere in the poem.
The section entitled 'Black Bottom' details the daughter's childhood experiences of
racism. During a dance class at school her teacher,
shouts from the bottom
of the class Come on, show
us what you can do I thought
you people had it in your blood.
My traversing of the surface of Kay's poem, establishing connections with it does
not eclipse these and other meanings. To read the poem thus is not simply to remake
it in my own image. It is more, as Deleuze puts it, to go
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from one specific place to another, from one singular point to another ...
producing thus effects of transversality and no longer universality,
functioning as a privileged point of exchange or crossing. 4-.2.~
It is also to unfix the text, as it were, from a chromatic relation (white readerlblack
text) to one based on its other meanings. And also to suggest that mirroring has a
specificity that is often overlooked.
(... )
Conclusion
In examining the problem of identification for white feminist readings of
race-different writings I stress the following points: the importance of separating the
mechanism of identification from the universal; the question of who is the other
woman; and the rethinking of identification itself. In addition I argue that the notion
of sameness cannot be dispensed with in favour of a focus on difference; a text of
pure difference would be illegible, unreadable in that any reading is always a process
of recognition. Rather the point is to find ethical ways of identifying that do not leave
the Other woman frozen, petrified in the self-consolidating gaze of the white subject.
I suggest some of those ways here: the notion of identificatory practice, the
historicisation of the universal offer potentially exciting projects in realising the
ambition contained in Zora Neale Hurston's phrase, 'In my eyesight you lose nothing
by not looking just like me,43
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Chapter 4. Theory and Identification
In this chapter I suggest that certain uses of theory operate as displaced modes
of identification, in the sense that, in place of the reading self, a particular theory is
said to match up or identify with the text. In addition to replaying the structuralist
error whereby the patterns that are identified in the text are supposed as belonging to
it, as deeply embedded and hence observable from the outside, the gesture of
applying theory renders the unfamiliar, familiar through the reproduction of the
already known, or the self-same. This raises the question of the precise nature of
what is familiar or recognisable in making the 'Other' text legible as well as what
happens to the excess of meaning produced with theoretical identifications; what are
the costs of French feminist framings of Toni Morrison's work, for example.
However, as I argue in the previous chapter, this is not to suggest that identificatory
modes can simply be dispensed with in favour of a pure focus on difference. Even as
I argue for reading Morrison's work in terms of witnessing and testimony I run the
risk of repeating the error diagnosed, of reproducing a mirroring relationship between
the novels and the theoretical texts I rely upon to make my case. Rather the question
of interpretation can be seen to be, at once, one of distinction and identification, a
dynamic shuttle movement of alignment and disagreement. So, my resistance to
certain framings of Toni Morrison's novels nevertheless involves me in aligning the
texts with alternatives. In addition to highlighting some of the dangers and traps of
applying theory in terms of straightforward identification, I offer possibilities which
resist the objectifying discourses of tools, lenses and frames, the uncomplicated
view from outside or above.
By way of drawing out these issues I concentrate upon two radically
opposing, even mutually exclusive, readings of the author's work. 1 Barbara Hill
Rigney's The Voices of Toni Morrison' deploys French feminist thought as a means
of determining the politics of Morrison's work. Doreatha Drummond Mbalia's Toni
Morrison's Developing Class Consciousness3, striking in its difference to Rigney's
text, with its strict materialist analysis, locates its politics in what is identified as a
progressing preoccupation with class struggle in the novels. More than offering
merely 'different' readings, each critic reaches utterly opposing conclusions in
assessing the significances of the same literary features. While the fact of the
difference is interesting in itself and raises questions, among others, about the precise
nature of literary politics, I wish to stress the costs of the particular framings each
critic proposes. Following this I argue that the tensions between the two essays - the
literary and the social, history and the imagination, the semiotic and the material, for
example - constitute an important theme in Morrison's work. In this context I offer
the figure of the witness as an alternative means of reading. Briefly, I argue that
Morrison's texts, in particular Song of Solomon and Beloved', in foregrounding
issues of interpretation and reading, constitute a massive act of witnessing; an act
which participates in the events it describes and thus implicates the reader in the
debates it sets up.The figure of the witness, through the very fact of her/his narrative
involvement, or to use Morrison's term, 'participatory'S nature, breaks the objectivity
implied with pure framing. Through this, alongside a development of the notion of
testimony as outlined by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub in their book of the same
name", I hope to find ways of honouring aspects of Morrison's texts that escape
interpretive framing, the blindnesses that accompany insights, what is obscured as
well as revealed in any reading of her work.
The Politics of Holes and Gaps.
The Voices of Toni Morrison privileges a French feminist perspective and
examines the author's work in terms of its perceived linguistic subversion. With their
stylistic complexity and non-linear structure, Morrison's novels are said to present a
radical challenge to 'phallocratic law'. The site par excellence of this subversion is
the narrative hole or gap: Morrison's celebrated spaces specifically designed for the
participation of the reader. The significance of these spaces for Rigney is 'profoundly
political' and therefore crucial to an understanding of the author's work. These
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'stunning absences' are seen as acquiring their political significance in a number of
ways. To begin with, leading on from Morrison's own comments, Rigney sees the
author as rejecting 'theories that privilege the author over the reader' (p. 25). In
accord with postmodern views of authorship' Morrison is held to be surrendering
control over the text's meaning, adopting an anti-authoritarian stance, as it were, in
relation to her work. Following on from this, Rigney offers a compelling account of
how silence operates as a specific trope in African-American writing. Drawing upon
the work of Henry Louis Gates Jr., it is argued that the novels manipulate, destabilise
and effectively deconstruct the Western metaphysical constructions of whitelblack,
and presence/absence. Focussing on Beloved, Rigney details how the trope of silence
is informed by the referential silencing of African-Americans from slavery to the
present, and how in tum the 'unspeakable thoughts unspoken' of recorded history are
are taken up by Morrison to exert a pressure upon that record. Referring to
Morrison's comment that:
... invisible things are not necessarily 'not there'; that a void may be empty,
but it is not a vacuum. In addition, certain absences are so stressed, so ornate,
so planned, they call attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and
purpose. 8
Rigney illuminates the extent to which silence is always 'ideologically and politically
revelatory' (p. 25) in the novels.
From this a broader feminist argument is constructed regarding the texts
political meanings. Through specific reference to French feminist thought Rigney
outlines the contours of Morrison's perceived textual politics
Significant to Morrison's great strength as a writer is the fact that her style is
imbued with contradiction and saturated with breaches of narrative
continuity. And according to Irigaray, a feminine style of writing is 'always
fluid', always 'resists and explodes every firmly established form, figure,
idea, or concept to the point that linear reading is no longer possible.' (p. 31)
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In short it is argued that Morrison's texts 'break the back of words' (p. 10), they
subvert Symbolic codes and systems of signification. With their fluid, jouissant
'celebrations of the Laugh of the Medusa' (p. 34), the novels constitute collectively
an 'unpoliced . . . black and feminine discourse - semiotic, maternal, informed as
much by silence as dialogue, as much by absence as presence' (p. 7), and thus refuse
the conventions of patriarchal discourse.
Mbalia's reading of Morrison's narrative silences could not be more opposed.
For instance, in her discussion of The Bluest Eye, the novel's temporal shifts are
attributed to the author's' ... clumsy handling of time' which is in tum read as
evidence that 'She is not yet skilled in structuring plots' (p. 34) Such clumsiness,
however, is deemed to have been remedied by the time Morrison writes Song of
Solomon, in which time is 'manipulated much more skillfully':
Transition sentences such as 'That was the beginning. Now itwas all going to
end' transport the reader from the past to the present without the nauseating
jolt of an air pocket. Such sophisticated use of transitions appears between as
well as within chapters. (p .64)
Far from constituting the site of radical subversion the text's gaps and holes are read
by Mbalia as indication of Morrison's artistic weakness, 'a mark of her undeveloped
writing skills.' What are read as stylistic inconsistencies are seen to impede the
advancement of plot, to create 'confusion, not clarity' (p. 37). Linguistic disruption
detracts from rather than constitutes the text's politics in that form is deemed,
necessarily, to reflect structure. Texts are privileged, then, in terms of their ability to
convey information as to the 'African's oppression' (p. 49). What is more, they are
valued for their perceived capacity as offering political blueprints or solutions:
Tactically, she employs her novels as vehicles to incite action. They are, in
fact, social and political treatises; not simply aesthetically pleasing, but, in
making a social statement, they are didactic because she understands the
urgency of arriving at a solution for the African's crisis. (p. 22)
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The novels are seen to be expressly didactic; they are political manifestos, test sites
for the author's emancipatory project: 'Like a scientist, she uses each work as a
laboratory in which to research a hypothesis as to the nature of the oppression
experienced by African people and to posit a solution to it.' (p. 87). Written from
what she terms 'a people class perspective', Mbalia's analysis is clear in its
identification of the specific 'oppression experienced by African people; that is, class
exploitation' (p. 16) Drawing upon the work of Kwame Nkrumah, Mbalia maintains
that class exploitation underpins all other oppressions such as those of race and
gender:
... it is the economic system of capitalism, characterised by the exploitation
of one group by another that gives birth to and continues to fuel racism and
sexism. It is neither racism nor sexism but capitalism that is the primary
enemy of African people. (p. 17)
The analysis is also clear as to the relationship between literature and politics.
Just as form reflects content, literature reflects society: 'Literature is a product of the
society in which it is produced, arising from and dependent on the material
conditions of the society ... literature can in turn help shape the particular society in
which one lives' (p. 15).
One critic stares into Morrison's celebrated 'holes and spaces' and sees
evidence of authorial inadequacy; 'Morrison's inability to make her text cohere'
(Mbalia, p.37). Another intent on the same place finds proof of the author's radical
politics; 'Clearly, the significant silences and the stunning absences throughout
Morrison's texts become profoundly political as well as stylistically crucial' (Rigney,
p.25). The fact of this disagreement is interesting in itself. Highlighting the
amenability of texts to a range of interpretations, it becomes more interesting if each
text is allowed to speak to the other's inadequacies.
In focussing its political project in terms of textual revolution The Voices of
Toni Morrison is able to take account of an important critical dimension that is
entirely missing from Mbalia's text. Her view of literature as a scientific testbed or
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political manifesto which is in tum assessed as to its pragmatic use-value neglects the
textual politics that form the basis of Rigney's study. Mbalia, therefore, overlooks
the specifically literary function of Morrison's work. Rita Felski explains:
. . . it is clear that fictional works are shaped by relatively autonomous
aesthetic structures which mediate the text's relationship to ideology. A
reflectionist understanding of literature as authentic reproduction of authorial
experience pays inadequate attention to the way texts signify as literature."
By neglecting the text's multiple and various mediations Mbalia's reflectionist
argument is hobbled by intentional fallacy. Comments such as these abound:
Her first novel The Bluest Eye (1970), serves as proof of her low level of
class consciousness at the beginning of her writing career.... By the time she
writes Tar Baby, Toni Morrison has become increasingly aware of capitalism
as the African's primary enemy.... Thus Morrison's works reflect a thematic
and structural evolution that coincide with her own growing class
consciousness. (pp. 20-1)
As organising principle of the texts meanings Morrison is held personally responsible
for their perceived shortfall as political solutions. In rendering Morrison accountable
in this way, Mbalia is able to attribute that which exceeds and consequently threatens
the certainty of her theoretical frame to authorial inadequacy. Postmodem objections
to the author as guarantee of a text's meaning notwithstanding, Mbalia seriously
misconstrues the nature of the relation of literary and the social.
In The Field of Cultural Production Bourdieu outlines the complex
relationship between the fields of power and cultural production. Although in some
ways independent, ('Reflection theories, no matter how elaborate or euphemised,
neglect the relative autonomy of the literary field, p. 13) the cultural/literary field
exists, nevertheless, in a relation of subordination to the field of economic and
political power (whose legitimacy is based on possession of economic and symbolic
capital). Situated in and dominated by the field of power, intellectuals therefore exist
in a 'dominated fraction of the dominant class.' 10 The relationship between cultural
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practices and other broader social processes can be summarised as an 'economic
world reversed' or 'winner loses logic' (p. 9) in that success in economic terms in
literary field translates into low prestige, which in turn constitutes a barrier to the
field's symbolic power. The prizes of the literary field are thereby denied those who
succeed in economic terms; Jilly Cooper although exceeding James Joyce in terms
of book sales, for example, accrues in the literary field a negligible level of symbolic
capital, particularly when compared with the high prestige accorded to Joyce. The
complex relation between cultural and economic power is such that one does not
translate directly into the other. Mbalia's analysis thus neglects the objective
conditions which govern the 'production, circulation, and consumption of symbolic
goods' (p.l3). However, even if Morrison's novels were intended and consumed as
transparent political treatises, as calls to arms, their success in the social field would
be compromised by the domination of the literary field by that of power and
economics. The profound disregard of literary and social mediations of texts leads
Mbalia to seriously misread, not to say underestimate, the political force of
Morrison's work.
As it has been noted Rigney's analysis foregrounds the very issues that
Mbalia's overlooks or condemns in that it favours a textual approach to the novels
and sites the author's politics in her manipulation of language. Citing Temma Berg,
the political significance of Morrison's disruptive poetics is outlined thus:
... the use of such language 'will lead to the subversion of the closure of
traditional Western metaphysics'. In all her novels Morrison implies the
primacy of the maternal and the semiotic in the economy of language in order
to achieve signification and a higher form of poetic (and also political) truth
(p. 12)11
While considerably less reductive than Mbalia's conception of the text's politics,
Rigney's argument is not without its problems.
First, The Voices of Toni Morrison relies upon an almost wholly uncritical
use of French feminist theory. Given the space that is given over to the issue of
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theorising itself in the text's introduction this is entirely unexpected. Using an extract
from The Bluest Eye a warning is issued regarding the interpretive process, for
instance.
Little Elihue learned everything he needed to know well, particularly the fine
art of self-deception. He read greedily but understood selectively, choosing
the bits and pieces of other men's ideas that supported whatever predilection
he had at the moment. Thus he chose to remember Hamlet's abuse of
Ophelia, but not Christ's love of Mary Magdalene; Hamlet's frivolous
politics, but not Christ's serious anarchy.... For all his exposure to the best
minds of the Western world, he allowed only the narrowest interpretation to
touch him. . . . A hatred of, and fascination with, any hint of disorder or
decay. (p. 133_4)12
In addition to rehearsing the dangers of selective reading some of the problems
specific to French feminist thought are raised. Through reference to Ann Jones'
critique of ecriture feminine" Rigney questions the precise nature of its political
project. However, as quickly as the problem is raised it is resolved by appealing to
what Jones terms an ' "energizing myth" rather than an agenda for change' and 'an
island of hope in the void left by the deconstruction of humanism'(p. 4). This
recuperation is problematic in two ways. Initially, there is a sense in which the notion
of French feminisms as energising myths is denied in the collapse between textual
and social revolution that occurs within Rigney's argument. Subversive language is
deemed to contain the power to confound Western metaphysics, to enact political
change; disruption of linguistic and material processes are identical, political and
artistic revolution are one. Here Rigney's reasoning coincides in unforeseen ways
with Mbalia's. The lack of attention payed to the mediations of world and text, albeit
from the opposite end of the equation, renders Morrison's texts as paradigmatically,
indeed programatically French feminist. With this is a comparable investment in the
kind of reflectionist conception of the text practiced by Mbalia; formal features of
Morrison's work mirror their worldly effects: narrative disruption, polyvocality, the
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eruption of the semiotic, catalyses political transformation as does madness and
hysteria (,Hysteria itself can function as an agent of such transformation', p. 20).
Rigney accepts too readily the French feminist equivalence of fluidity and
radicalism. To locate revolution in the subversion of Symbolic codes is to drastically
overinvest in the power of theory as well as to underestimate what Edward Said has
referred to as the text's 'capacity for the production of misery or liberation'!". Felski
again explains:
Such a position . . . fails to offer any adequate explanatory account of the
relationship between the subversion of internal formal structures and
processes of social change. Any such abstract conception of a feminine text
cannot cope with the heterogeneity and specificity of women's cultural needs,
including, for example, the development of a sustained analysis of black
women's or lesbian writing, which is necessarily linked to issues of
. representation and cannot be adequately addressed by simply arguing the
'subversive' nature of formal self-reflexivity. (p. 9)
Despite the potential reification of black women's and lesbian writing as preoccupied
with realism, Felski's point is crucial to a consideration of literary politics. To recall
Bourdieu, the political nature of a piece of writing cannot be determined in terms of
form alone. Rather it is to be located relationally, within the field of discourses in
which it finds itself competing.
The full explanation of artistic works is to be found neither in the text itself,
nor in some sort of determinant social structure. Rather it is found in the
history and structure of the field itself, with its multiple components, and in
the relationship between that field and the field of power. (p. 9)
To borrow a phrase from Nancy Miller, feminist critics must beware of being too
confident that non-discursive practices will respond correctly to the correct theory or
discursive practice' IS
A more serious problem, however, inheres with Rigney's conception of the
relation between French feminist and race theory and politics. Black feminist
127
objections to the 'subsuming of racial difference into the category of the feminine'
(p. 4) are raised and quickly dispensed with. First, the question of racial difference is
deemed answerable through a metaphorised idea of a double-voiced discourse,
articulable via French feminist thought. The necessary focus on race and gender is
achieved through what Rigney terms a 'philosophical two-step' (p. 4), the plural
assertion of 'both/and rather than either/or ... perform[ing], as Beloved does, 'A
little two-step, make-a-new-step, slide, slide and strut on down' ([Beloved, p. 74], p.
5). Rigney then stresses the suitability of her approach to Morrison's texts by
appealing to her chosen theorists adoption of blackness as a metaphor of difference.
The important metaphor that pervades the works of such theorists as Luce
Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Helene Cixous, Catherine Clement, Marguerite
Duras, and Monique Wittig, is in fact that of marginality, of blackness as
symbolic of radical dissidence and linguistic revolution. Duras, for example,
defines feminine writing as 'an organic translated writing ... translated from
blackness, from darkness . . . from the unknown, like a new way of
communicating rather than an already formed language.' (pp. 3-4)
Making reference to Cixous' statement 'we are black and we are beautiful'" it is
argued:
'Blackness' as a metaphor, for Morrison as well as for these French theorists,
embraces racial identity and a state of female consciousness, or even
unconsciousness, that zone beyond the laws of white patriarchy in which
female art is conceived and produced. (p. 4)
In assuming 'blackness' as a metaphor for race-and-gender difference Rigney's
theoretical framing of Morrison's novels runs into a number of difficulties. As a
conduit for thinking about the exclusion zone of the feminine, blackness as metaphor
is one available only to white women scholars. Kadiatu Kanneh draws attention to
the colonial imperative at the heart of metaphorising racial difference in this way.
Referring specifically to Cixous' appropriation of the slogan 'black is beautiful' she
comments:
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This reference to African peoples in order to underline the position of women
outside history and culture, beyond the self-conscious, adult world of reason
and politics, is in indirect collusion with the deliberate policies of the Western
colonial countries which aim to wipe out the achievements and intricate pasts
of the colonized. 17
Likewise, Cixous' assumption 'In woman, personal history blends together with the
history of all women, as well as national and world history'P is read both as an
active dissociation of white woman from colonial history and as a further mark of
white privilege. This 'flagrant fluidity of metaphor' where the critic occupies a
steadfast position in gender terms 'and yet can slide racially and class-wise' (p. ) is
dependent upon an ability to disengage such metaphors from their respective
signifying histories. This ability to erase the past is uniquely a property of the white
critic. What is more, it is a project which denies what Toni Morrison has termed the
continued 'ideological utility' (Playing in the Dark, p. 64) of historically constituted
racialised discourses. Kanneh explains:
The idea that women should ignore the divisions between themselves and
sweep together across class, race and national boundaries to create a post-
historical Utopian home, bypasses the knowledge that racial oppression has
always created the body from obsessive fantasies of biology and environment.
The power of Cixous's metaphors comes precisely from their continuing life
in present ideologies of race. Black women are not in a position to bypass the
histories and divisions, both of class and race, which block the development
of a unified feminist movement. (p. ?F, S')
So, despite its celebratory, not to say political, intent Rigney's linking of racial and
gender oppression through the discourse of French feminist thought has the effect of
suppressing any consideration of race as a distinct and above all historical oppressive
force. Blackness is subsumed into the feminine, pressed into service as a metaphor of
the wild zone of ecriture feminine. The warnings of subsuming race to gender,
although initially noted by Rigney, go entirely unheeded.
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The methodological device of dancing is no less free of difficulty however.
Rigney's analytical soft shoe shuffle, although intended as a means of combining
consideration of race and gender, succeeds mostly in effacing race from the critical
agenda. Nancy Miller discusses Annette Kolodny's deployment of the dance as a
signifier of plurality and multiplicity, alongside that of Derrida in 'Choreographies',
in Getting PersonalP Summarising the thirty-five pages of replies elicited by
Kolodny's controversial essay published in the Autumn 1982 edition of Feminist
Studies Miller states:
... both the critical plural of a mainstream, white woman's feminism, and a
'degendered' poststructuralist 'multiplicity of sexually marked voices' can be
seen to erase the bodies of differentiated social subjects. The one imposes a
false feminist universal that seems to be complicitous with a central
institutional authority; the other reveals itself to be the cover of a
phallocentric subject who measures difference by himself. (pp. 83-4)
Rigney's choreographic method enables the critic to 'slide, slide' out of any
obligation to the concrete differences that structure all relations between women. In
supposing a metaphorised notion of race-and-gender difference in the form of a
dance Rigney overlooks the ' ... real and consequential differences of race, class, and
sexual identification [which] often entail the destructive impact among women of
unequal and oppressive power relations, their history, and their continuation into the
present. ,20 The 'philosophical two-step', therefore, is a dance that neutralises, even as
it proposes itself as a means of holding onto, racial difference. The both/and of
Rigney's intentions slips into the false universal identified by Miller. Despite the
demonstrated awareness of the potential problems of her critical enterprise Rigney's
insights remain split off from the main analysis.
Both critics, in advancing a theory of the text, determining a frame in advance
of reading, find what they set out to discover: evidence of the theory in the text.
Mbalia's and Rigney's investment in an all-encompassing critical position has the
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effect of blinding them to key features of Morrison's texts. In Rigney's case the
emphasis upon deferral, fluidity, disruption, and other features of ecriture feminine,
produces a closed circuit and sacrifices issues of witnessing through the privileging
of a critical frame that disdains Symbolic signification. The referential, denotative
function of Morrison's poetics, her professed concern with bearing witness, is
dispensed with in the generalised focus upon linguistic subversion and the defiance
of closure. Whereas Mbalia retains a concern with the material she does so at the
expense of any viable consideration of the text's function as literature. The
doctrin aire, rigid nature of her thesis produces an excess of meaning which is then
projected out of her discussion in the name of inadequacy, 'clumsy handling of time',
or weak class consciousness. Hill Rigney's approach for all its professed interest in
multiplicity and fluidity is no less confining, however; in her analysis contradiction is
entirely recuperable in a classic postmodem gesture which marks narrative
contradiction or discontinuity as the very essence of a radical poetics. In
foregrounding wildness, anarchy, disorder, the unpoliced black and feminine
discourse, the critical text exempts itself from charges of repressing disorder and
decay. And yet paradoxically the -text's meanings are subjected to an ordering
process albeit one based upon disorder. The uncontrolled aspects of Morrison's texts
are recuperated within the fold of French feminisms, shepherded into a theoretical
enclosure whose boundaries are wildness and disruption itself.
The tensions that I have identified here between these two radically opposed
readings of Morrison's novels are identifiable in tum in issues that accrue in
Morrison criticism. The suggestiveness of Morrison's work makes it particularly
susceptible to multiple and wide-ranging meanings; the complexity of her poetics
render her texts amenable to radically different readings. Indeed, it is this amenability
that is one of the sources of Morrison's celebration as an exemplar of the
postmodem. With their multiple meanings, quarrel with documentary history,
undermining of oppositional thinking, the novels have been read as profoundly
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postmodem. However, just as Rigney and Mbalia produce an excess of meaning that
is either repressed or cannot be accounted for in their rigid framings of the texts, so
many postmodem readings cannot deal with Morrison's express purpose of finding
'the words to say it.,21What follows is an attempt to address these tensions in the
criticism. In thinking through Morrison's work as testimony, as preoccupied with
witnessing, I hope to offer ways not only of negotiating the split between history and
the imagination; but also a means of rethinking critical responsibility regarding
interpretation and third, a mode of identification that can take account of difference.
Inventing the Past: Toni Morrison's Crisis of Witnessing
In interview Morrison makes frequent mention of her need, as a writer, to
invent, and yet, equally, sometimes in the same sentence, references are made to her
perceived role as witness. So, for example, in 'Memory, Creation, and Writing'
Morrison speaks of her purpose thus:
If my work is to be functional to the group (to the village, as it were) then it
must bear witness and identify that which is useful from the past and that
which ought to be discarded; it must make it possible to prepare for the
present and live it out, and it must do that not by avoiding problems and
contradictions but by examining them; it should not even attempt to solve
social problems, but it should certainly try to clarify them.22
Additionally, in her many comments about Beloved, Morrison refers to having (in the
words of Linda Anderson), 'researched very thoroughly the historical background of
the novel' at the same time as refusing 'to find out any more about Margaret
Garner'Pas she 'really wanted to invent her life,24. In the context of an historical
project founded upon positivist logic, the idea of rigorous research accompanied by
an act of imagination is a contradiction in terms. Indeed the very suggestion of an
imaginative act is enough to cast doubt upon the verity of the historical record or
document: the possibility of a history is supposed to involve the suspension of the
imagination in favour of the 'bald' facts.
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Such was the discursive context of the slave's narrative. Presented as 'the
plain, unvarnished truth,25, accounts of slave experience were nevertheless
profoundly euphemised 26in their denial of the role of memory and subjectivity in
writing. In an essay examining the narrative conventions of slave accounts, James
Olney explains the political importance of the slave narrative's professed
immediacy:
The writer of a slave narrative finds himself in an irresolvably tight bind as a
result of the very intention and premise of his narrative, which is to give a
picture of 'slavery as it is.' Thus it is the writer's claim, it must be his claim,
that he is not emplotting, he is not fictionalizing, and he is not performing any
act of poe sis (= shaping, making). To give a true picture of slavery as it really
is, he must maintain that he exercises a clear-glass, neutral memory that is
neither creative nor faulty - indeed, if it were creative it would be eo ipso
faulty for 'creative' would be understood by skeptical readers as a synonym
for 'lying.'27
The presence of memory, then, would threaten both the validity of the account and
by extension the abolitionist cause. The necessity of the 'clear-glass', memoryless
account also served to shape the conventions of slave narrative as a genre. The
resulting account tended to depict the perceived evils of slavery as an institution
rather than as an individual experience. So, in Olney's words:
The lives in the narratives are never, or almost never, there for themselves
and for their own intrinsic, unique interest but nearly always in their capacity
as illustrations of what slavery is really like. (p. 154)
In short, the slave's narrative was concerned more with slavery than with slaves.
In interviews and lectures, Morrison has referred to the deliberate omissions,
the codified narrations, in addition to the wholesale absence of any mention of 'the
interior life' of the slave, in published accounts of slave experience.f Precisely intent
upon those omissions and spaces Morrison wrote Beloved. This is not to say, simply,
that a handful of facts about slavery were gathered and then the rest made up or that
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the author added a few feelings, the subjective, to the historical document. Rather, in
pressing hard upon the narrative refusals and omissions of orthodox history its very
existence is called into question. Linda Anderson puts it thus:
Morrison's complex re-imagining of history in Beloved is also an exploration
of how what is unwritten and unremembered can come back to haunt us,
troubling the boundaries of what is knownr"
In Morrison's own words, in drawing attention to 'the presence of the unfree within
the heart of the democratic experiment' the 'dark', 'abiding' Africanist
presence/absence inhabiting the centre of (white) America's self-representations, the
'unspeakable things unspoken' of American history, a re-ordering, not to say a
reinvigoration of history and the literary canon is intended." Put another way, if, as
Lyotard has it, history 'forgets through discursive ordering';", Morrison is addressing
the structural forgetting of slave narrative as a form and in a broader sense the
forgettings of documentary history itself. If the forgetting is structural, a re-ordering
of memorial history is implied in Morrison's ambition of making its silences speak,
of filling in the blank on Beloved's headstone. Furthermore, in granting hitherto
denied interiority to the case of Margaret Garner, Morrison is engaging in a
profoundly political act. Morrison's preoccupation both with memory in her work
generally and with imagining the interior life of a particular slave in Beloved, one for
whom only 'objective' and hence exteriorised, accounts exist, becomes a politically
charged restorative act given Olney's point about 'the ex-slave being 'debarred' from
the use of memory and the imagination' (p. 151). The narrative and social purpose to
which slave accounts were put, therefore, militated against what might be termed
personal expression/imagination; if slaves lacked ownership of themselves they also
lacked ownership of what were professed to be their own words. Although ostensibly
'written by themselves' slave accounts were by no means the sole property of their
authors.32 Houston Baker puts it thus:
the voice of the unwritten self, once it is subjected to the linguistic codes,
literary conventions, and audience expectations of a literate population, is
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perhaps never again the authentic voice of black American slavery. it is,
rather, the voice of a self transformed by an autobiographical act into a sharer
in the general public discourse about slavery.33
In Beloved Morrison's literary project can therefore be seen as the articulation of the
inscribed silences, refusals of the documented history of slavery. A crucial part of
this articulation is achieved through granting the characters not merely the right to
tell their own story, but also the' ... the time afterward to shape it' (Beloved p.78).
The act of shaping, ordering, making, hitherto denied, is politically resonant in
Morrison's text. In Sethe's words: 'Her story was bearable because it was his as well
- to tell, to refine and tell again.' (p.99, my emphasis)
History and Memory Work
This focus upon the interior history further shakes up the historical order of
things. The privileging of memory over document/monument implies first a temporal
re-ordering; a radical reworking of the metaphysical renderings of past and present.
Notions of teleology, chronology, are here complicated by the deferrals and
belatedness that mark the temporality of the psyche. Designated by the term
Nachtraglichkeit (translated variously as deferred action, belatedness or in
Laplanche's translation afterwardsness'") the concept of psychic time finds its most
early development in Freud's case history, the Wolf Man. In this study Freud
describe the process by which the Wolf Man's shock at witnessing a sexual act
between his parents produces an accompanying psychic act of deferral in that the
significance of the primal scene is only realised later in adulthood. Peter Nicholls
explains further:
As Lacan observes, 'the event remains latent in the subject', thereby giving
rise to the complex temporality in which the subject is always in more than
one place at any time.... Nachtraglichkeit calls into question traditional
notions of causality - the second event is presented now as the cause of the
first - and its retroactive logic refuses to accord ontological primacy to any
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originary moment. Since the shock of the first scene is not felt directly by the
subject but only through its later representation in memory we are dealing
with, in Derrida's words, 'a past that has never been present'P,
An event's eventness, so to speak, or its significance is less a delimited set of
occurrences consciously registered both individually and socially in their full
presence than a kind of self-divided shuttling between two temporal moments, or
what has been termed historicity.l"
These ideas of the differing temporality of the psyche have received further
consideration in the work that has developed in relation to the notion of trauma.
Following on from psychoanalytic conceptions of forgetting, a traumatic event, too,
constitutes 'a record yet to be made,37
Massive trauma precludes its registration; the observing and recording
mechanisms of the human mind are temporarily knocked out, malfunction.
The victim's narrative - the very process of bearing witness to massive
trauma - does indeed begin with someone who testifies to an absence, to an
event that has not yet come into existence, in spite of the overwhelming and
compelling nature of the reality of its occurrence. (p. 57)
In addition to psychic amnesia, a forgetting that retroactive in that, to recall Nicholls
phrase, 'the second event is presented now as the cause of the first', forgetting can
also be determined in more active terms: the dissociative, psychic work which Freud
describes as 'dissolving thought connections, failing to draw the right conclusions
and isolating memories' (Benjamin, p.171) Given this it would be more useful to
speak offorgettings, in the plural, as opposed to mere forgetting.",
Forgetting as the dissolving of 'thought connections' is practiced most by
Sethe in Beloved. The used-to-be-slave woman' ...worked hard to remember as close
to nothing as was safe.' (p.6); her' ... future was a matter of keeping the past at bay'
(p.42). The work, the conscious activity that forgetting demands of Sethe is made
explicit here:
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Sethe looked at her hands, her bottle-green sleeves, and thought how little
color there was in the house and how strange that she had not missed it the
way Baby did. Deliberate, she thought, it must be deliberate, because the last
color she remembered was the pink chips in the headstone of her baby girl.
After that she became as color conscious as a hen.... Every dawn she saw
the dawn, but never acknowledged or remarked its color. There was
something wrong with that. Itwas as though one day she saw red baby blood,
another day the pink gravestone chips, and that was the last of it. (pp. 38-9)
Sethe's realisation of not experiencing colour is also acknowledged as belated, as
retroactive or, to use Peter Nicholls' phrase, 'the second event is presented now as
the 'cause' of the first'. That is, it is only through becoming conscious of the
existence of colour in the present moment that Sethe has awareness of its lack in her
past. What is more, the return of her awareness of colour is directly linked to Sethe's
confrontation with the scene of its loss: the murder of her daughter at her own hands.
The re-ordering of temporality required by memoried history also extends to
the consideration of place. In the process of remembering, geographical and spatial
location are fundamentally disrupted. Given the unintegrated nature of traumatic
memory, its profound disconnection from everyday life, the spatial distinctions
between places in the 'real' world are entirely absent in the traumatised memory. In
Dori Laub's words:
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of
'normal' reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time .... Trauma
survivors live not with memories of the past, but with an event that could not
and did not proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attained no
closure, and therefore, as far as its survivors are concerned, continues into the
present and is current in every respect. (p. 69)
Despite Sethe's relentless work of 'beating back the past' (p. 73), 'Unfortunately her
brain was devious' and with the slightest of triggers 'suddenly there was Sweet
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Home rolling. rolling, out before her very eyes' (p. 6) Memories of the plantation in
the form of Sethe's 'rememory' are concrete and physical:
Where I was before I came here, that place is real. it's never going away.
Even if the whole farm - every tree and grass blade of it dies. The picture is
still there and what's more, if you go there - you who never was there - if you
go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen again; it will be
there for you. (p. 38)
The process of remembering, by contrast, is a process of re-integration of the split-
off, frozen 'memory'. The fact of its unspeakable and unspoken nature places the
soon-to-be remembered event in a relationship of crisis with the everyday. It is in this
sense that testimony is said to necessarily enact a breakage of the available discursive
frames for its expression. Shoshana Felman notes:
As a relation to events, testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of
a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled
into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as
knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames
of reference. (p. 5)
Bringing such memories into cognition then requires an act of creation, of
composition, and therefore entails the piecing together of fragments never before
placed together. In this respect, testimony is not the retrieving of a lost, forgotten,
already-constituted object/event, a referring back, but a textual event in itself taking
place in the present. It is not, therefore, a faithful copy, or a simple mirroring, of a
past incident but the present enactment/construction/realisation of an event's
significance(s). Testimony is therefore less an appeal to the already known than a
movement toward knowing.
Knowledge in the testimony is, in other words, not simply a factual given that
is reproduced and replicated by the testifier, but a genuine advent, an event in
its own right. (p. 62)
138
ITestimony, therefore impacts upon the world of the listener in ad1tion to that of the
teller. Without this impact, Felman argues, the telling has not been truly heard:
'Testimony cannot be authentic without that crisis'(p. 52).39As a textual event in its
own right, testimony necessitates the act of reading; it is dynamic and involving
rather than static and immediate. Testimony therefore also implies the presence of an
empathic listener, a witness. Conversely, without a witness testimony is unthinkable.
Testimonies are not monologues; they cannot take place in solitude. The
witnesses are talking to somebody: to somebody they have been waiting for
for a long time. (p.70-1)
The absence of an empathic listener, or more radically, the absence of an
addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one's memories and
thus affirm and recognize their realness, annihilates the story. (my emphasis,
p.68)
The listener, the witness, then, is said to activate the testimony; herlhis presence
enables the story to be told, provides what has been termed a 'testimonial bridge'
(p.101), a holding, supporting role in the testimonial relationship. To testify is,
consequently, to participate in a testimonial relationship with an other; a witness to
the testimony. A testimonial narrative is therefore relational and not monolythic, in
the sense of its constituting a discrete object, it is instead determined and therefore
exists between two people; teller and witness.
In short, to remember is to create, to literally re-collect, to piece together that
which has been held apart, or to reconstruct a traumatic scene retroactively. The idea
of remembering as creation resonates with Morrison's conception of memory as
outlined in her essay 'Memory, Creation, and Writing,4o: 'Memory (the deliberate act
of remembering) is a form of willed creation' (p.385) A form of creation that, as
Annette Kuhn notes, is without end;
Memory work, on the other hand, is potentially interminable: at every turn, as
further questions are raised, there is always something else to look into."
Or in Felman's words
139
The way in which the translator can bear witness to what actually happens in
the original is, however, paradoxically, not by imitation but only by a new
creation, a creation that, although it insures the literal survival of the original,
is itself only the testimony of an afterlife... ( p. 160)
Testimony or bearing witness, rather than presenting an event in its perceived
transparency, as an exact copy of an original event (as Andrew Benjamin enquires
what is 'the first time of this first time?', p. 170) instead implies the necessity of
reading, of interpretation, which brings with it the question of responsibility, of how
to read.
Guardian of the Testimony: Witnessing and Responsibility.
If the reader participates in the creation of the testimony it is a role not
without responsibility. As 'guardian' of the narrative (p. 58) the witness is under
obligation in a number of ways. Laub outlines this obligation, first, in terms of the
listener's 'both unobtrusive, nondirect, and yet imminently present, active' role. The
listener bears some responsibility both in controlling the flow of the remembrance
and in helping to piece the fragments together: letting the 'trauma fragments make
their impact both on him and on the witness'.
Thus, when the flow of fragments falters, the listener has to enhance them and
induce their free expression. When the trauma fragments, on the contrary,
accelerate, threaten to get too intense, too tumultuous and out of hand, he has
to reign them in, to modulate their flow. (p.71)
The witness then bears responsibility for the survivor surviving the telling; 'holding'
the teller at the moment event and significance(s) are felt/realised. Having passed a
'mutual test of safety', having established that 'they are stable and strong enough to
affirm the reality of [the event] in actual nonmetaphorical statements'(pp.69-70),
both teller and listener enter a testimonial contract:
Implicitly, the listener says to the testifier: 'For this limited time, throughout
the duration of the testimony, I'll be with you all the way, as much as I can. I
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want to go wherever you go, and I'll hold and protect you along this journey.
Then, at the end of the journey, I shall leave you'. (p.70)
Sethe can be read as enacting the role of witness to Paul D's untold stories in
in
the following extract. While the . very presence of Sethe 'the closed portion of his.,
head opened like a greased lock' (p. 41), she also plays a more active part in Paul D's
testimony.
,You want to tell me about it?' she asked him.
'Idon't know. Inever have talked about it. Not to a soul. Sang it sometimes,
but Inever told a soul. '
'Go ahead. Ican hear it. '
'Maybe. Maybe you can hear it. I just ain't sure I can say it. Say it right, I
mean, because it wasn't the bit - that wasn't it.'
Paul D then tells of the moment when he realised that Mister, Sweet Home's rooster,
'was allowed to be and stay what he was' whereas he, tongue 'held down by iron'
was 'something less than a chicken sitting in the sun on a tub.' At which point Sethe
.intervenes to slow the telling down.
Paul D had only begun, what he was telling her was only the beginning when
her fingers on his knee, soft and reassuring, stopped him. Just as well. Just as
well. Saying more might push them both to a place they couldn't get back
from. (p.72)
Sethe holds Paul D's emergent story, acting as 'the guardian of its process and
momentum' thereby ensuring he survives its articulation. The testimonial process is
consequently a strenuous one for both participants. The testimony is not a literal
recording of experience but a creation that bears the hallmark of textual activity. The
reader/witness then has to be alert to its potential encodings, deferrals, and repetitions
in order to read meaningfully.
Laub details an incident where the pursuit of historical accuracy served to
discredit the testimony of one of the rare survivors of the Auschwitz uprising. In a
videotaped interview with Laub, a woman in her early sixties gave an eyewitness
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account of the moment when, in her own words, 'we saw four chimneys going up in
flames, exploding.' At a conference organised a few months later, a debate ensued as
to the validity of the woman's account. According to a number of historians, the
narrative was inaccurate: empirical evidence demonstrated that only one chimney,
and not four, was blown up. From this, they argued, the woman's testimony was false
and could not be relied upon. Given the existence of a virulent revisionism, in the
form of holocaust denial material, the argument ran, historical accuracy was
paramount.
As the woman's interviewer, Laub intervened, arguing that the testimony had
been misread, its purpose misconstrued:
The woman was testifying not to the number of chimneys blown up but to
something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable
occurrence. One chimney blown up in Auschwitz was as incredible as four.
The number mattered less than the fact of the occurrence. The event itself was
almost inconceivable. The woman testified to an event that broke the all
compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts just did not
happen, and had no place. She testified to the breakage of a framework. That
was historical truth. (p. 60)
The message/meaning of the testimony was not the empirical data of the chimneys
but the fact and the secret of her survival. Laub continued:
The woman's testimony is breaking the frame of the concentration camp by
and through her very testimony: she is breaking out of Auschwitz by her very
talking. (p.62)
It is in this sense that testimony admits a degree of textuality i.e. it is a message that
needs decoding, reading and not a simple mimetic representation of some already
determined external reality. It is not a totalised depiction that can be held up to an
objective idea of how it really was to confirm its validity, a faithful copy of an event
dependent upon a reality outside of itself for its 'truth'. In Shoshana Felman's words:
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What the testimony does not offer is, however, a completed statement, a
totalisable account of those events. In the testimony, language is in process
and in trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of a
verdict or the self-transparency of knowledge. Testimony is, in other words, a
discursive practice as opposed to a pure theory. (p.5)
As Peter Nicholls points out, Laplanche and Leclaire's conception of memory is
useful here in that for them the experience of working through or remembering 'has
less to do with the recollection of an event than with the repetition of a structure. ,42
The testimony of the Auschwitz uprising repeated the structure of the breaking of a
frame, the shattering of a universe that was itself originally shattering of the pre-
concentrationary universe.P
Read this way Halle Suggs 'sitting by the churn ... butter all over his face'
testifies to his wife's violation at the hands of Schoolteacher's nephews:
[Sethe] shook her head from side to side, resigned to her rebellious brain ....
I am full God damn it of two boys with mossy teeth, one sucking on my
breast the other holding me down, their book-reading teacher watching and
writing it up But my greedy brain says, Oh thanks, I'd love more - so I
add more There is also my husband squatting by the churn smearing the
butter as well as its clabber all over his face because the milk they took is on
his mind And as far as he is concerned, the world may as well know it. (p.
70, my emphasis)
In 'watching and writing it up', or documenting the attack, Schoolteacher bears
false witness to what he is viewing in that the data he is pursuing is not the true
record of what is happening. Instead it is Halle's actions that bear tortured witness to
Sethe's ordeal. The nauseating image of his smashing congealed butter into his face
echoes the nauseating scene of the boys at Sethe's breast. Similarly, his broken self
testifies to the breaking of Sethe's subjectivity.
'The Work's Own Canvas': Witnessing and DecidabiJity.
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The contrast between the two witnesses in this scene further stresses the issue
of witnessing and responsibility. The emphasis so far placed upon the lack of
resolution and closure of testimony should not be taken as signalling relativism, a
kind of 'anything goes', free-market approach to interpretation. Within the realm of
testimony in which I have located Morrison's novels, the reader carries an obligation
toward realising the event that resists intelligibility, that is emerging in the telling. In
the case of Morrison's texts the reader could be construed as being obliged to pay
attention to what the author has termed 'the work's own canvas. ,44 Part of the author's
battle against the effects of reading her work in terms of 'approved treatments' _
sanctioned theoretical approaches that censor through the exclusion of 'the
specificity of the culture, the gender, the language', that 'rank and grade the readable
product' (p. 10) - is not to suggest an alternative theoretical approach but as far as is
possible to disarm the reader upon entry to the text.
Whereas in her earlier fictions Morrison provides points of entry into the
novel's universe in the form of what she refers to as a 'welcoming lobby'
(Unspeakable, p.24), a transitional space that mediates between reader and text thus
'introducing an outside-the circle reader into the circle'(p. 25), in Beloved she
eschews such devices. 45 Speaking of the novel's opening sentence she remarks
It is abrupt and should appear so. No native informant here. The reader is
snatched, yanked, thrown into an environment completely foreign, and I want
it as the first stroke of the shared experience that might be possible between
the reader and the novel's population. Snatched just as the slaves were from
one place to another, from any place to another, without preparation and
without defense. (p. 32)
This intention coincides with Laub's description of the witnessing role. Referring to
his lack of historical knowledge with respect to the Auschwitz uprising when
interviewing the woman who testified to the blowing up of the chimneys, Laub
suggests that a detailed knowledge of the event may have interfered with the
woman's testimony. Arriving at the scene of witnessing armed with a nuanced
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account of the uprising, Laub 'might have felt driven to confirm [his] knowledge', an
action which 'could have derailed the testimony'(p. 61), in passing everything that
was told to him through the filter of what was already known. By being in possession
of the historical 'facts' the witness, then, potentially fails in herlhis role in that the
knowable runs the risk of being foreclosed upon in favour of the known. As Laub
stresses however, this is not to espouse willful ignorance, a celebrated stance of not
knowing as discussed in chapter 1, it is more to emphasise the limits of prior
knowledge. In Laub's words: ' ... knowledge should not hinder or obstruct the
listening with foregone conclusions and preconceived dismissals, should not be an
obstacle or a foreclosure to new, diverging, unexpected information.' (p. 61)
With respect to Morrison's work, the overinvestment in questions of
aesthetics, and 'pure' literary debate (whether or not her work has literary merit or
not for instance), forecloses upon its testimonial function. The author has commented
upon the effect of literary references regarding her texts as 'supply[ing] a comfort I
don't want the reader to have', a comfort which insulates and protects herlhim from
direct involvement in the novel's universe.
I want my fiction to urge the reader into active participation in the non-
narrative, nonliterary experiences of the text, which makes it difficult for the
reader to confine himself to a cool and distant acceptance of data. (Memory,
p.387)
As opposed to the distanced posture of Schoolteacher 'watching and writing up',
through which the text bears witness to the violence of the record founded upon the
observation of the Other," Morrison is calling for an ethically responsible, and by
extension, involved, reading relation to her texts; in short, a witness.
To pick up on an earlier point, the reader's role in activating the text, like the
emphasis on lack of closure is not to suggest either the supremacy of the reader over
the text, or the undecidability of an event. As Andrew Benjamin states 'irreducibility
is not undecidability' (p. 15), it is not the potential for boundless interpretation or
whim on behalf of the reader. Abraham and Torok's theory of readability or
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cryptonymic analysis is instructive here. Whereas the Lacanian account of linguistic
functioning posits the notion of a primordial and necessarily permanent split between
linguistic markers and their meanings, as represented both in Lacan' s algorithm .s.
s
and in his famous statement 'an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier',
Abraham and Torok would see this separation as itself a potential object for
investigation. Esther Rashkin explains:
Cryptonymic analysis can, therefore, be said to recognise the proliferation of
the signifying chain whilst providing a tool for understanding how a
particular signified has been severed from that chain. What is obstructed or
barred in cryptonymy is not 'meaning' in any traditional sense of the term but
a connection, situation or drama that resists meaning or intelligibility. (p.46)
'Cryptonymy' posits a way of thinking of the specificity of gaps in signification as
well as the dissociation of signifier and signified, of mark and meaning, of enabling
'the settling of pieces into places designed and made especially for them' (Beloved,
p. 175). In viewing the past as a denied connection and not a lost object waiting to be
unearthed, cryptonymy as an analytic mode retains the particularity of history's
secrets, its unspeakable things unspoken, without construing the past as already
formed yet somehow lost. Interpretation is then a matter of 'discovering why
signification or meaning has been made unavailable' (p. 51, my emphasis) as
opposed to focussing on how the text resists decidability; 'In a cryptonymic reading,
we may stop at a signifier if we can determine what it hides, how it hides it, and what
drama might be linked to its process of hiding' (p. 45). In examining how a particular
signifier resists being read, the process of cryptonymy allows precisely for a
decidable outcome, of discovering what is being hidden without relying upon
archaeology, for 'the reading of a symbolic text does not stop at observing a one-to-
one correspondence between two terms' (p. 45). Instead, the textual fragments or
signifiers when allowed to re-join with their missing or hidden counterparts are then
transformed into a functioning symbolic unit, an operating symbol, a dynamic
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relational entity which in turn requires its own counterpart. 'the operation of the
symbol is itself infinite ... To join a symbol with its complement is to encounter, in
this union, another symbol itself separated from its own complement' (p. 48).
What is implied here is the temporality of interpretation, the fact that all meanings
cannot be realised at once and are instead part of an ongoing symbolising process.
This cryptonymic process of interpretation is enacted in Song of Solomon. A
meditation on history and memory, interpretation and reading, the novel is organised
around an enigmatic text/song: the song of Solomon whose meaning is gradually
deciphered by Milkman Dead, as it turns out, a direct descendent of the song's
protagonist.
As readers we encounter a version of the song within the novel's opening pages.
Sung by Milkman's aunt, Pilate, the song also represents the keeping of a promise
made to the ghost of her father who keeps appearing and urging Pilate to 'Sing, sing.'
(p.208)
o Sugarman doneflyaway
Sugarman done gone
Sugarman cut across the sky
Sugarman gone home (p. 6)
As the narrative progresses the veiled lexical significance of Sugarman is revealed as
Solomon. As he sets out to trace his ancestry, a journey prompted by the promise of
gold, Milkman is halted in his tracks by a group of children playing a singing game.
Spinning in a circle the children are singing a song that Milkman 'has heard off and
on all his life' (p.300) The children are singing Pilate's song but with' 'Solomon
don't leave me' instead of 'Sugarman.' Even the name of the town sounded like
Solomon: Shalimar, which Mr. Solomon and everybody else pronounced
Shalleemone.' (p. 303). Milkman realises that his own history is encoded in its lines.
He couldn't be mistaken. These children were singing a story about his own
people! He hummed and chuckled as he did his best to put it all together. (p.
303-4)
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Piece by piece, line by line, the song's hidden meanings are realised. What is more,
the enigmatic message 'Sing, sing.' is not, as it is supposed by Pilate, an instruction,
but rather the name of her mother who died minutes before Pilate was born. The
hidden significance of names for Milkman becomes absorbing in itself.
He read the road signs with interest now wondering what lay beneath the
names. The Algonquins had named the territory he lived in Great Water,
michi gami. How many dead lives and fading memories were buried in and
beneath the names of the places of this country. Under the recorded names
were other names, just as 'Macon Dead', recorded for all time in some dusty
file, hid from 'view the real names of people, places and things. Names that
had meaning. . . . He closed his eyes and thought of the black men in
Shalimar, Roanoke, Petersburg, Newport News, Danville, in the Blood Bank,
on Darling Street, in the pool halls, the barbershops. Their names. Names
they got from yearnings, gestures, flaws, events, mistakes, weaknesses.
Names that bore witness. (my emphasis pp.329/30)
Deciphering and unravelling a veiled history is not the only issue at stake in Song of
Solomon, however.
Unbeknownst to her, Pilate has carried her father's bones around in a sack for
a good many years. Mistaking the bones for those of an assailant she presumes killed
by her brother, Pilate heeds the words of her dead father's ghost to signify her
responsibility to the dead man's body.
'You can't just fly off and leave a body,' he tole me. A human life is
precious. You shouldn't fly off and leave it. So I knew right away what he
meant cause he was right there when we did it. He meant that if you take a
life then you own it. You responsible for it. You can't get rid of nobody by
killing them. (p. 208)
Pilate's assumed responsibility for the body echoes, I would argue,
Morrison's own sense of responsibility for the bodies of the disremembered, which
in tum becomes the responsibility of the critic reading the text. In an examination of
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the work of critic Paul de Man, Shoshana Felman highlights the critic's concern with
what happens to the poet Shelley's body in readings of his final, unfinished poem
The Triumph of Life. The text of the poem is interrupted by the poet's death, a fact
which, for de Man, constitutes a problem of reading for the critic: 'The final test of
reading, in The Triumph of Life, depends on how one reads the textuality of the
event, how one disposes of Shelley's body.'47 With this, de Man is critical of the
tendency to dispose of the body-in-the-text too readily, to transform the silent
inscription of the body in the text's margins into an 'historical and aesthetic object'
(Felman, p. 158). This reading of Shelley's poem is extended into a reading of
history itself. The implications of treating history as a 'totalised, settled, understood
and closed account' are that of reproducing it as a 'speech act which disposes of the
scandal of the bodies'. Felman concludes: 'The task of the translator ... is to read the
textuality of the original event without disposing of the body, without reducing the
original event to a false transparency of sense.' (p. 158)
Following this, Morrison's concern in Song of Solomon appears to be one of
rendering the textuality of the historical event imaged through the song at the same
time as dealing with the bones, the unmarked graves of that history. The problem of
how to contemplate the dead becomes paramount in Morrison's writing generally.
The unburied dead litter Morrison's novels: from the 'red ribbon knotted around a
curl of wet woolly hair, clinging still to its bit of scalp'found by Stamp Paid
(Beloved, p.180), to the feetless, headless, corpse of Paul A. hanging from a tree, to
the foot that 'rose from the river bed and kicked the bottom of the boat and Sethe's
behind' (p. 84) to the sixty million and more of the Middle Passage. Furthermore, the
dead of African-American history form what Morrison has referred to as her debt as
an author. For instance, in interview with James Wood she responds forcefully to his
asking if, given the magnitude of her literary success, she feels herself to be
'immune' to the racism she depicts in her novels:
I wish it were true that it didn't apply to me any more, but it isn't. I have a
certain amount of protection, but not here, not on the street where I live am I
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free of it. Not ever! In addition, I am conscious to the bone of everyone else. I
understand that one of the reasons that I am in this postion is because I am
good at it, but another is that I have a very big debt to pay to a lot of children
who got their brains shot out in the sixties. lowe it to them, I really do. I'm
happiest when I write something that both pleases me and also pays off this
debt."
This sense of debt pervades Morrison's self-descriptions of her role as a writer. It
also further signals her concern with witnessing. Felman outlines another dimension
of testimony: 'Contemporary writing is testimonial to the extent that it exists in a
state of referential debt, of 'constant obligation' to the 'woes of history', and to its
dead.' (p.llS). In writing out of a sense of historical debt Morrison is simultaneously
acting as its witness.
Despite Morrison's comment about paying off this debt her fictions
continually refuse to settle up in full. Beloved ends with an acknowledgment of the
impossibility of completely accounting for both the loss of a daughter and the sixty
million of the novel's epigraph. 'There is a loneliness that can be rocked .... Then
there is a loneliness that roams. No rocking can hold it down.' (p. 274) Something
Denver has already realised in witnessing Beloved and her mother's relationship:
Denver thought she understood the connection between her mother and
Beloved: Sethe was trying to make up for the handsaw; Beloved was making
her pay for it. But there would never be an end to that, and seeing her mother
diminished shamed and infuriated her. (p. 251)
The Bluest Eye similarly resists the reduction of its events to the 'false transparency
of sense'. The sense of loss at the novel's close is palpable. The image of Pecola
Breedlove, driven to madness, flailing 'her anus like a bird in an eternal,
grostesquely futile effort to fly', allows no easy resolutions, no relief at the text's
end. The loss is unequivocal: 'The damage done was total.' (p. 188). Audre Lorde's
'There Are No Honest Poems About Dead Women' is suggestive here:
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What do we want from each other
after we have told our stories
do we want
to be healed do we want
mossy quiet stealing over our scars
do we want
the powerful unfrightening sister
who will make the pain go away
mother's voice in the hallway
you've done it right
the first time darling
you will never need
to do it again.
Thunder grumbles on the horizon
I buy time with another story
a pale blister of air
cadences of dead flesh
obscure the vowels. 49
Lorde's poem, like Morrison's novels, highlights the incompleteness of the
testimonial narrative or text, the sense in which 'the literature of testimony is at once
a performance of its obligation and a statement of its falling short of cancelling its
referential debt.' (Felman, p. 116). The poems about dead women cannot be honest,
they cannot, however much they aspire, achieve full or final truth. The idea of saying
it once, getting it 'right the first time' is exposed as fantasy. As is the promise of
complete healing through the testimony. Instead the urgency and obligation of the
stories is made clear, they 'buy time'. They halt the threat of thunder even as they fail
to account for the materiality of death. The fact of this failure is strained against with
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the intensely visceral and yet inescapably linguistic images of blistered air and the
'cadences of dead flesh', images which nonetheless fall short of achieving full
significance. Language cannot account for the materiality of death and yet neither
can it be dispensed with.
Likewise, Morrison's texts consistently refuse the comfort of resolution, easy
healing, and instead foreground its costs. Which is not the same as saying that they
privilege undecidability in what has been taken to be a 'postmodem' sense but that
they self-consciously explore sites of conflict. In her essay 'Rootedness' Morrison
makes a distinction between problems and conflicts, implying that problems infer the
obligation of solutions whereas conflicts are simply conflicts and therefore carry no
such obligation: 'There is a conflict between public and private life, and its a conflict
that I think ought to remain a conflict. Not a problem, just a conflict.' (p. 339)
Moving on to describe what she feels the functions of the novel to be she adds:
it should have something in it that enlightens; something in it that opens the
door and points the way. Something in it that suggests what the conflicts are,
what the problems are . But it need not solve those problems because it is not
a case study, it is not a recipe. (p. 341)
Morrison's work, rather than forming as Mbalia supposes a series of manifestos,
speaks to a crisis of representation and witnessing in the late twentieth century, a
situation that is far from resolved.
Witnessing and Identification
In allowing the testimony to impact upon her/his self, and in stripping away
readerly expectation to achieve a state of almost 'pre-literacy', to borrow Morrison's
term, the reader is not, as it might be supposed, a mere mirror or reflection of the
testifier's words. The realisation of the testimony on the part of the witness is
achieved through an act of reading and not reflection. Here I wish to stress that
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paradoxically, successful acts of witnessing involve the necessary failure of the
testimony to reproduce what is held to be the truth of the event. It is in this sense that
the witness both 'makes and breaks a promise' (Laub, p.91) Laub explains further:
The testimony aspires to capture the lost truth of that reality, but the
realization of the testimony is not the fulfillment of this promise. The
testimony in its commitment to truth is a passage through, and an exploration
of, differences, rather than an exploration of identity, just as the experience it
testifies to - the Holocaust - is unassimilable, because it is a passage through
the ultimate difference - the otherness of death. (p.91)
Testimony is ' ...a dialogical process of exploration and reconciliation of two worlds'
(ibid), past and present, self and other, and not the reflection of one world within the
other.
Of all Morrison's novels it could be said that Beloved provides the most
intense examination of the processes of remembering and witnessing. In terms of its
structure, demands on the reader, and its thematic concerns, Beloved could be said to
bear witness to the process of witnessing itself; the work thus 'participates in the
events it describes'. so In particular, the novel offers a sustained examination of the
dynamics of witnessing and identification as reading relations to history. Through the
characters of Paul D. and Beloved the text exposes the problems of mirroring as a
reading relation to the past or to experience. In drawing out these issues I wish to
highlight their implications for feminist criticism, and while I would not wish to
. reduce Morrison's texts to mere allegories for literary theory they nevertheless
contain important lessons for the critic engaged in reading difference.
From the moment he re-enters Sethe's world, Paul D. forms a witnessing
presence to her disavowed past. The very essence of an empathic listener: 'For a man
with an immobile face it was amazing how ready it was to smile, or blaze or be sorry
with you. As though all you had to do was get his attention and right away he
produced the feeling you were feeling' (p. 7), Paul D. activates Sethe's testimony:
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So, kneeling in the keeping room the morning after Paul D came, she
was distracted by the two orange squares that signaled how barren 124 really
was.
He was responsible for that. Emotions sped to the surface in his
company. Things became what they were: drabness looked drab; heat was
hot. Windows suddenly had a view. (p.39)
The significances that Sethe works so hard to hold apart, line up in his presence:
'drabness looked drab; heat was hot', the relation of event to significance is restored.
Paul D thus constitutes a 'testimonial bridge' through which the significance of the
past is accessed. Felman writes:
Joining events to language, the narrator-as-eye-witness is the testimonial
bridge which, mediating between narrative and history, guarantees their
correspondence and adherence to each other. (p.I 0I)
Later on in the narrative Paul D states his commitment to Sethe's past and by
extension their future together:
Sethe, if I'm here with you, with Denver, you can go anywhere you want.
Jump, if you want to, 'cause I'll catch you 'fore you fall. Go as far inside as
you need to, I'll hold your ankles. Make sure you get back out. (p. 46)
Paul D thus establishes his role as a witness to Sethe's untold history by creating a
place of safety from which she can begin to speak, by assuring her that he will
continue to hold her story (thus fulfilling her need for 'the holding presence of a
witness', Laub, p. 88) as he first held her body by the stove:
Behind her, bending down, his body an arc of kindness, he held her breasts in
the palm of his hands. He rubbed his cheek on her back and learned that way
her sorrow, the roots of it; its wide trunk and intricate branches. Raising his
fingers to the hooks of her dress, he knew without seeing them or hearing any
sigh that tears were coming fast. And when the top of her dress was around
her hips and he saw the sculpture her back had become, like the decorative
work of an ironsmith too passionate for display, he could think but not say,
154
'Aw, Lord, girl.' And he would tolerate no peace until he had touched every
ridge and leaf of it with his mouth, ... (p. 17-IS)
Bearing at this point wordless witness to Sethe's injury, Paul D 'feels the pain her
back ought to' (p.l S) and thereby:
comes to be a participant and co-owner of the traumatic event: through his
very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in himself. The
relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, therefore, impacts on the
relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to feel the bewilderment,
injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma victim feels. (Laub,
p.57-S)
This promise of wordless knowing also marks Beloved's position in the narrative.
The ghost made flesh offers full understanding, knowing-without-saying through a
totally identificatory relation with Sethe and her past.'I don't have to remember
nothing. I don't even have to explain. She understands it all.' (p. 183); 'Thank God I
don't have to rememory or say a thing because you know it. All.' (p.l91). However,
there is a crucial difference in the relation offered by Beloved in that by knowing
already she effaces the need to testify. Sethe does not 'have to explain', or put her
trauma into words. Beloved is the event itself and as such needs no explanation, she
is identical to Sethe's and her own trauma. This stands in contrast to Paul D. who
stands at the other side of 'bridge' awaiting Sethe's spoken testimony. Beloved
promises knowledge without the pain of recalling and narrating the event, however.
Sethe knew that the circle she was making around the room, him, the subject
would remain one. That she could never close in, pin it down for anybody
who had to ask. If they didn't get it right off - she could never explain. (p.
163)
Deprived of the obligation to testify however, Sethe's relationship to her past, to
Beloved, remains traumatic, without hope, indeed pathological (a potential which is
slowly realised after the departure of Paul D. who is unable to comprehend Sethe's
actions), in that the event of Beloved's death remains split off, sealed off, from the
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world. The boundary of the trauma remains unbroken and hence the necessary
dialogue and integration between worlds, present and past, cannot take place. Laub,
again, explains:
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of
'normal' reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time. The trauma is
thus an event that has no beginning, no before, no during and no after. This
absence of categories that define it lends it a quality of 'otherness', a salience,
a timelessness and a Ubiquity that puts it outside the range of associatively
linked experiences, outside the range of comprehension, of recounting and of
mastery. Trauma survivors live not with memories of the past but with an
event that could not and did not proceed through to its completion, has no
ending, attained no closure, and therefore as its survivors are concerned,
continues into the present and is current in every respect. (p. 69)
The understanding that Beloved offers serves to further disconnect Sethe from the
world. Arriving uncharacteristically late for work (p. 184) Sethe spends her day
' ...wondering how she could hurry time along and get to the no-time waiting for her.'
(p.191) Sethe's past although fully known by Beloved continues to be unwitnessed,
events therefore persist in their frozen, petrified character: time, chronology,
sequence remain absent. Locked inside a significantly icy, unwitnessed, landscape,
where, whilst skating, 'Nobody saw them falling.' (p. 174) Sethe and Beloved
withdraw into their own undifferentiated universe:'The world is in this room. This
here's all there is and all there needs to be.' (p. 183)
The blissful existence in which Sethe,'excited to giddiness by the things she no
longer had to remember' (p. 183), is mirrored completely by Beloved soon begins to
collapse. Their symbiotic merging becomes parasitic; the demands of Beloved,
'getting bigger, plumper by the day', reduce Sethe to skin and bone. The sight of her
mother's skin 'thin as china silk'(p. 239) prompts Denver to 'step off the edge of the
world' to find help and so breaks the boundary of that world in the process. So
begins the process of witnessing.
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That Paul D fails to 'hold' Sethe's testimony to the murder of her daughter is
crucial inasmuch as it is through this 'failure' that he is able to maintain his
difference, his otherness to Sethe's 'rough choice' (p. ) and so offer her a route out of
her traumatic, and hence frozen relation to her past. Paul D, in his refusal to accept
Sethe's reasoning, represents what Laub refers to as the promise 'of a sane, normal
and connected world' (p.91) 'a life' or its possibility: 'We can make a life, girl. A
life.' (p.46); ' ... We got more yesterday than anybody. We need some kind of
tomorrow.' (p. 273). In breaking his promise to Sethe, Paul D. thus catalyses the
passage through difference necessary to her survival. The breaking of the promise
forms the space within which the testimonial bridge can be built. Instead of knowing
already a space for knowing is created in the concrete world of the present:
There was no room for any other thing or body until Paul D arrived and broke
up the place, making room, shifting it, moving it over to someplace else, then
standing in the place he had made. (p. 39)
The frames of knowing in both worlds broken, the act of witnessing can resume.
Conclusion
The process of witnessing here outlined offers a highly suggestive means of
thinking about the act of critical reading and framing for the white feminist reader.
The figure of the witness presents a way of thinking between straightforward
identification and saying nothing, about the text's referent without falling into the
trap of freezing its significance. It offers a dynamic listening/reading relation that
bridges the gap between knowledge and ignorance, and warns against the advancing
of a frame as a way of reading, of knowing before reading. Likewise Morrison's
work can be read as a sustained meditation on issues of reading. Its participatory
structure breaks down the presumed objectivity of certain critical approaches; the
distinction between the text as an object of study and the reader as master of that
text's meanings. If the witness is needfully disarmed of preconception on listening to
the testimony so the reader is required by Morrison to break the certainty of an
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advanced theoretical frame, to relinquish the knowledges that threaten to 'censor' her
texts, that merely translate them into the terms of an already constituted discourse,
the latest theory, turning them into marketable products. Finally, the figure of the
witness offers a way of thinking through a readerly connection that exceeds simple
mirroring; the passage through difference being crucial to the connection between
witness and testifier, reader and text. Like the narrator in Jazz the reader who knows
in advance of reading, who maintains a separation between herself and the text is
bound to misread. The unidentified narrator who expresses a doubtless knowing in
the very first sentence of the novel ('I know that woman ...') is forced to a different
conclusion by the end of the narrative:
I thought I knew them and wasn't worried that they didn't really know about
me. Now it's clear why they contradicted me at every turn: they knew me all
.along. Out of the comers of their eyes they watched me. And when I was
feeling most invisible, being tightlipped, silent and unobservable, they were
whispering about me to each other. They knew how little I could be counted
on; how poorly, how shabbily my know-it-all self covered helplessness ....
So I missed it altogether. I was sure one would kill the other. I waited for it so
I could describe it. I was so sure it would happen. That the past was an abused
record with no choice but to repeat itself at the crack and no power on earth
could lift the arm that held the needle. I was so sure, and they danced and
walked all over me. Busy, they were, busy being original, complicated,
changeable - human, I guess you'd say, while I was the predictable one,
confused in my solitude into arrogance, thinking my space, my view was the
only one that was or that mattered. I got so aroused while meddling, while
finger-shaping, I overreached and missed the obvious. (pp.220-21)
The figure of the witness lifts the needle from the critical record.
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A comment that I feel to be equally applicable to Morrison's text.
162
Chapter 5. The 'Proper' Context: Limits and Homework.
Suppose you want to write
of a woman braiding
another woman's hair-
straight down, or with beads and shells
in three-strand plaits or com rows -
you had better know the thickness
the length - the pattern
why she decides to braid her hair
how it is done to her
what country it happens in
what else happens in that country
You have to know these things 1
In an essay on Alice Walker's The Color Purple Cora Kaplan warns of the effects
of a reading position based upon recognition of the already familiar.
Unless we are actually specialists in the area from which these foreign
anglophone literatures come, and teaching them in that context, our more
than usually fragmented and partial knowledge of the history, politics and
culture in which they were produced and originally read, frequently leads
us into teaching and thinking about these texts through an unintentionally
imperialist Iense, conflating their progressive politics with our own
agendas, interpreting their versions of humanism through the historical
evolution of our own. 2
The witting or unwitting use of 'dominant forms of cultural interpretation', it is
argued, translates texts such as Walker's into further versions of the universal
human condition, and other transhistorical 'truths' (p. 177). Most vulnerable to
this treatment are what Kaplan terms 'foreign texts that appear to be written in
our "own" language'(p. 177); the potential for misreading or rather
misrecognition is, then, greater the closer to 'home' the text appears. Given this,
the critical question becomes one of finding ways to read The Color Purple 'so
that its cultural and political conditions of production are not deracinated, so that
its narrative retains its rich, polychromatic texture, its provocative politics' (p.
182).
The answer to this question is seen to lie in gaining '. . . a specific
understanding of the other cultural moment and histories in which [the text] was
written, published and read'(p. 178). In short, to contextualise. Other critics have
also embraced the notion of context as a means of decolonising the text. Gina
Wisker, for instance, states:
One very important element in our reading, teaching and studying of
Black women's writing is that of ensuring the recognition of cultural and
historical context. It is only through ensuring that these texts , as any
others, are read in context that the kind of essentialism which surrounds
and validates the works of the 'great tradition' and its canon can be
undermined and the difference and worth of works hitherto ignored or
marginalised be properly acknowledged and read from a basis of
something more than ignorance.'
'Respecting' the varying cultural traditions and discursive fields out of which
black women's texts emerge, then, becomes a crucial critical gesture for the white
feminist critic. What is more, it is one that finds support in theoretical statements
from many black feminists. Deborah McDowell states, for instance:
Its limitations notwithstanding, I firmly believe that the contextual
approach to Black women's literature exposes the conditions under which
literature is produced, published, and reviewed. This approach is not only
useful but necessary to Black feminist critics."
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While McDowell is here addressing the black feminist critic, it is implied that
paying attention to the context of a text is a necessary undertaking for all
commentators of black women's writings. So, if white feminist critics have been
guilty of misreading on the grounds of ignorance, then the answer would seem to
lie in the direction of gaining knowledge of the Other text and where it is 'coming
from'.
However, the invocation of context is not, and should not mark, the end of
the story. Often, the notion of context is deployed as if it were fully determining,
as if texts come automatically prepackaged with a (singular) context that the
irresponsible critic removes and throws away. The critical task is then rendered a
matter of simply shepherding the loose text back into its originating enclosure or
signifying wrapper. There are a number of difficulties that arise as a result of this
view. First, in supposing a text to have a proper, in this sense single, context, the
flexibility of the term is denied in that it belies the extent to which there are a
range of contexts which can at anyone time be brought to bear upon a text's
meanings. For example, the context of African-American women's writings is
often considered in relation to the content or themes of the text, so much attention
is paid to the history of slavery or sharecropping at the expense of other
contextual ising issues: ' ... the other cultural moment and histories in which [the
text] was written, published and read' (p. 178), to recall Kaplan's phrase. The
concept of context, then, is far less determinable than it first appears, and can be
rendered variously.
A further problem emerges when it is considered that the use of the term
'context' is repeatedly assumed to dispense with what is seen as the 'problem' of
textuality. Ellen Rooney summarises the situation thus:
In some lexicons, at least, context is an anti-essentialist slogan; to
contextualise is to expose the history of what might otherwise seem
outside history, natural and thus universal, that is, the essence. S
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Arguments about meanmgs of feminist texts are frequently settled through
reference to context as the legitimate source of meaning above all other discursive
registers. So, for example, Judith Butler draws attention to the risks of reading
Nella Larsen's Passing in psychoanalytic terms and suggests, in light of its
'belong[ing] to the tradition of the Harlem Renaissance [it] ought properly ... be
read in the context of that cultural and social world." Diana Fuss solves the
question of essences by invoking the notion of context as arbiter in the dispute
over meaning. The feminist pedagogue/critic bears ' ...the responsibility to
historicise, to examine each deployment of essence, each appeal to experience,
each claim to identity in the complex contextual frame in which it is made." In
keeping with Gayatri Spivak's notion of 'strategic essentialism" Fuss argues that
it is not enough to simply deconstruct essences or to point out instances of
essentialism in order to undermine feminist argument/theories, as even the most
constructivist of positions contains its own essential assumptions. Essentialism
alone cannot, therefore, be the deciding factor as to the political usefulness of any
theory or text; the discursive and cultural context becomes crucial instead.
Placing a text in context operates not only to help rank textual meanings
(historical over psychoanalytic as in Butler's case for instance), it also assists in
traversing the difficult territory of the essentialism debates.
However, in being seen to settle postmodem issues of language and
representation, or to use Nancy K. Miller's phrase, in acting as a 'brake on
rhetorical spinning,'? the notion of context is constituted as immune from the very
questions it is being called on to solve. In other words, the question of the
textuality of the context as it is established (whether historical, literary etc.) is
itself repressed. A text's context is no less vulnerable to the kinds of critique that
other authenticating texts/discourses (experience for example, not to mention
history) have been and continue to be exposed to, in that it, too, is language
bound and therefore subject to the very critical attention that inheres with
linguistic issues.
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This is not to say that context is no more than yet another story we tell
about language or texts and thereby to herald the slip into relativism. Rather, it is
to complicate a term that has come to be valued for its stabilising properties. It is
also to confront its limits. Often the notion of context is deployed in ways that
suggest that ultimate knowledge of a text can be gained. For the white critic, the
project of contextualisation, insofar as the text's context is rendered as absolute,
potentially colludes with that of the anthropologist. The gathering of information
about a race-different text with the aim of expertise constitutes a reenactment of a
mode of colonial authority where, as Elleke Boehmer puts it 'To colonise
something was to pile writing upon it'lO. The critical ambition of respecting the
tradition of the text necessarily confronts its limits. As Boehmer notes:
... postcolonial discourse trusts to the translatability of texts taken from
other cultures. The assumption, predicated on the global event of empire,
is that some hybridised version of a Western language or syncretic
cognitive framework will mediate gaps in understanding. The reality is,
however, that there are utterances which remain out of reach of
postcolonial interpretation. World music, McDonalds, various aspects of
our globalised Coca-Cola culture may camouflage this reality. And yet a
certain incommensurability of historical worlds has to be conceded. (p.
247)
A crucial part of 'respecting' any text's contexts is a confrontation with that
which resists as well as allows intelligibility. This tension between knowing and
not knowing operates in Spivak's work around the relation of First World
critic/Third World text. On the one hand, the First world reader/critic is urged to
do herlhis 'homework': 'learning what is going on there through language,
through specific programs of study' II,whilst at the same time 'think[ing] through
the limits of one's power.'12 Part of this confrontation is the realisation that for
instance, even the most gifted linguistically can only learn so many languages;
that 'the world is a large place. Others are many' .(p. 18). Rather than engendering
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critical paralysis this facing of limitations is intended to undermine the potential
for grandiose theoretical statements and instead signal the collectivity of critical
work. One person cannot exhaust the text's contextual significance. The
responsibility to contextualise, to do one's 'homework' is a task without
discernible limits in that it is, first, dependent upon the translatability of the text
in question, and second, subject to the textuality of the context itself. The extent
to which a reader is able to read in context is therefore not decidable either in
advance or in transcendent terms. In the same way, the contours of what is
unknowable about a particular text are not able to be anticipated up front, so to
speak. This undecidability of the tension between knowing and not knowing is
critically important and should not be read as signalling complacency on the part
of the white reader. To place limits on the ability to contextualise is not to
celebrate or reify wilful ignorance or the deliberate refusal to find things out, it is
instead a pledge to continue to read the texts we read as opposed to returning
them to what we perceive as their proper meaning, as well as a commitment to
discovering what those limits are as a part of the critical enterprise. What'
becomes stressed in the space between knowing and not knowing is the activity
of considering what it may be that constitutes the particular blindnesses and
insights of any relation between white reader and 'raced' text.
Following this, it is my contention that contextualisation is far more
readily referred to as a potentially decolonising move than it is actually enacted.
That is, that critics often stress the need to contextualise, to respect the specific
location of a text without going on to do just that, to transfer the articulation of
that need into critical practice. Appeals to context are then often rhetorical
gestures, strategies in an abstracted, discursive debate or language game over
essences or imperialism that pay scant regard to the actualisation of, for instance,
the historical location or content of texts, the complex social reality that texts
inhabit, however each may be determined. By way of drawing out these points I
examine, first, a particular act of contextualisation which relies on the idea of a
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fixed and determining context. Gina Wisker's essay , "Disremembered and
Unaccounted For": Reading Toni Morrison's Beloved and Alice Walker's The
Temple of My Familiar' uses Susan Willis's Specifying as the basis of its
historical authority, a use that I question in an extended critique of Willis's text. I
then look at Adrienne Rich's essay 'Notes toward a Politics of Location' and
Gayatri Spivak's'How to Teach a "Culturally Different" Book' as a means of
thinking through the issues of context and textuality.P
Respecting Tradition: Gina Wisker and Susan Willis
In her editor's introduction to the collection Black Women's Writing Gina
Wisker stresses the importance of reading contextually for the white feminist
critic. This concern is carried into her essay on Morrison and Walker:
We have a problem as critics and readers, then faced with the cultural
imperialism of appropriation and alternative canonisation of writing by
black women, which colonises them for the literary academy. (p. 81)
In an echo of Kaplan, contextualising is constituted as the means of addressing
the question of critical appropriation. By way of providing a context for her
chosen texts Wisker selects 'extracts from critical works by Susan Willis, Barbara
Burford and others, [and] some of Toni Morrison's critical comments from
interviews' (p. 81). In addition, Morrison's 'historically situated, politically
focused' text: is seen to provide its own context. A dramatisation of a real
historical event," Beloved is, for the most part, read as a documentary history of
slavery.
As a means of inscribing a context for her two texts Wisker's
methodology is mostly inadequate. Leaving to one side, for the moment, the
questionable authority of Susan Willis's text, there are problems associated both
with the use of interviews, the assumption that the text provides its own
historical context, and her invocation of the institutional context of black
women's writing. Throughout the essay there is a wholesale lack of engagement
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with the critical material called upon to account for the novels' contexts.
Quotations from interviews are treated as literal explanations, as supplying absent
meaning; texts are read literally as if descriptions of historical events. As I have
discussed already the difficulties that result from representing race-different
writings as repositories of truth and authenticity (see in particular chapter 1) I
will here confine myself to the matter of the institution.
In her thinking about the literary/academic context of Morrison's and
Walker's novels Wisker presents a contradictory account. To begin with,
Morrison is deemed 'flavour of the month', an 'established' literary figure. As a
result of the author's success it is seen as nothing 'other than embarrassing' to
recall Sara Blackburn's now infamous review of Sula,15 read by Wisker as an
'example of white female racism' (p. 79). However, the way in which the white
critical problem of appropriation is presented is at odds with this scene of
unequivocal success. To recall, besides the issue of cultural imperialism the
(white) reader is seen to face the problem of an academy which colonises
through the 'alternative canonisation' of black women's writing. In light of this
what is implied for Morrison's aforementioned success? If it is no longer
anything but embarrassing to read Blackburn's comments how does this square
with an institution that colonises through canonisation?
The fact of the contradiction is, I would argue, a result of an over-
investment in a binary which equates white with power and black with
marginality. So, the literary establishment/academy is seen as irredeemably
colonial, by extension, white, despite Morrison's declared success. Indeed the
author's success cannot be incorporated into Wisker's construction because of
this unconscious marking of the academy as coloniser. This over-simplification
of white academy/black text; centre/margin, extends to the unqualified use of
'we' and 'us', meaning white, privileged, throughout the text. For instance, black
women's writing is seen to 'interrogate a continuum of attitudes towards racial
difference which make us feel uncomfortable because they upset our
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unconsciously held beliefs: they confront us with our own racism, and our own
guilt' (p. 83, my emphasis). The universalised reader is implied throughout as
white; 'we' readers deal with the problem of how to read 'them', black women
writers, objects and victims of 'our' knowledge. In an essay concerned with the
institutionalisation of feminist criticism, Jane Gallop, echoing Hortense Spillers,
refutes the idea that writing by black women, fiction and non-fiction, is plainly
'other' or marginal to the academy.l" Citing the facts of Toni Morrison's, Alice
Walker's and Paule Marshall's tenure at prestigious universities along with the
'growing industry in academic articles and conference papers on these very
writers' (p. 60) Gallop criticises the construction of the academy as resolutely
white-male and by extension as purveyor of elitist values. The situation is far
more ambiguous than this construction allows, she argues:
Between 1975 and 1983 the mainstream of academic feminist criticism
implicitly defined its enterprise in a way that fit the literary academy.
Cooption or strategy? We may not be able simply to decide what
motivated this fit. But we live in the legacy of that period; we benefit from
it. It allows us not only radically to call its terms - 'women' and
'literature' - into question but to be heard through an institutions channels
of transmission when we do so. (pp. 66-7)
While Wisker acknowledges Morrison and Walker's success, she unwittingly
holds on to a caucacentric'? view of the academy. The contradiction cannot be
resolved within the terms of Wisker's discourse as it stands and instead
constitutes a fracture in her conclusions. Rather than posing questions for the
construction of the academy the success of the black woman writer presents a
reading problem for the (white) feminist critic. 'We' white readers 'consider
reading, reception and response in relation to that rich variety of Black women's
writing now available to us' (p. 79). 'We' contemplate, from the centre, the
problem of how to read the voices from margins.
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Wisker's use of Susan Willis's Specifying as a source of the contextual is
no less problematic. Such are its problems that an extensive examination is
justified. From its opening statement Specifying is unequivocal regarding the
importance of history to any consideration of African-American women's texts
History enters the texts not only as 'topic and substance' or background theme
but in the very fibres of individual characters. So, discovering why 'Sula is Sula'
or 'Meridian is Meridian'
involves reconstructing the development of the character's individual
personality in relation to the historical forces that have shaped the
migrations of her race, the struggles of her community, and the
relationships that have developed within her family. (p. 3)
Describing these themes as the 'most obvious' ways in which history enters the
work, Willis argues the relation of African-American women's literature to
history to be 'even more essential and significant' (p. 3) than this. Black women
are attributed a privileged relation to a specific history. The specific history in
question is the economic transformation of America from an agrarian mode of
production to one organised around industrial capital.
The single most important aspect of the history of North America, indeed,
one that defines the entire modem history of the Americas and has only
reached its most advanced stage in the United States, is the transition from
an agrarian to an urban society. (p. 4)
Willis delineates the specifically American nature of this transformation: it is less,
as in Europe, a move from feudalism to industrialisation than the evolution of the
post-Columbian world itself under capitalism (p. 4). The privileged relation of
America's black women to this history is determined through a kind of standpoint
theory":
... there are economic and historical reasons why black women are in a
better position to grasp history as a concrete experience. The history of
black women in this country is the history of a labour force. Almost every
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black woman living in the United States has as her past the accumulated
work of all her female forebears . . . As workers, black women shaped
their present and intimately knew the circumstances of their moment in
history. Because the mode of labor defines the epochs of history; black
women have had firsthand knowledge of slavery, sharecropping, and
domestic and wage labor. (pp. 6-7)
The story she offers of American black women's writing is, then, at once the
story of, and a political resistance to, the development of capitalism in the West.
History is seen as fully determining of African-American women's writing.
Statements such as this abound:
No-one can read a novel by Toni Morrison or Alice Walker or Paule
Marshall without confronting history, feeling its influence and
experiencing the changes wrought by history.(p. 3).
This is the historical context and wellspring of American black women
writers. I know of no other body of writing that so intimately partakes of
the transformation from rural to urban society or so cogently articulates
the change in its content as well as its form. (p.4)
The authority of black women's experience of the American condition is
augmented further by its maternal genealogy. 'A bridge defined along
motherlines' (p. 6); 'The black woman's relation to history is first of all a
relationship to mother and grandmother.' (p. 5) .Willis continues:
As mothers, the reproducers of the labor force, black women have had a
keen awareness of history as change. In their hope for their children's
future, black women have learned to be attentive to moments of historical
transition and many have struggled for social change. In their role as
producers, black women have known the present; then, in relation to the
economics of reproduction, they have envisioned and strived for the
future. As workers, they have sustained their families; as mothers, they
have borne the oral histories from their grandmothers to their children. For
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all these reasons, today's black women writers undertand history both as
period and process. (p. 7)
These oral histories passed along motherlines combined with what is seen as a
unique relation to the labour market, as it is organised around capitalist logic,
place African-American women as peerless commentators of the post-Agrarian,
which is to say, industrial capitalist, United States. The privileged view attributed
to American black women is further born out in Willis's chosen subtitle of
Specifying: black women writing the American experience. The true story of
America is that of its black women.
The movement from an agranan to an industrial economy IS
simultaneously a story of loss: loss of community, authentic relationships,
humanity. Discussing the novels of Paule Marshall, Willis states:
Her writing is deeply haunted by the notion that there once existed
a whole - a traditional Caribbean black community - but immigration and
the pressures of life under commodity capitalism have sundered the
whole. (p. 67)
The advent of industrial capitalism signals the end of authenticity and wholeness
and the beginning of a fragmented, inauthentic, alienated existence. So the
protagonist of Marshall's Praisesong for the Widow is described as having
relationships which:
...are partial, embracing no more than family members, and, like
the telephone calls that link them, defined by an advanced technological
society that abstracts and fragments human relationships.(p. 67)
This shattering of what was once whole is also extended to language itself. The
transition from agrarian to urban is seen by Willis to herald the moment at which
authentic discourse is replaced with postmodern uncertainty, where signifier and
signified part company. The emergence of this faultline is directly attributable to
the logic of a capitalist economy. In an extended discussion of the language
practice of 'specifying'Willis argues:
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'specifying' insist[s] on a direct relationship between the names and the
person being named. The only thing that stands between the signified and
the signifier is the name-caller who gives herself as guarantor of the
relationship, with the whole community standing witness to the contract.
'Specifying' represents a form of narrative integrity. Historically, it speaks
for a noncommodified relationship to language, a time when the slippage
between words and meaning would not have obtained or been tolerated.
Such concerns are important in contemporary black women's writing, as I
will show in the discussion of Toni Cade Bambara's Gorilla My Love ... ,
whose young protagonist rebels precisely against the sort of schism
between signifier and signified that not only typifies the narratives and
theories generated under late capitalism, but also serves the interests of
domination. (p. 16)
In other words, for Willis, 'specifying' represents a time when language-use
privileged connection over fragmentation, when word and meaning lined up
neatly together and was guaranteed by the authority embodied in the form of a
witness or community of witnesses. Furthermore, this sense of connection is
offered as a form of resistance to the fragmentation that is seen to embody the
'interests of domination.' Following a line of argument associated with Frederic
Jameson, the notion of the postmodern is tied to the hegemony of a late capitalist
economy and culture.l"
This sense of connection associated with pre-capitalist culture is also
present with regard to the lack of distinction between speaker, text and audience.
In the oral tradition of specifying Willis points out, there is ' ...no separation
between teller and text' (p. 15). Nor is there any firm distinction to be made
between text and audience in that narratives are participatory in structure and
invite contribution from the listener. In the move toward the industrial there is an
'erasure of the speaking subject' (p.20) a dislocation of the traditional basis of
authority as the speaker/witness or witnessing community no longer functions as
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guarantor of what is said. Without the binding presence of the guarantor, text,
meaning, and audience go their separate ways.
History emerges in Willis's account as the source both of a forceful
critique of industrial development under capitalism and its alternative: a utopian
vision of noncommodified relations and socio-economic organisation.
Throughout Specifying Willis appeals to the opposition of a racist bourgeois
society by a vision of a future reclaimed from a past uncontaminated by capitalist
logic. This is articulated quite clearly, for instance, in a discussion of Toni
Morrison's Song a/Solomon.
Milkman's journey into the past takes him out of consumer society, where
he, Christmas shopping in the Rexhall store, practices the translation of
human emotions into commodities, and thrusts him into the preindustrial
world of Shalimar, where for the first time in his life Milkman sees
women with 'nothing in their hands' (SOS, 262). Stunned, Milkman
realises that he 'had never in his life seen a woman on the street without a
purse slung over her shoulder, pressed under her arm, or dangling from
her clenched fingers' (SOS, 262). The vision of women walking empty-
handed produces an estrangement of Milkman's normal view of women,
who conditioned by a market economy, haul around purses like grotesque
bodily appendages.
The past, which is also entirely coincident with the South in her analysis, offers to
Willis the antidote to the damaging, dehumanised existence of the
present/North/industrial society. Here a vision of wholeness and integrity is offset
against that of the commodity fetish; the women without purses versus the
shopaholics. Unsullied by capitalist interests the women of the South are said to
present a utopian vision of the possibility of genuine relations and authentic
human existence: 'The descent into the past means stepping out of reified and
fetishized relationships' (p. 96).
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Willis's argument is compelling, to say the least, and has exerted
considerable influence in the critical field. Elizabeth Abel highlights the largely
favourable reviews Specifying has received from black feminist critics. 'Although
several have decried its arbitrary historical boundaries and selection of texts, they
have mostly found her historically grounded readings provocative and
illuminating. ,20 With its promise of historicising African-American women's
writing, Specifying is an important critical text, and what is more, a text which is
in keeping with the historical ambitions of many contemporary American black
women writers.e' However, despite this, there is an abiding sense in which
Willis's project to historicise black women's writing falls short of its own
ambition.
To begin with, the extent to which Willis succeeds in her attempt to think
through the specific history that forms the referent to African-American women's
writings is debatable. First, it has been argued that the history to which she refers
is far more contradictory, not to say complicated, than the grand story which
constitutes the frame of Specifying's argument. As Abel has pointed out, Hazel
Carby's Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American
Woman Novelist, gives a very different interpretation of events to that presented
in Willis's text and highlights the 'romanticisation of 'the' black cultural heritage,
whose truth resides in an uncontaminated past to which the novels' protagonists
repeatedly return'(p. 491).22Likewise Michelle Wallace remarks, 'In Specifying,
Susan Willis announces the intention of historicising the literature of
contemporary black women writers. But not unlike Bloom's crypto-
deconstructionism, Willis's 'historicism' inserts 'Hurston' where one might
expect to read history.,23 In other words, Willis's interpretation of Hurston's
notion of specifying is seen to replace a consideration of the history of 'Afro-
American letters' (p. 179); in place of history is a grand narrative with black
women uniquely poised as its tellers.
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The history invoked by Willis, when subjected to further analysis, is
highly problematic both in terms of its own authority as a story of black women's
writing in North America and in its implications for the writings themselves.
Specifying puts forward a unified, grand narrative, not only of black American
women's texts but also of the United States generally. Willis's story of America
follows a single narrative trajectory and is entirely coincident with the
development of industrial capitalism which 'has only reached its most advanced
stage in the United States.' This 'single most important aspect of the history of
North America' (p. 4), is singular, and most important, insofar as its status is seen
as as overriding the potential hermeneutic power of other histories, namely, the
'personal', 'literary' not to mention, those pertaining to 'race and culture' (p. 4):
I feel that the only way to develop a theoretical approach to the work of
contemporary black women writers is to define their writing in relation to
a history larger than the personal and literary. Moreover, I suggest that the
sense of history that shapes black women's writing is larger and more
profound than one specifically determined by race and culture. (p. 171)
The economic transformation of the United States is, in every extent,
foundational in Willis's account of an African-American women's literary
tradition.
In recent years many feminist theorists have displayed a manifest
suspicion of the 'big story' as an interpretive approach to a wide range of texts.
Moreover, the big story that a Marxist view proposes has a number of critics. Jane
Flax, for example, in Thinking Fragments, questions the appropriateness of
Marxism to an analysis of race stating that as an ideological critique it is strangely
silent with regard to the race question. Indeed, Willis's own account appears to
subscribe to the orthodox Marxist view that the story of class is foundational and
gender and race inequality being effects of this basic structure which will wither
away with the rise of the industrial proletariat and the defeat of the bourgeoisie.
As a story of black America a Marxist perspective would seem to offer a
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curiously deracinated account. However, in Willis's case, she attempts to
recuperate this loss by casting black women as privileged knowers of the
American experience under capitalism. The point at which race threatens to
disappear from her interpretation it stages a comeback in the form of ' ...a
properly Marxian perspective where the "popular" or underclass is revealed as the
source of historical definition'( p.25). Far from having no relevance to the race
question, Marxism here is revealed to be the perspective from which to interpret
texts by African-American women writers.
This recuperation is not without cost. In a discussion of Nancy Hartsock's
idea of standpoint epistemology, Christina Crosby demonstrates its circular logic.
Drawing on Althusserian notions of historicism as ideology, Crosby disputes the
notion of history as something which 'gives women an experience of subjection
which is the ground for knowledge'<'. With this, the source of critique of the
dominant ideology is cast as prior to theory: 'knowledge is given by that material
reality'. Theory is then a matter of reading off or describing one's social and
politically charged location: 'theorising is but the recognition of what one has
already become: "woman" , (p. 135). In Althusser's phrase, the logic of
standpoint is not a theory but 'the vicious circle of the mirror relation of ideology
reflection'P; it is, as such, a foregone conclusion:
a feminism which goes to history to find 'women' and always finds what
it is looking for is bound to be ideological - falsely universalising and
dehistoricising - despite its appeals to history (and to Marx). (p. 133)
By making history responsible for creating a priori critical subjects, standpoint
epistemology denies the mediations that inescapably inform its methodology. In
Crosby's words, 'The relationship ... between 'the real' and knowledge of the
real, between facts and theory, history and theory is occluded' (p. 136). Willis's
story of America is curiously ahistorical; bound by its ideological presuppositions
it merely confirms the Marxist frame used for its explanation. Such reflectionist
logic can be found elsewhere in the text.
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Specifying moves from a consideration of content to that of form: 'Just as
history is what the novels are about so, too, is it embodied in how the novels tell
their stories' (p. 13). Following Lukac, form reflects content." So what Willis
identifies as the 'four-page formula' (p. 14), the narrative form comprising short,
episodic pieces of writing, 'partakes of the rhythm of daily life as it evolved in an
oral agrarian culture.' (p. 15). It also 'embodies the story-telling tradition' thus
representing a radical departure from the bourgeois novel form which assumes
'sustained and leisurely reading'(p. 14). Just as black women's consciousness,
and indeed, existence, is seen as a reflection of the truth of an industrial capitalist
country, and is deemed essentially oppositional and anti-bourgeois so their
literary texts reflect an understanding of capitalist logic alongside an anti-
bourgeois sensibility. This view of black women's texts as essentially political
both in form and content is based on a mistaken view of the role of literature as a
force for/of social change. To reiterate a point raised in the previous chapter, to
suppose a clear reflectionist relation between form, content and political force is
to misconstrue the relation of the literary and social fields. Furthermore, such a
formal conception of politics looks for its evidence in the wrong place, in addition
to perpetuating a similar circular logic to that of standpoint theory. The text's
form reflects its political message; the political theory dictates that form reflects
content. Bourdieu explains his objections to formal or internal textual analysis:
. . . it looks for the final explanation of texts either within the texts
themselves (the object of analysis, in other words, is its own explanation)
or within some sort of ahistorical 'essence' rather than in the complex
network of social relations that make the very existence of the texts
possible .... To be fully understood, literary works must be reinserted in
the system of social relations which sustains them, this does not imply a
rejection of aesthetic or formal properties, but rather an analysis based on
their position in relation to the universe of possibilities of which they are a
part.27
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Willis's object of analysis comprises its own explanation: the four-page formula
reflects daily life, daily life is reflected in the four-page formula, the theory of the
text finds confirmation of itself in the evidence it presupposes.
Notwithstanding these critiques, the idea of black women as privileged
knowers of the American nightmare presents further difficulties. Not least the
degree of idealisation to which the selected writers are subjected. Wallace objects
to Willis's casting of black women's writing 'in polar opposition to the alienation
and reification of white middle-class culture' (p. 179). In a discussion of Willis's
essay 'I Shop Therefore I Am: Is There a Place for Afro-American Culture in
Commodity Culture' Elizabeth Abel questions the construction of black women
and their writings as a site of resistance and authenticity, as untouched by
commodity culture. 'White feminists, like the frozen or mummified white women
represented in some black women's texts, seem in Willis's discourse to be
corpses finding political energy through the corpus of black women,28
The idealisation of black women's words is part of a series of idealisations
that operate in Willis's text. Specifying is organised around a number of
oppositions: SouthINorth; preindustrial/industrial; whole/fragment; past/present,
of which the first term is privileged over the second. Indeed, these particular sets
of terms function as interchangeable in the terms of Specifying's discourse, in that
South signifies as pertaining to preindustrial, which pertains to wholeness; a
geographical and experiential space which is other to that of the alienated,
fragmentary, industrial North. The degree to which this division, not to say
privileging of South over North and past over present with its attendant
associations of wholeness, and anti-capitalism, is so clearly marked in the fiction
is open to question. For example,Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon offers a more
inconsistent image of the South than Willis's interpretation allows. Milkman
Dead has journeyed South in search of his grandfather's gold that he supposes to
be his inheritance. Having arrived in Shalimar he asks for assistance in fixing his
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car. When doubt IS expressed over the availability of a fan belt Milkman
responds:
'If they can't find one, let me know right away. I may have to buy
another car to get back home. '
They looked with hatred at the city Negro who could buy a car as
if it were a bottle of whisky because the other one he had was broken. And
what's more, who had said so in front of them. He hadn't bothered to say
his name, nor ask theirs, had called them 'them', and would certainly
despise their days, which should have been spent harvesting their own
crops, instead of waiting around the general store hoping a truck would
come looking for mill hands or tobacco pickers in the flatlands that
belonged to someone else. (p. 266)
Here, Shalimar and its inhabitants are depicted as deeply affected by labour
patterns organised upon capitalist principles. Far from offering a space
untouched, and uncompromised by capitalism: preindustrial, to use Willis's
formulation, Shalimar is drawn in terms that are related to rather than separate
from those of the industrial North. This division between North and South is
betrayed within the critical text itself as the following extract shows. In a detailed
analysis of an episode from Morrison's The Bluest Eye Willis states:
I want to argue that even though the incident takes place in Chicago,
Marie's account of the fish fry is a metaphoric representation of the
Southern economy.... The anecdote offers an alternative to wage labor
and industrial alienation, it matters little that the real South was equallly
oppressive of black people. In fact, the real South has been transcended in
the making of a metaphoric memory. The function of the anecdote is to
generate the notion of possibilities, not to conjure up a purely nostalgic
image of the past and the South. (pp. 9-10)
While it is argued that the prostitute's description offers a metaphoric
representation of the Southern economy and is therefore not to be read literally,
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this is inconsistent with Willis's position throughout her text. First, metaphor is
privileged as a trope of the real, a post-Lukacian reflection of the urban and the
modem: 'The narrative form that best expresses the urban as it is produced in
relation to a dependent agrarian economy is based on metaphor' (p. 20). Second,
the division between fiction and the real is one that is constantly elided in the
pursuit of the history of African-American women's writing. Specifying is
concerned with real histories, communities and people. Throughout, the
connection between text and referent is stressed to the extent that the literary
nature of the text, the way it signifies specifically as literature, is mostly
overlooked. So, the argument that the referent in this instance 'matters little',
notwithstanding the degree to which Willis bends the text to suit her critical needs
(the episode takes place in the Midwest and not the South), reads as a rather
sudden change of priorities.
In many ways this shift is another consequence of Specifying's standpoint
epistemology. Hence there is some confusion regarding the distinction between
the representation of the Southern economy as it is and its use as a space for the
presentation of alternative possibilities. This blurring of the distinction between
history and fantasy is one that troubles Willis's analysis generally, in that there is
some slippage between the South as a material, specific location on the one hand
and as utopian imaginary alternative on the other. Specifying is intent upon
representing the material oppression it associates with industrial capitialism
whilst at the same time preserving those who experience its oppressive effects as
voices of hope and resistance. Indeed, there is a curious reversal in Willis's
attempt to verify the oppression of America's black women, in that within the
terms of her analysis those who are most damaged by the dominant capitalist
ideology are not those who service it with their alienated labour but those who
consume. Seduced by the commodity fetish, white women emerge as its victims.
Inauthentic, empty, without a culture white women are capitalism's real losers.
Somewhere within this formulation of black women as privileged witnesses and
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utopian visionaries, the specificity that is the critical goal of Willis's argument is
lost; as is the distinction between black women writers, their texts, their
characters and 'real' black women. Specifying presents a curiously unspecific
history, a history that is for the most part ahistorical even as it pursues the 'real'
story of African-American women's writing.
Specifying and the Literary Text
If Willis's argument fails as a history of black American women's writing
(\
it is simultneously problematic in its consideration of its literary politics. To
.1\
begin with the story of African-American linguistic practice that Willis subscribes
to is contested within black literary theory. Taken from Zora Neale Hurston's
Dust Tracks on a Road the practice of 'specifying' is taken to refer to a language
practice where signified and signifier are absolutely aligned. If Willis reads black
culture as originally 'authentic', however, Henry Louis Gates Jr. reads it as
originally postmodem. In his essay 'The blackness of blackness: a critique of the
sign and the Signifying Monkey' Gates argues that 'The Afro-American
rhetorical strategy of signifying is a rhetorical practice unengaged in information-
giving,29 In direct opposition to Willis' view Gates asserts the indirectness of
black American linguistic practice.
Notwithstanding this disagreement, further problems emerge In
connection with this narrative of development with Willis's treatment of black
modernist texts. For example, Dust Tracks on a Road is contrasted with Paule
Marshall's Praisesongfor the Widow in terms of a distinction between the spoken
and the literary. Hurston's text is construed as an immediate written record of
black speech to Marshall's work of literature. With this distinction there is some
confusion as to its significance. On the one hand, Dust Tracks is privileged as
representing a state of language prior to the ravages of capitalism. On the other, a
story is told of the transcendence of oral, written-down forms to the more mature
destination of the truly literary. In an attempt to recuperate modernism into her
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reflectionist understanding Willis makes the case for metaphor as the basis of an
urban narrative form. In an extended discussion of the characterisitics of
metaphor it is argued that metaphoric language is better able to represent 'history'
in its capitalist epoch: ' ... the text whose mode of articulating history is based
on metaphor captures the complex meanings and contradictory relationships
generated by capitalism'; ' ... condensation is what enables metaphorical images
to capture history, which for its duration and multiplicity would otherwise require
numerous volumes' (p. 21). Hurston's task as a writer is then, of managing the
transformation of spoken/oral to written literary forms; this transformation is seen
by Willis as involving a move toward metaphoric language.
. . . barnyard simile becomes metaphor and a lot of the invective IS
redirected. In line with the relationship between condensed metaphoric
images and the raw material of history that I suggested in chapter 1, I want
to emphasise the development of metaphor as a literary language is what
differentiates Hurston's writing from that of her more realist
contemporaries like Ann Petry and makes her the ptecursor of today's
great modernist writers like Toni Morrison and Paule Marshall. (p. 32)
That Willis identifies a move toward metaphor in the texts is less important than
the value that is accorded to this perceived shift. For implied in this observation is
the idea of a narrative of progress from speech to writing, from the raw material
of history to the cultured realm of metaphor. The direct, or as it is suggested
simple, correspondence of signifier to signified that Willis contrues as pertaining
to the oral is replaced by the greater complexity of metaphor's signifying
structure. So Hurston's images are seen as occupying a space between
'specifying' and metaphor: 'Although drawn from colloquial expression, [they]
represent a more complex form of describing than the simple "calling-out" and
naming.' (p. 19) This distinction is in evidence in the following extract where
Willis articulates a continuum of language-use that ranges from specifying to
colloquialism:
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When Hurston describes herself as feeling 'as timid as an egg without a
shell', she evokes absolute vulnerability and she does so in a language that
is only one step removed from the barnyard, but on its way to a frame of
reference that will no longer be purely animal. 'Specifying' equates the
opponent with a brute, and, by the very nature of animal existence, cannot
give symbolic expression to feelings. In contrast, the colloquial image,
even though it is still rooted in a rural system of specification, gives ample
space for the expression of emotion. This is not possible not only because
the shell-less egg is no longer a part of nature in the same way as a
'puzzle-gutted' and 'knock-kneed' animal is.
What is perhaps most extraordinary abovt this distinction is less the story it
narrates about the progression from speech to writing, calling-out to proper, that
is symbolic, signification, than the language chosen in which to do so. The
development of written expression is coincident with a story of a move from
nature to culture. Hurston's simile 'as timid as an egg without a shell' is
construed as a step away from the brute expression of the barnyard (as 'written
down' in Dust Tracks) and simultaneously as a step toward the implied
civilisation and maturity of metaphor and symbolic expression. The raw is
transcended, as is simple calling-out; the immediate and unojectified is left
behind in the move toward self-consciousness. here, Willis unwittingly walks in
step with a set of racist ideas that align writing, culture, whiteness, and
civilisation and conversely orality, nature, blackness and the animal. One of the
best known originators of theses ideas is Hegel who asserted Africa as a
historyless, cultureless expressionless other-world. What follows is one of his
more familiar statements:
In general it must be said that [African[ consciousness has not yet reached
the contemplation of a fixed objective, an objectivity. The fixed
objectivity is called God, the Eternal, justice, Nature, natural things ....
The Africans, however, have not yet reached this recognition of the
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General. ... What we name Religion, the State, that which exists in and
for itself - in other words, all that is valid - all this is not yet at hand ....
Thus we find nothing other than man in his immediacy: that is man in
Africa. As soon as Man as Man appears, he stands in opposition to
Nature; only in this way does he become Man.... The Negro represents
the Natural Man in all his wildness and indocility: if we wish to graps
him, then we must drop all European conceptions.
What we actually understand by 'Africa'is that which is without
history and resolution, which is still fully caught up in the natural spirit,
and which here must be mentioned as being on the threshold of world
history."
Immediate, natural, occupying the space on the cusp of history, the 'African man'
bears more than a passing resemblance to Willis's construction of 'specifying'.
Just as the transcendence of nature is the requirement of accession into the realm
of the civilised, so the transcendence of the animal conventions of name-calling is
necessary to enter that of literature. Hurston's colloquialisms succeed in paving
the way out of the barnyard, in that they represent a transitional mode: a step
beyond the brute expression of mere calling-out. However, it is only when, like
Hegel's African man, the author achieves objectivity and distance, that she is able
to make the transition to the sophisticated world of metaphoric substitution and
hence, signification.
What enables Hurston to transcend colloquialisms such as these and write
more complex and condensed metaphors is the same element of distance
that allows her to look back on and study the folklore she was born
into.(p.34)
In breaking out of the undifferentiated space name-calling Hurston is able
produce a properly symbolic account of her own culture.
In addition to rehearsing this set of oppressive meanings the way in
which Willis distinguishes between natural expression and the cultural, coded
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symbolic is itself subject to question. In contradistinction to the conclusion that'
the shell-less egg' is no longer a part of nature in the same way as a 'puzzle-
gutted' and 'knock-kneed' animal is' I would contend that all three formulations
are equally beholden to language and culture. In other words, it is difficult to see
precisely, first, what makes the shell-less egg less connected to nature than a
puzzle-gutted animal, and second, how such a complex linguistic image as a
puzzle-gutted animal comes to be thought of a natural in the first instance.
It is difficult to resolve this contradiction, save to suggest that it is,
perhaps, indicative of the extreme degree of idealisation present in the work. The
overinvestment in orality produces as an effect the devaluing of written and
indeed modem and postmodern forms. The construction of metaphoric
representation as hyper-real, as better able to represent the fragmented form of
modern life is one way of recuperating the effects of over-valuing realist and oral
forms. And so on.
In contrast to Willis who assumes a fixed and determined notion of
context I wish now to turn to two essays that problematise the concept.
Locating Location: Adrienne Rich and Gayatri Spivak
In 'Notes Toward a Politics of Location'?' Adrienne Rich speaks of the
importance of situating feminist theory and practice as a counter to the
universalist assumptions of seventies feminism. If 'a few years ago [she] would
have spoken of the common oppression of women ... ', (p. 210), aligning herself
with Virginia Woolfs statement 'as a woman I have no country. As a woman I
want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world', at the time of
writing Rich recognises the need to account for differences between and among
women. As a way of beginning this project: ' a struggle for accountability' (p.
211), Rich attempts variously to think through the .particularity of her own and
other women's words. The effort to read the words of 'the other woman' involve
Rich in the pursuit of her own situation. The essay opens with a self-conscious
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statement as to her geographical location and moves through a number of
strategies focussed upon particularising and contextualising her speaking
position. Unlike Willis, Rich does not presuppose a single method for
establishing her own or the others' context and it is this that makes her essay
particularly useful.
What is interesting, first, about Rich's procedure as opposed to Willis's is
the instant connection that is established between the context of the self and that
of the other. Rather than merely constituting a story to be told, a determinable
history, the essay places emphasis upon the relatedness of the contexts of black
and white women in the United States, First and Third Worlds. The first
American woman astronaut is considered in the context of the 'female proletariat
... largely from the Third world [who] will create the profits which will stimulate
the "big companies" to invest in space' (p. 223). A reference is made to a 'Third
world poster' in a Manchester bookshop which reads 'WE ARE HERE
BECAUSE YOU ARE THERE' (p. 226). The story of Rich's birth is
overdetermined by race: segregated wards mean that her race is considered before
her gender. 'I was located by color and sex as surely as a Black child was located
by color and sex - though the implications of white identity were mystified by the
presumption that white people are the center of the universe' (p. 215). Contexts
are not merely observable but are directly connected to the position of the
observer.
Equally interesting is the abiding sense of the failure of the inscribed
context to fully account for where one or the other is coming from. Throughout
the essay attempts are made to situate the critic and 'different' women, and like
her girlhood efforts at location, what is produced is the need for more and more
framing.
When 1was ten or eleven . . . a girlfriend and 1 used to write each other
letters which we addressed like this:
Adrienne Rich
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14Edgevale Road
Baltimore, Maryland
The United States of America
The Continent of North America
The Western Hemisphere
The Earth
The Solar System
The Universe (pp.211-12)
Beginning with the scene of writing itself, Rich locates herself in her own house.
Distracted by a bumble bee bumping against the window she gets up and tries to
coax it outside. Having freed the bee she returns. 'I sit down and pick up a
secondhand, faintly annotated student copy of Marx's The German Ideology,
which "happens" to be lying on the table' (p. 211). In this scene some of the
problems of a self-reflexive approach, discussed in the following chapter, are
anticipated. In one sense Rich is seemingly describing her direct physical
location; the detail of the bee, the book on the table, add to the scene's
verisimilitude. The details provide an anchor, a way of rooting or locating Rich
spatially in terms of her immediate surroundings. And yet the scene also self-
consciously signals its fictionality: the copy of The German Ideology 'happens' to
be lying on the table. The text hints at its construction. The casualness of the
book's location is undermined. The 'staging' of this scene is also indicated by the
text's invitation to read it allegorically: 'I, too, have been bumping my way
against glassy panes, falling half-stunned, gathering myself up and crawling, then
again taking off, searching' (p. 211). The bee operates as a mirror image of Rich's
position as a critic, trapped inside a theoretical enclosure that is no longer useful
or sustaining: 'its mode of being cannot be fulfilled inside this house'. The choice
of glass as an image of restriction is particularly revealing, or rather readable, in
the light of Rich's pushing against the doxie, unspoken, assumptions of her
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available theoretical frames: the transparency or invisibility of whiteness as a
racial category being one.
Marx's text 'casually' lying on the table is taken up as a potential way out
of the glass enclosure of 'white Western self-centredness' (p. 219), a new
beginning to the search for accountability and locatedness. 'Begin, though, not
with a continent or a country or a house, but with the geography closest in - the
body' (p. 212). With its assertion of the body as 'the first premise of all human
history' The German Ideology offers an authority that coincides with Rich's
project as a radical feminist, that of the material. In a much cited passage Rich
offers the particular body as a means of locating the subject and thereby
contextualising speech/texts/events, as a means of returning 'back down to earth'
(p. 219) in the face of abstraction and universalism. However, even as Rich
moves towards the body as a source of guarantee, as the grounds of location,
there is an extent to which the move is unsettled or rather acknowledged as not
uncomplicated: 'The difficulty of saying I' can be matched with that of 'saying
"we"'; 'even ordinary pronouns become political problems' (p.224).
As much as the urgency of locating feminist discourse is asserted, Rich
refuses to settle the source or means of that location easily. The various
beginnings to her project do not lead to obvious conclusions. Rather than supply
automatic limits, as in Willis's text, for Rich the context functions as finally
unresolvable, which is not to capitulate to relativism but to suggest what has been
termed the textuality of the context.
In order to gain insight into the significance and impact of the context on
the text, the empirical context needs not just to be known but to be read;
to be read in conjunction with, and as part of, the reading of the text. We
thus propose to show how the basic and critical demand for
contextualization of the text itself needs to be complemented,
simultaneously, by the less familiar and yet necessary work of
textualization of the context; and how this shuttle movement or this shuttle
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reading in the critic's work - the very tension between textualization and
contextualization - might yield new avenues of insight, both into the texts
at stake and into their context - the political, historical, and biographical
realities with which the texts are dynamically involved and within which
their particular creative possibilities are themselves inscribed. 3io..
The context, then, is not a fiction, but neither is it a reified story or final,
stabilising, textual enclosure. 'Notes toward a Politics of Location' is a text that
demands active reading and so participates in the struggle it depicts.
In her essay 'How to Teach a "Culturally Different" Book,32 Gayatri
Spivak takes a comparable approach to Rich in combining rigorous research
whilst, at the same time, preserving the textuality of the context. Developing her
notion of 'homework' Spivak demonstrates the necessity of what she terms
allegorical reading, meaning:
semiotic in the most formulaic way (this "means" that). This may be the
only way in which the literary critic can be helpful for the study of
culture, and for the historical study of the aftermath of colonialism and the
postcolonial present. It is an enabling limitation, a decoupage for the sake
of the discipline (p. 244).
In contextualising R.K. Narayan's The Guide, the text that forms the subject of
the essay, Spivak does not restrict her reading merely to explaining that 'this
means that' however. Rather than gloss the text with a set of knowledges, the
critic subjects one of the texts whose status is that of explaining the context of
The Guide to a deconstructive reading, using other competing sources of
information. In an extended investigation of the history of the temple dancer (a
character Spivak predicts will be of interest to the Western feminist reader/critic)
the authority of one of the more readily available 'source books' on the subject
(Frederique Marglin's Wives of the God-King)is challenged. Despite the intense
display of erudition there is an abiding sense in which Spivak fails to exhaust her
subject. Instead, the emphasis is placed upon the deferral or suspension of facts
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about the temple dancer or devadasi: information leads to other information. So,
the suppressed agency of the devadasi in Marglin' s text, often overlooked by the
Western reader overcome by 'postcolonial piety' (p. 247), is highlighted by
Amrita Srinivasan; Srinivasan's 'utopian solidarity' with the devadasi alongside
her contempt for contemporary popular culture is challenged through reference to
a conversation between Folabo Ajayi Soyinka and Sanjukta Panigrahi which, for
Spivak, demonstrates that 'the popular can mediate the relationship between
practicing artists' (p, 255) and so on. As this is a process without a 'natural' end
the essay's ambition is less the pursuit of the truth of the text than the undoing of
the orthodox critical relationship between Western reader and 'ethnic' text.:
Such readings in the discipline of Cultural Studies cannot claim the
attention of the disciplinary historian of the aftermath of colonialism.
They can timidly solicit the attention of the teacher of multicultural
literature courses so that s/he can remain aware of the differences and
deferments within 'national identity' and 'ethnic minority' and not take
the latter as the invariable starting-point for every decolonisation of the
mind. (p. 261)
In complicating the issue of cultural self-representation the Western reader is less
likely to mistake such representations for authentic truths and furthermore, the
apprehension of which as the anti-colonial programme.
As rigorous as 'How to Teach ... ' is, Spivak does not simply recommend
this relentless search for framings of framings of framings. As has been noted, a
crucial task for the Western feminist or hegemonic reader is the facing of her own
limitations. 'One of the first things to do is to think through the limits of one's
own power. One must ruthlessly undermine the story of the ethical universal, the
hero. ,33The fact of restricted capacities for learning languages, for understanding,
must be confronted. It is with this in mind that I tum to Spivak's 'In praise of
Sammy and Rosie Get Laid,34. In contrast to 'How to Teach .. .' this essay is
almost shocking in its admittance of its lack of expertise, and consequent
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limitations. It opens thus: 'I'd like to preface my remarks by saying that I don't
know how to talk about films' (p. 80). Set within a pedagogical context the essay
determines its limits tightly:
I am a literary-philosophical critic, and that's the only way I know how to
talk about film. I'm actually looking at these films in a very special way,
as didactic pieces. And I'm interested in the fact that there is a lot to read
there. Now that's an old-fashioned way of looking at films and I think it
should be understood that that's what I'm doing. (p. 80)
Having established its boundaries, Spivak moves on to consider the way Hanif
Kureishi's film is more readily readable to British than American 'cultural
workers'(American students not having the 'wherewithal' to read the film) in
addition to its subtle rendering of the British 'social text' and its renegotiation of
'the relationship between aesthetics and politics.' In other words, Kureishi's work
refuses the kinds of easy, politically correct, representations of postcolonial
agency that American academic audiences expect and it this, precisely, that
Spivak values. So, the character Rosie is celebrated for her moments of
unreadability:
Now of course many critics might object to this inability to read
characterologically but it doesn't upset a reader like me because those
moments of bafflement are the moments which make the film didactically
useful and that's how a deconstructionist reads. It is the stalling of a
programme of reading that is dramatised here. (p. 82)
Here the limits of knowledge are presented as radical. The lack of intelligibility
pertaining to Rosie is read as itself a sign of the film's progressive politics.
Likewise, Kureishi's portrayal of the lesbian characters is read by Spivak as
'extraordinary' mainly due to their 'didactic focus [being] blurred' (p. 83).Instead
of stable, coherent, even authentic representations Sammy and Rosie ... presents
a 'whole chain of displacements in terms of which you are shown how a quick fix
or a quick judgement or a quick read is productively resisted by the film.' (p. 87).
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These limits are then further extended into Spivak's method. The essay ends with
an additional assertion of its limits: 'These are incomplete musings', together
with a pledge to do more homework: 'I am painfully learning film-talk and will
/ have more to say about groups of post-colonial films soon.' (p. 87)
'In praise of Sammy and Rosie .. .' seems absolutely to conform to
Spivak's political programme. It is self-conscious in its advertisment of its limits
whilst at the same time straining at those limits with the promise of learning the
discipline of film discourse. The combination of homework and the realisation of
constraints seems to be achieved. However, there are degrees to which Spivak's
essay recuperates the power that it appears to relinquish thus undermining its
political potential. First, the way in which the radical force of unreadability is
inscribed in the text is profoundly contradictory. On the one hand, American
students are said to not be able to fully appreciate Kureishi' s film in lacking the
necessary reading skills (Le. knowledge of the British social text) that are
presumed to be in the possession of British audiences; they cannot read Sammy
and Rosie, it resists intelligibility to an American viewer. On the other,
unreadability is the mark of progressive politics. What escapes Spivak's
formulation here is the extent to which she renders the unreadable text (Rosie)
readable through recourse to deconstructive discourse. The contradictory
character may stall a programme of reading but the critic recuperates that
unintelligibility through her own theoretical frame. Spivak's unreadable is
nonetheless readable in ways that the American student's is not. Furthermore, the
extent to which Spivak's advertising of her essay's shortcomings stand as
evidence of her thinking through the limits of her own power is also debatable.
Cf,'hw /i/"\;h
The fact that this rehearsal of takes place within the pages of a prestigious journal
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serves to undermine this reading. Given Bourdieu's observation that those able to
dispense with the rules of the game are usually its most powerful, well disposed,
players, Spivak's admittance of not knowing how to talk about films is less an
acknowledgment of her lack of power than a demonstration or illustration of the
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considerable power at her disposal. It is questionable whether the said journal would
accept the 'incomplete musings' of a graduate student's favourite film, for example.
Self-confessed limits are not always readable as or coincident with lack of power.
Conclusion
All of this is to say that the question of contextual limits cannot be answered in
absolute terms. Indeed, I would go as far as to say that limits impose themselves and
to a great extent are outside the individual critic's reach or control. The balance
between homework and limits is not decidable in advance. The establishment of a
context is a project without discernable boundaries and is, hence, not the stabilising
force that some critics have suggested. But it is precisely the sense of limitlessness
that is seen as valuable by the anti-colonial critic. In his work around the sociological
context of the literary text, Bourdieu stresses the work entailed with situating texts
within their discursive fields.The sheer difficulty of reading the field adequately
could be read as potentially productive in that it martials against a single critic
getting it right, it calls for work, collective work, a process of reading and theory
production. The off-puttingness of contextualising needs to be set against its
productiveness as an antidote to grandiose reading strategies
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Chapter 6. Self-Reflexivity: Decolonising the (Imperial) Mind.
In light of the normativity of whiteness and the potential for critical appropriation,
some white feminist critics have argued for a specific reading relation to the black
text. Many have adopted the strategy of declaring their whiteness within their critical
writings. Of the nine white contributors to the collection of essays Black Women's
Writing 1, for example, six make self-conscious reference to their own whiteness, and
situate themselves, in relation to the texts they study, specifically as white readers.
While some critics admit almost parenthetically to being white before moving on to
produce readings of various black women's texts, others are more interrogative,
foregrounding their whiteness as a part of their critical work. Some recommend that
the critic cultivate a degree of self-awareness in their critical endeavours,
incorporating a self-reflexive gesture into their methodologies. Minrose C. Gwin
proposes such an approach in her essay 'A Theory of Black Women's Texts and
White Women's Readings, or ... The Necessity of Being Other':
. . . if such reading is to have any meaning at all, it must curve back upon
itself to become a reflexive process which not only reads its own cultural
assumptions ... but which also turns back upon itself to read itself as white
other in many black women's texts. 2
For the white reader, then, reading writing by black and other race-different women
involves a necessary encounter with what is perceived as one's own complicity in
white supremacist structures of thinking and of existing. Gina Wisker elaborates:
It is only by looking closely and honestly at the difficulties and the joys of
reading Black women's writing - in the majority of cases here for the white
feminist - that we can develop self-aware, culturally contextual, critical
reading techniques and, while we might argue that there is no overt racism in
our feminist classrooms, perhaps some of the blunders of any covert racism
can be avoided.(p. 5)
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For Wisker, 'looking closely and honestly' entails a confrontation,on the part of the
white reader, with one's own 'otherness' in the context of writing that, in her view,
implicates the white reader in a history of racism and colonialism. Referring to Toni
Morrison's Beloved she states:
Its exposure of the pathology and the legacy of slavery directly confronts the
reader and, as a white reader in the academy, I feel I have a (necessarily
problematic) responsibility to try to deal with the tradition of these issues, in
context. (p. 79)
The white feminist reader, then, has a specific critical responsibility to black and
race-different writings.
Making visible what has previously passed unnoticed or assumed is an
important feminist political activity and is no less so in this context: it has been
argued on more than one occasion that dominant ideologies succeed by reason of
their assumption of an unmarked relation to that which differs and is hence marked
as deviant or 'other,3. As I have indicated throughout, the normativity of whiteness
succeeds, in part, though assuming the unmarked side of an opposition to blackness
or 'race'. Whiteness operates as the supposedly neutral term in an otherwise
conspicuous field of differences, deviations, others. Speaking as a white critic rather
than as a critic, or as a white feminist critic rather than as a feminist critic is then
strategically important by way of undoing the privilege of assuming the position of
centrality from which all other meanings radiate.
Many claims have been made for the radical potential of self-reflexive
criticism. From its suggested greater honesty to a means of placing limits on the
postmodern proliferation of meaning, the inclusion of the self in the critical frame is
seen to provide a number of answers to some of feminist criticism's key areas of
debate. Stepping out of the shadows afforded by orthodox critical methods, exposing
the scene of (white) feminist theorising itself, is seen to comprise a means of
continuing the logic of contextualisation as an anti-colonial method. Including 'the
self that writes' in the theoretical picture can be read as an extreme form of
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contextualisation of the text: a further indication of where the text is 'coming from',
an acknowledgment of the mediating effect of the critic's gaze in the construction of
the literary text in question. ('Here is the text as I see it'). Indeed, it is in this sense
that a self-reflexive approach has found favour with some black feminist critics.
Barbara Christian, for example, writes:
Inspired by feminist discussions about objectivity and subjectivity, I
constructed an introduction to my volume [Black Feminist Criticism] that,
rather than the usual formal introduction found in most lit crit books, was
intended to introduce me in my specific context. It was a personalised way of
indicating some of my biases, not the least of which was the fact that the
literature I chose to study was central to an understanding of my own life, and
not only an intellectual pursuit.'
I
Self-reflexivity in white-authored feminist criticism is also intended as an
effort to join in the post-colonial project of decolonising the mind.! As it has been
shown above many white feminists view the encounter with the race-different text as
an opportunity to raise awareness of race issues. Wisker states, for example:
These texts by Black women writers interrogate a continuum of attitudes
towards racial difference which make us feel uncomfortable because they
upset our unconsciously held beliefs: they confront us with our racism, and
our own guilt. (p. 81)
The critic is then forced to face up to 'her own racism' as a necessary component of
the reading experience.
This is nowhere more true than in Toni Morrison's Beloved, for the novel's
dramatic exposure of the horrors of slavery and its legacy forces white
middle-class readers to be uncomfortably aware of their national and
historical complicity. (pp. 83-4)
In short, reading racially different women's writing is for the white feminist reader,
no matter how well-intentioned, a needfully difficult and uncomfortable experience
and a coming to terms with her own race privilege.
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In accord with claims made for reading in context, self-reflexivity is also
valorised for its role as a producer of limits. As with contextualisation, critical self-
writing offers, in Nancy K. Miller's view, boundaries in the face of boundlessness.
Discussing similarities between critical statements from Adrienne Rich and Roland
Barthes she comments:
... despite the gulf separating their views of the intellectual's role in cultural
criticism, what joins them, I think, is the sense they share of the ways in
which one's own body can constitute an internal limit on discursive
irresponsibility, a brake on rhetorical spinning. The autobiographical act -
however self-fictional, can like the detail of one's (aging) body, produce this
sense of limit as well: the resistance particularity offers to the grandiosity of
abstraction that inhabits what I've been calling the crisis of representativity.t
Autobiographical criticism offers not only a sense of limits in an ever more limitless
world, but also a means of establishing critical accountability in connecting the
critical self with the, in orthodox terms, object of study. This notion of critical
responsibility is echoed in Nicole Ward Jouve's White Woman Speaks with Forked
Tongue.' In exposing the source of much critical authority - the third-person mode of
objectified discourse - critics such as Miller and Ward Jouve hope to undermine the
potential for textual appropriation or colonisation. In Ward Jouve's words:
There ,is an appropriate honesty, however, in working on, writing out of, the
here and the now. In all its ordinariness and modesty. I am glad on reflection
that the essays that follow have such a homely pitch. If we cannot make
something out of what we are, out of what we know, how shall we ever cease
to colonize others? (p. viii)
The ordinary, the honest is offered as a counter to the grandiosity of abstraction; the
here and now, the immediate, the subjective, an opposition to the devastating
pretensions of the transcendent and the objective.
In this chapter however, I wish to contest some of these claims: mainly the
idea that a self-reflexive critical approach is an automatic, guaranteed method of
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decolonising the text. The logic of much autobiographical criticism is that of
stripping away the false perceptions brought by the white reader to the black text in
order to arrive at an uncluttered, clear view. Reflecting upon one's own whiteness in
order to achieve closer proximity to the real significance of black women's words, as
with other positions that privilege the goal of truth, only succeeds in raising further
difficulty. Some critics have assumed whiteness to carry a fixed significance which
similarly carries paralysing effects into the discourse. White self-reflexivity also
runs the risk, in refocussing the critical act through a consideration of what it means
to be white, of placing whiteness back centre stage. It can also operate as a
reassertion of mastery, of stability in the attempt to destablisise. White critical
privilege can be upheld even as it is being ostensibly undermined; self-reflexivity can
serve to shore up a relation of white dominance to the black text. My discussion
divides into four parts: naming, confessing, confronting and decentring whiteness. In
each I look at a particular way in which self-reflexivity is practised, from simple
naming of one's perceived position to more interrogative critical work, stressing the
problems as well as the gains of attempting to include the self that writes in the
critical picture.
Naming Whiteness
It has become almost a commonplace for white feminist critics to declare their racial
identity as significant to their work. Readings of black women's texts are offered as
emanating from 'a white feminist's point of view'. Critics are said to be speaking 'as
a white reader in the academy', 'as a white woman's. Eva Birch presents a more
explicit example:
So what is my own subject position when I approach the writing of black
American women as reader and teacher? I am white, female and, by virtue of
education and occupation though not through family origins, now regarded as
'middle class',"
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Speaking as white woman/feminist is to declare one's interests in the critical
endeavour, to say where one is 'coming from'", to locate one's critical commentary.
Within the context of normalising discourses which assume whiteness as
transparent or invisible, such declarations are only to be welcomed. As Ruth
Frankenberg states in her study of the social construction of whiteness 'Naming
'whiteness' displaces it from the unmarked, unnamed status that is itself an effect of
its dominance. ' 11 Also to be welcomed is the implication that in declaring
themselves as white, these feminist critics are also relinquishing any pretence to the
kind of authoritative criticism described by Catherine Stimpson in chapter 1. A white
feminist perspective is a particular perspective, a non-authoritarian perspective: a
partial, not a totalising view. It is also a view determined by relations of domination.
The white reader, consequently, is seen as having a responsibility to acknowledge
this in her reading of any texts by black women. To read as a white feminist, to adopt
a position as a white reader, is to acknowledge the existence of a continued history of
white supremacy both within the text and in the world it inhabits.
It has also been suggested that to draw attention to the critic's whiteness is to
signal the untrustworthiness of what is written; to say that what is written is flawed
by the writer's whiteness. Whereas Wisker seems to envisage a largely positive
outcome from her anti-racist endeavours, others are not so sure. In White Woman
Speaks With Forked Tongue, for example, Nicole Ward Jouve, makes the following
suggestion:
Perhaps every white person should affix an authorial health warning to their
texts. Something like 'white woman speaks with forked tongue'. It's not
because you are aware of a danger, nor because you mean well that your
words or actions do no harm. Hell is paved, etc. Writing is never innocent.
White writing is less innocent than any other. As Gayatri Spivak has said,
every First World woman's book is typed out on a word processor made
cheap by the low-paid labour of a Third World woman. Natalie Sarraute used
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to say that the novel was in an 'era of suspicion'. Today, the politics of white
interpretation is in an era of far worse suspicion.'?
To read or produce critical commentary 'as a' white feminist critic is to produce
something defective, short of the mark, suspicious. Eva Lennox Birch qualifies her
examination of black American women's writing, similarly, when she reads Barbara
Smith's comment: 'When white women look at black women's works they are, of
course, ill-equipped to deal with the subtleties of racial politics' as 'self-evident.,l3
The problem with using white to signify authorial inadequacy is that it
implies racial politics as a kind of essence, as something that whites don't have and
can't acquire.
Birch accepts Smith's assertion too readily; her words are read as a kind of
commandment, an essential truth and not as a contestable and, at the very least,
historically contingent text. With this notion of untrustworthiness comes the
corresponding idea of black women's words as uniquely trustworthy and as somehow
speaking for themselves, the problems of which having been raised in chapter 1.
Assuming too permanent a stance of inadequacy also produces similar effects to the
strategy of saying nothing (Chapter 2). Authorial health warnings could serve to
substitute for serious engagement with structures of racial domination and so operate
as a defensive tactic, entrenching rather than dismantling dominant divisions.
Even if such a significance is not intended there is nothing automatic about
reading 'as a' white critic. As Alison Light has pointed out, 'Reading the black text
as a white reader, even as a feminist or socialist reader, does not guarantee reading as
an anti-racist'14. Naming oneself a white feminist, for example, carries no
corresponding obligation to rethink reading practices, methods and theories. The
anti-racist commitment, of which the declaration of one's whiteness is a sign, needs
to be carried over into the critical methodology itself and not left as a prefacing
remark or indicator of intentions alone. The self-conscious signalling of authorial
whiteness is therefore only a beginning and not a solution in itself.
206
The act of naming oneself as white, feminist or otherwise, and leaving it at
that, as a means of decolonising the black text, is also to underestimate the
representational difficulties associated with any identity claim, and to misunderstand
the nature of subject positions. For instance, in both Wisker's and Birch's case the
term 'white' is assumed to carry a unified negative significance. This is made more
than explicit in Birch's analysis:
Any white reader who approaches black American literature must start by
recognising that the experiential reality described is a unique one. Black roots
in American history were planted in institutional slavery. To this fact white
readers of black writers must constantly return, for it is the source of the gulf
which lies between our history as white imperialists, and theirs as the
oppressed. (1994, p. 13, my emphasis)
'We' the oppressors, the imperialists, 'they' the oppressed, the colonised. Ruth
Frankenberg discusses the problems that accrue with assuming such a division. On
being asked to state what white meant to her, one of Frankenberg'S interviewees
replied that she thought 'of people like the Ku Klux Klanners when I think of
"white." Another referred to the 'largest colonial legacy anyone has ever seen in
history'; another to U.S. imperialism (p. 169). While Frankenberg highlights the
positive aspects of these equations between whiteness and global systems of power
she simultaneously points up their limitations. Given the fact that systems of
domination exert their force by being for the most part unnamed, along with that of
the inevitable complicity between 'individual white selves and white dominated
power structures' (p. 170), making the link between whiteness and global projects
such as Western imperialism is an important move. However, in doing so, the
interviewees, like Birch and Wisker, subscribe to an overarching equation which
serves to obscure their anti-racist intentions. Focussing what it means to be white
through extremist white supremacist activity and ideology not only obscures 'the
everyday structuring of their lives by racism', the more mundane ways in which
racist social organisation benefits those with white skin, it also masks the complex
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histories of the various imperial projects that make up the term imperialism. In
assuming an 'undifferentiated "we" of domination' (p. 170) white women obscure
the connections between the fact of their whiteness, the privileges that a racially
stratified social structure bestows upon them, and the various histories of white
supremacy. This fixed and determining view of whiteness simultaneously writes
white anti-racist women into a paralysing position where 'racism [comes] to stand for
a static condition of being, possibly even an "original sin" that the white individual
could never undo' (p. 173) If there is a problem with asserting race neutrality, a
liberal position where race is seen not to matter here the opposite is the case,
'asserting a complicity with racial domination that was totally encompassing, totally
definitive of whiteness and individual white selves' (p. 171) This extreme
identification with the white supremacist, in the case of the anti-racist, often produces
a dualism, a swing in the other direction which denies the identification as strongly
as it is asserted. Frankenberg refers to a particular informant who moves erratically
'between two poles: " I am like the Ku Klux Klan!U.S. imperialism" and "I am not
like the Klan!U.S. imperialism" and diagnoses a situation in which 'either one is
fully complicit with racism and imperialism or not complicit at all' (p. 171) Having
arrived on the side of the equation where one is not complicit, a corresponding push
in the opposite direction is produced, and so on. A short circuiting of intention
replaces real engagement with racial difference.
A comparable oscillation between identification with the oppressor and race-
neutralising tactics can be seen in both Birch's and Wisker's texts. What is more the
fixing of racial significances is further betrayed by the fact that neither critic is able
to incorporate differences of class into their analyses. This is made evident in elisions
of race and class that occur in both texts. For instance, Wisker speaks of the response
of 'white middle-class readers' to Toni Morrison's Beloved as one of being
'uncomfortably aware of their national and historical complicity' (p. 83), as well as
the unique position of black women whose colour makes them particularly well
placed to write about the triple burden of race, sex and class' (p. 81). More stark,
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however, is this example from Birch's essay in the same volume: 'The unevenness of
Hurston's style in which her own recorded voice is sometimes black, sometimes that
of an educated woman, is matched by the uneven tone of the whole text.' (p. 143)
The exclusivity of the terms black and educated reads as little short of racist. In
buying into such an overdetermined configuration of meaning where white is
assumed to connote undifferentiated privilege over black disadvantage, Wisker and
Birch, albeit inadvertently, rehearse a series of racist associations: white is made to
line up alongside 'we', middle-class, educated, privileged, imperialist, oppressor, in
opposition to black, 'they', poor/working-class, underprivileged, uneducated, slave,
victim.
Further problems emerge when gender enters the critical scene, for racial
difference disappears when gender difference is considered. For instance, the 'self-
evident truth' of white women's inadequacy with regard to dealing with racial
politics is declared, by Birch, to be 'an impassable barrier to understanding if the
only way of looking at that work is from the viewpoint of race' (1994, p. 2). The
investment in the idea of whiteness as extreme in its oppressive force produces a
similar duality when it comes to considering gender oppression. Having cast white
women as unequivocal oppressors Wisker and Birch cannot accommodate gender
into their model as the binary does not allow for being oppressor and oppressed at the
same time. Race then disappears, in Birch's case, or else is reintroduced as one of a
number of additional burdens to the foundational model of gender, in Wisker's. A
familiar set of difficulties is mobilised: 'we' white women are all oppressors switches
to 'we' are all women oppressed by men, and any consideration of race vanishes in
the process. Once again black women are asked to choose between race and gender
oppression. Elizabeth Spelman comments: 'Ironically, the categories and methods we
may find most natural and straightforward to use as we explore the connections
between sex and race, sexism and racism, confuse those connections rather than
clarify them.' 15 This point is made explicit by Carol Ramazanoglu:
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The experiences of black women cannot, then, be incorporated into feminist
analysis simply by adding on Asian or West Indian families. The oppression
of black women must be seen as contradictory in that the common interests of
all women in patriarchal societies are cut across in variable ways by class,
race and ethnicity. Black women do have interests in common with each
other, and in common with white women, but they also have interests - for
example, of class, sexuality, and ethnicity - which cut across these common
ones. 16
By identifying 'white' with 'racist' whilst holding onto a notion of gender as the
source of oppression, white feminist critics such as Wisker and Birch are trapped in a
dynamic of guilt and denial that is difficult to resolve.
Confessing whiteness
In 1985 Feminist Review published a piece by socialist-feminists Michele
Barrett and Mary McIntosh which attempted to address black feminist critique
through what they termed an autocritique of their The Anti-social Family.17 Stressing
the importance, for white feminists, of re-examining 'our own practices' (p. 23),
Barrett and McIntosh reread their text in the light of black feminist theory in order to
consider the extent to which its fundamental concepts are suited or not to an analysis
of black and Asian families. Before doing so, however, reservations are raised as to
the suitability of the type of critique they propose:
Clearly there is something of a dilemma here for writers like ourselves, for to
engage in a public reconsideration of past work is to assume that this work
was significant enough for it to be useful to 'set the record straight'. Hence
there is something pretentious, by definition almost, in the idea of indulging
in an autocritique. In addition, there is an danger of a public breast-beating
exercise that enables white women to carry on as before but with the added
reassurance of having articulated some fashionable guilt. (p. 24)
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Having aired these anxieties the risk is decided as worth taking and the authors
proceed with their self-analysis.
As an approach this is by no means confined to this particular article. In a
comparable move, literary critic Elizabeth Abel begins her analysis of white feminist
readings of black writing by narrativising her initial reading of Toni Morrison's short
story 'Recitatif' in order to disclose how white women often, albeit unwittingly,
project culturally scripted fantasies about black women onto their texts and
'interpret' those texts according to highly specific, though unrealised as such, cultural
agendas:
Twyla's sense of social and physical inadequacy vis-a-vis Roberta, like her
represention of her mother's inferiority to Roberta's, signalled Twyla's
whiteness to me by articulating a white woman's fantasy (my own) about
black woman's potency. (pp,473-4)
Other critics have included comments from students which serve the same narrative
purpose; to illustrate the awakening of a racially aware consciousness. For instance:
Like other seminar members, Julie felt a sense of oppression in the indictment
against her inherited and assumed racism, but she went on to reason that this
can lead to growth, clarity and change.(Wisker, p.82)
Seminar students underwent an uneasy process of self-examination when
confronted by the enormity of an inescapable racism that had contributed to
the self-definition of these writers and themselves. (Birch, p.138)
In many ways, as Rita Felski has pointed out, such narrative confessions are 'clearly
related to the exemplary model of consciousness-raising"! and the importance of CR
groups to feminism is not to be underestimated. Ann Russo outlines the importance
of consciousness-raising techniques to white women attempting to deal with their
racism and white supremacist inheritance'", Creating spaces to study specifically the
meanings of race for white women is also a recommendation of Tia Cross et.al.' s
paper 'Face-to Face, Day-to-Day, - Racism CR.,2o For the white feminist critic
switching the anti-racist focus to thinking through one's whiteness is useful because
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it gets away from the notion of anti-racism that is founded upon the idea of
benevolence, of charity to black women . As Ann Russo puts it, in this sense
'working on the problem of racism becomes a matter of "helping" these women out,
as if the problem of racism were "their" problem .... Focussing on white supremacy
means we look at racism as a white problem and issue' (p. 299).
In indicating the political importance of confession in the history of second
wave feminism Felski also highlights its 'ambivalent status' (p. 88) in current
feminist thinking.
In particular if the function of confession is the pursuit of a greater truth or more
honest view, 'setting the record straight' to borrow Barrett and McIntosh's phrase,
then problems abound. Felski, for example, draws attention to the will to self-identity
that drives the confessional act:
The more frantic the search for an mner self, for a kernel of meaning
untouched by a society rejected as oppressive and alienating, the more clearly
subjectivity is revealed to be permeated by and dependent upon those very
symbolic constraints from which it seeks to liberate itself. In other words, the
act of confession can potentially exacerbate rather than alleviate problems of
self-identity, engendering a dialectic in which the production of ever more
writing as a means to define a center of meaning merely serves to underscore
the alienation of the subject even as it seeks to overcome it. (p. 104)
In short, the moment of self-revelation, of reading in truth, the straightening of the
record is not only endlessly deferred but is rendered the more opaque the more
relentlessly it is pursued. In addition, the proposed link between self-reflection and
self-awareness, the founding narrative of confession, is placed under some doubt in
that the moment of awareness is never fully realised. This is not to argue against
consciousness-raising per se but to question the usefulness of confession as a
narrative act in the context of race.
To return to Barrett and McIntosh's paper, the process of deferral can be seen
to operate in their discussion of the preface to The Anti-social Family. An attempt to
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signal, in the original text, their 'belated anxiety' over the potential ethnocentrism of
their argument, the preface is criticised for its 'ignorance and neglect ... that
pervaded the book as a whole' (p. 25) While it functioned as a means of
apprehending some of the text's shortcomings, its authors admit that it merely
magnified them in the process. However, in making these observations, the anxiety
evident (self-indicated) in the original preface is less dealt with than displaced in its
critical commentary. The text's potential methodological problems are 'confessed' in
the essay's opening paragraphs. The anxiety over appearing 'by definition almost',
pretentious, self-indulgent is aired in a repetition of the original prefacing act. The
very attempt to address the shortcomings of the prior text is, then, deferred, the
confession of the potential problems of confession displaces rather than addresses the
text's difficulties. 'Ethnocentrism in Socialist-Feminist Theory' reproduces the
problems of its subject more than it resolves them.
The ambition of setting the record straight is no less problematic for being
unrealisable. Although white feminists may need to engage with the ways in which
they are the beneficiaries of structures of racial domination, to do so in this way is to
reproduce the relation of dominance that self-reflexive approaches are intended to
undermine. To hope to achieve a position of a 'straight record', in other words a
clean slate, the critic is, first, entertaining a fantasy of inhabiting a subject position of
pure 'non-racism' or producing a wholly racially 'correct' piece of writing, and
second, reconstructing the other as an object of knowledge through self-correction.
An interviewee of Frankenberg observes:
A lot of white women who get into discussion about racism, and go into the
internal process of it, might get to a point of clarity about where their
prejudices and racist thought are , feeling, "So that's great, now I'm not so
racist anymore!" And then stop there ... You're cleansed of certain sins and
now you can go home. (p. 168)
Setting the record straight operates as a version of this belief; the idea that a piece of
work can be purged of its ethnocentric or racist assumptions and rendered racially
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unproblematic. The promise of release contained within the urge to confess is
achieved, the 'problem' is solved. Again, the point that white critics/women, and, by
extension, their writings, are accorded privilege whether they wish for it or not, is
lost. Regardless of the degree of racial correctness achievable in a piece of writing its
authors continue to be white, and hence racially privileged in a racially stratified
umverse.
The idea of the final correction also undermines the anti-colonial intent of
self-reflexivity by reconstructing the posture of the ethnologist collecting data. If the
self-conscious examination of one's own ethnocentrism is intended to disrupt the
authority that is normally assumed with unmarked whiteness, the ambition of a
correct account seriously compromises this. Trinh. T. Minh-ha comments:
As an aesthetic closure or an old relativising gambit in the process
nonetheless of absolutising meaning, reflexivity proves critically insignificant
when it merely serves to refine and to further the accumulation of knowledge.
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A point echoed by Peggy Phelan:
Quantum physicists have attempted to measure the altering 'energy of the
observer' - and to transfer the desire for an epistemology of secure scientific
facts to a more insecure epistemology of probabilities and uncertainties. And
yet the particle continues to turn into a wave and a wave keeps becoming a
particle. Anthropologists and ethnologists have attempted to use 'reflexivity'
as a new model for observing the other, but such attempts have done little to
unsettle the fundamentally unequal relation which prevails in this mode of
scholarship. The project is not to locate the observer but rather to see that the
given to be seen - from the quantum to the 'native' - is apprehended (and of
interest) because of the failure of the perceiver to be seen. (p. 20)
The promised epistemological insecurity of the self-reflexive approach is recuperated
in a gesture of mastery. Uncertainty is replaced with greater certainty, the record is
finally set straight. The implication of a clean slate is also instructive here. The final
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correction is simultaneously the re-establishment of innocent ground. All risk is
gone, problem solved.
What escapes the practitioners of confession is that the 'problem' of racial
conflict is solved partly through the forestalling of black feminist/Third world
feminist critique, through getting there first, so to speak. Self-criticism functions to
stave off criticism from the 'other' and as such can be read as a defensive tactic and
not as anti-colonial; a recuperation and not a renouncement of critical authority and
power. Ramazanoglu responds to Barrett and McIntosh's approach thus:
This level of tightly defended 'autocritique' seems too complacent to be
appropriate in a feminist journal as a means of opening up the dialogue that
they seek between the exponents of white feminism and the anger and
frustration which have been widely expressed by black women. if we are
going to beat our breasts in public shouldn't we unbuckle the armour-plating
first? (p. 83)
Here autocritique closes down rather than opens up debate the effect of which is to
'lose sight of the seriousness of the divisions between women which black women
have brought to light' (p. 83)
At their worst, narrative acts of confession could function as no more than
the staging of a racist incident that is then overcome, a moment where consciousness
was raised, where racial privilege was realised or unconscious caucacentrism or
racism was detected; a sign that the feminist in question is worthy of the critical act
she intends to commit. The textual positioning of the confession is crucial here.
Placed at the beginning of the critical endeavour, confession could be read as a
means of gaining entry to what is perceived as black feminist territory, or else as
clearing a space of legitimacy for the execution of an already formulated critical act.
Elizabeth Abel's confession runs this risk in its placement even though its concerns
are carried into the main body of her work. Those of Eva Birch and Gina Wisker are
much more problematic in that worries over their perceived inadequacies are for the
most part divorced from their methodologies. Their remarks read more as an
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innoculation against accusations of theoretical insufficiency than as senous
interventions in the debate over reading and race. More worrying still is their use of
students' comments to stand for their own confessions. It is hard not to read this as
an act of critical dissociation despite appeals to a student centred approach.
Confession, then, if not followed by a rigorous and continued attempt to think
through the implications of race privilege for a reading of black women's writings
mostly fails as a means of decolonising the text. This is particularly so when the
confession is ostensibly concerned with closing off the possibility of being read by
the racial other to which it is addressed. The possibility of real readerly engagement
on the part of the black feminist is foreclosed in the fantasy of achieving her
unconditional approval.
Confronting whiteness
One of the methodologically more developed investigations into the
possibilities of white feminist participation in the field of black women's writing,
Minrose Gwin's 'A Theory of .. .' argues for the indispensability of a self-reflexive
critical stance. Although in many ways linked to the notion of confession Gwin's
method advances a stage further by incorporating the confessive mode into the very
fibres of her critical method. In her discussion Gwin shows how white women often
feature as the breakers of promises in black women's writings. Therefore, in reading
black women's texts, it is argued, white women need not only to take account of this
extended, above all, referential history of betrayal, but also to reverse the way in
which black woman (as sign) has operated as self-consolidating 'other' to white
woman.
The reading process advocated by Gwin for the white woman reader is
thereby one of learning to undo the ways in which she has been 'enfolded' into
dominant 'cultural narratives' by reading herself as 'other', by positioning herself as
. the breaker of the promise, as the white oppressor. Having thus confronted the full
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extent of her otherness to black women, the white woman reader is then, and only
then, able to listen truly to what black women have to say.
I must drag myself to the brink of the unrepresentable, into what Juliet
Mitchell calls that terrifying moment of the 'splitting of the subject', to give
over to that dark space of otherness created for me by another woman, and to
become acquainted with its cultural landscapes .... I want to be able to really
hear black women and to hear black women I must confront, and read, my
otherness in their texts, however painful that may be. For, if I am ever able to
become other to my own otherness in black women's texts, I must first be
able to read that otherness truly. (p. 23)
While the project of undoing the ways in which privilege structures the encounter
between white woman reader and black woman's text is clearly a crucial one, the
extent to which Gwin's formulations contribute to this task is questionable. As with
the case of naming or declaring oneself as white, the idea of confronting what is
perceived as the otherness of white identity to black women constructs whiteness in
overly abstracted terms; whiteness is made to signify as undifferentiated
privilege/dominance, which is then overcome or neutralised through confrontation
with what is seen as this fact. Implicit in this is the fantasy that white
supremacy/racism can be ultimately apprehended, that whiteness is something that
can be literally encountered. In addition she assumes a similar degree of complicity
with structures of domination: 'we as white women may need to 'read', with pain and
fear and grief, our complicity in what Jean-Francois Lyotard has called the 'grand
Narratives' of culture, of which patriarchy is one.'(pp.22-23):
I must allow myself to be caught by surprise and in that epiphanic and
terrifying moment, to see myself as other to black women's SUbjectivity- in
short, to encounter myself as an object. ... I must be able to read my white
womanhood as a sign of everything I personally abhor. (pp.21-22)
Once the 'epiphanic and terrifying moment' (p. 22) of the primal encounter with
white womanhood has passed, reading in truth can begin. Here Gwin's analysis can
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be seen to converge with popular or New Age therapy discourses, in that the pain of
reading one's otherness is set against the promise of release, catharsis, cure. The
black text is equivalent to the empty chair of the therapeutic encounter: the site of the
selfs 'working through'.
In constructing the relation of white readerlblack text in terms of encounter
Gwin is also perpetuating the overinvestment of whiteness with ahistorical, extremist
meaning (as simply abhorrent) referred to above, and thus gliding over the more
mundane effects of reading as a white woman, in addition to losing the significance
of gender to her enterprise. Indeed, in her response to Gwin's paper, Barbara
Christian is critical of its project in terms of its proposition of reading as white
'other':
I would hope that white women are reading the Works of Black Women, not
as "white other," (which is an alienating even abstract term) but as white
women, which, after all, is who they are.... In actively choosing to look out
at the universe, and really know it they may need to know our point of view,
and perhaps see themselves in ways that they had not before, thus refining
their definition of the concept, woman.22
What Christian is implying is that not only is gender a crucial yet overlooked feature
of Gwin's reading identity, but also that the point of her reading technique is to
disrupt the notion of white woman as norm. While Christian does not contest the
drive to 'really know'she stresses the necessarily disruptive nature of the reading
process for white women. In stating her critical goal as one of reading in truth, Gwin
effectively puts a brake upon the disruption she needs to bring to her own readerly
subject position. The vital transformation that is hoped for in confronting herself as
other is given a false limit, an imagined end that is unrealisable. Similar to Gwin,
Peggy Phelan summarises the problem of reading in the context of First World
readerlThird World text as one of making the other the material for one's own self-
representations: 'Within the psychic and aesthetic economy of the Western gaze, the
visible image of the other necessarily becomes a cipher for the looking self. ,23 And
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yet while Gwin seeks to disrupt this economy through recourse to a greater truth, a
clearer vision of both self and other, Phelan recommends the opposite: the acceptance
of the limitations of the capacity for clear sight, for self-seeing, for 'knowing' the
other.
Seeing the hollow blindness of our own eyes is dangerous because it risks
both self-absorption (one sees nothing other than the self) and self-
annihilation (one sees only the nothing of the self). But until one can accept
one's internal other as lost, invisible, an unmarked blank to oneself and
within the world, the external other will always bear the marks and scars of
the looker's deadening gaze. (p. 26)
For Phelan, then, the inward gaze is ultimately impotent, lacking, 'always already
lost'. It cannot be either the source of absolute knowledge or the undoing of a
representational field that makes the other bear the cost of self-representation. In
routing her attempt to undermine the economy of whitelblack reading relations
through the pursuit of her own truth Gwin short circuits her method. Reading oneself
succeeds only in reproducing the blind-spots that are endemic to the (split) subject.
Placing to one side the representational difficulties that ensue from looking to black
women's fictional characters as sources of white women's truth (the problem of
reading such texts as sociology, as data, for one), the seeing produced by the other,
however mediated, is never identical with the imagined seeing of the self. In Lacan's
words, 'you never look at me from the place I see you'24. Access to the other's
knowledge of ourselves is as cluttered with obstacles as our desire for self-
knowledge. The moment of 'true' self-revelation is endlessly deferred and displaced.
Felski argues similarly that the 'yearning for total intimacy, immediacy, and
fullness of meaning' emphasises the 'reality of uncertainty and lack' so producing a
further oscillating effect between intimacy and alienation. The fear of alienation
drives the longing for intimacy and vice versa, Felski explains:
The process of introspection, of the analysis and evaluation of motive, can
intensify feelings of guilt rather than resolve them; the compulsion to disclose
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oneself as fully as possible leads to a search for ever more telling details, the
continual interrogation of one's own motives, in the search for the impossible
ideal of absolute honesty. (p. 113)
The pursuit of the moment of self-truth is rendered obscure; the primal confrontation
with whiteness reverts to confession. Whiteness becomes something to atone or
apologise for, rather than as something to be investigated or criticised; its mundane
specificity is lost.
Decentring whiteness
If colonial privilege can be represented as that of being able to see without being
seen,25 the drive toward self exposure in reading/theorising the racially Other text
can be read as a potentially radical move. The decision to emerge from the off-stage
location of objective criticism, the position of outside the frame of meaning, (with its
attendent authority) becomes readable as one to decentre, indeed [surrender]de-
authorise the white feminist critical project. With this decision comes the blurring of
the distinction between subject and object, reader and text. Again, this is a potentially
radical move given the interests of maintaining such a distinction for the colonialist.
As Elleke Boehmer argues: 'It became habitual for Europe to approach other cultures
as objects of study, bodies of knowledge to assemble and to bring into shape.'26 A
bringing into shape which represses the act of shaping itself. The objectifying
colonial gaze as a producer of knowledge, and as a source of authority, predicated
itself upon the idea of neutrality, upon passive seeing: Victorian ethnologists, merely
observe the antics of 'savages', so to speak, and in doing so not only deny their own
relation to their objects of study but also the ways in which such a relation functions
to distort what is thought to be seen. Bourdieu puts it thus:
The distortion wrought on practice by the objectification of practice (for
instance, the operation which consists in distributing properties in tables with
two columns, left/right, feminine/masculine, wet/dry, etc.) is destined to pass
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unnoticed, since it is constitutive of the very operation that the ethnologist has
to perform in order to constitute practice as an ethnological object. (p. 100)
This distortion takes the form, for example, of translating practices or rituals into
algebraic formulae. In bringing to bear the instruments of objectification ('the
photograph, schema, diagram, genealogy or, quite simply, writing.'p. 98) upon an
event or phenomena observers' by failing to analyse [their] relation to [their] object,
project onto their object the relation they have with that object,'(p. 98) The effects of
objectification are not confined solely to the transformation of practice into
discourse, of unwritten into written. The relationship of reader to text, similarly, can
be construed in this way. Referring to Bakhtin, Bourdieu is critical of what is termed
a 'philological' approach to language: the treatment of language as if it were
something dead and consequently fixed in meaning. The pure object of knowledge,
to summarise, is a construction which is arrived at through a considerable act of
violence: ' ...it is only in the eyes of the observer that ritual can change from dance
into algebra, from gymnastics into a symbolic and logical calculus.', (p. 99)
From the moment a rite is retold, it changes meaning and you pass from a
bodily logic oriented towards functions, to a philological relation: the rites
become texts which have to be deciphered, they are pretexts for
decipherment. The need for coherence and logic appears, linked to
communication, discussion and comparison.' (p. 100)
The blurring of the subject/object distinction forms a crucial part of Nicole
Ward Jouve's project in her White Woman Speaks With Forked Tongue. Like
Bourdieu she is critical of the objective stance integral to orthodox literary criticism.
The critical genre, it seems, makes its adepts feel that they are being
miraculously transported on a magic carpet from which they can survey, or
peer into, the operations of the rest of humankind, the common herd of
writers as it were. They themselves are removed from the obligation of
having to bother with the self that writes. They inhabit a secure, objectified,
third-person mode that protects them from having to be self-aware. (p. 1)
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For Ward Jouve, objectivity offers the critic protection in the form of freedom from
responsibility for what is written. Objectivity also gives the illusion of dissociation
from the meanings that are created: the critic's position, floating above the text/event,
has the appearance of detachment, even disinterest. What is more, it is a detachment
which constitutes the necessary distance that forms the basis of colonial authority.
The securing of a commanding view of any text/event was founded upon the
establishment of the distance necessary to see not only the whole,but the whole at
once, at a glance. Boehmer summarises:
The gaze was made manifest in the activities of investigation, examination,
inspection, peeping, poring over, which were accompaniments to the colonial
penetration of a country. In ethnographic description and scientific study, in
the curious scrutiny of the colonized by the colonizer, there was much of the
attitude of the map-maker. In writing, the gaze appears as bird's-eye
description, and is embodied in the high vantage point or knowledgeable
position taken up by a writer or traveller as he re-creates a scene.F
In its extreme manifestations the idea of necessary distance made possible and
indeed, permitted the production of authoritative accounts of the colonized, based
upon little more than the imagination alone. James Mill, for instance, founds his
History of British India (1817) squarely upon the premise that 'the subcontinent
could best be understood by an informed outsider, one who had never visited India,
such as himself. '28 Fiction presented as fact, the objective view wielded an
inestimable power as a structuring force in the world of Empire.
The legacy of this as a way of viewing texts/events/cultures is more than
considerable, as Ward Jouve notes, suspecting it as a possible source of justification
for a continuation of the colonial attitude in literary criticism.
,
I belong to the race that has taken a few centuries only to destroy or threaten
what it has taken God or nature millions of years to make. Critical writing has
grown in the same period. Who knows but that it is tainted with the same
greed, the same tendency to exploit and to destroy. Today, in our infinite
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appetite for exoticism, for the new, we go on gleefully sacking all other
cultures to find something exciting to write about. (p. vii)
By way of loosening the colonial grip upon texts, and by extension, the world, Ward
Jouve proposes that the pursuit of the (in her view, fallacious) objective be
relinquished, in favour of the more honest, indeed modest, project of the subjective.
For Ward Jouve this is more than simply an option or alternative for the critic but
rather a facing of facts.
In any case, as I have tried to show at the outset, any writing constructs and
betrays a subject. It is not a question of choice. One might as well make
something of the process. It is not because consciousness can never be full,
never more than fragments or a patchwork, that the enterprise is fallacious.
Indeed, it is because subjecthood has become so difficult, has been so
deconstructed, that there is need to work towards it. (pp. 10-11)
So, given the inevitability of the relational quality of meaning, or as Bourdieu puts it:
' ... nothing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies, '29 it is better
to accept than deny one's own active role in the construction of an 'object', whether
text, practice or culture. With this Ward Jouve privileges the autobiographical as a
means of decolonising the text, stressing ' ...the importance of self-knowledge, or
rather the quest for self-knowledge, in the writing of criticism.' She continues:
Unless criticism springs out of genuine analyses of the real world, and in its
tum affects it (and in the word 'real' I include the self that lives out of and in
history as well as writes), then it inhabits the realm of fantasy. It perpetuates a
sterile state of fantasy, like cogs that no longer clutch into the dents of a
wheel, and turnin the void, mad with their own unimpeded speed. (p. 8)
The autobiographical is seen to usher the real into what, in Ward Jouve's thinking
has become the increasingly detached and, by extension, unreal critical universe.
This notion of bringing criticism back down to earth finds an echo in Nancy Miller's
Getting Personal. To reiterate, the body is seen as constituting 'an internal limit on
discursive irresponsibility, a brake on rhetorical spinning' (p. xiii) The particularity
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of autobiography is constituted as a counter to the smooth presentation of ideas that
characterises the abstract: the graininess, the materiality of the personal is contrasted
with the over-blown, global pretensions of abstraction.
As I am particularly interested in the potential of self-reflexivity in the
context of reading and race I focus here upon Ward Jouve's text alone, mainly due to
its being developed in the context of anti-colonial practice. The distortions of the
orthodox objective view are many and the authority that has been assumed with
whiteness is not to be understimated. However, the extent to which Ward Jouve's
methodology addresses these issues is questionable. Most crucially White Woman
Speaks ... reduces the colonial to an essence, or structure, that is identical with
objectivity and in doing so overlooks the particular histories that constitute its
project. The colonial contest is more than an attitude of mind or epistemological
habit; Ward Jouve blinds herself to important and meaningful aspects of the texts she
studies in focussing on their form alone. Just as crucially, the gesture of decentring is
confounded by the self-absorption of the method. Ward Jouve centres the text around
herself in the name of anti-colonialism, neglecting the colonial content of the issue of
translation, for example. Finally the colonial ambition of the view from above,
though opposed even denigrated in the text, creeps back into its approach to the work
of Doris Lessing, for one. The return of objectivity in White Woman Speaks, , "
despite its banishment, raises interesting questions as to the potential for a truly
subjective, that is non-objective, discourse.
In the text's opening essay Ward Jouve who 'livers] and writers] in two
languages: French and English', explores 'what [her] own 'bilingualism' entails' (p.
1). In particular she is interested in the problem translation poses for self-identity, a
problem which she places on a continuum with the generalised or even universal
identity crisis that she associates with all women 'who strive to speak with their own
voice experience', Her own predicament is seen as 'a more graphic form', a
magnification of this crisis, and hence a legitimation of her own self-exploration. The
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connection between Ward Jouve's own experience and that of other women's is thus
established.
In her account of her own bilingualism Ward Jouve presents herself as
divided more or less down the middle. As well as having had no childhood in
England and no adulthood in France, she calculates that approximately half of her
life has been spent in each country. And yet this distribution of languages and self is
in no way as comfortable as this neat equation suggests: 'My presence in one
country, one language always means my absence from the other.' (p. 19) What is
more, the division between English and French is presented as having further
significance as a division between the patriarchal and the feminine, the
academic/theoretical and the creative, adult and child, public and private, second-
hand and original, the conscious and the unconscious. It comes as no surprise, given
these accrued meanings that translation produces overwhelming feelings of
alienation and anxiety: 'Translating made me feel sick' (p. 29). The movement from
French to English triggers nothing short of an existential crisis:
The activity of translating destroyed whatever bit of identity the writing of the
stories had constructed for me in French. It threw me back into the horror of
indifferentiation, of possible non-sense. (p. 29)
Faced with the 'gaping chasm' that opens up between the two languages when
translation is contemplated, Ward Jouve chooses to highlight, and indeed occupy,
their distinctions. She then settles upon inhabiting a schizophrenic identity position
(legs astride the Channel) as a means of negotiating her internal divisions, accepting
them rather than attempting some sort of resolution.
I realise then that I need the partition, the cut between the two. I am perhaps
not so far away from schizophrenia as I'd like to think. I can live as two
people. I'd go mad if the two were forced to acknowledge each other, rather
than go their separate ways, the way it pleases each.... Where would I be if I
could do the same thing in both? Drowned, of course: in the grey waters of
the Channel.' , (p. 30).
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As interesting as this is as an account of Ward Jouve's personal struggle to
exist in two different cultures the context of the investigation introduces a number of
problems into the discourse. Given the expressed concern with colonialism in the
preface and introduction to White Woman Speaks ... it is surprising that there is no
consideration of language as a colonial issue. Nowhere is it considered that some
women who speak in a language that is not the mother tongue as an effect of the
colonial contest. Sujatta Bhatt's poem 'Search For My Tongue' testifies to a
markedly different experience of speaking two languages:
You ask me what I mean
by saying I have lost my tongue
I ask you, what would you do
if you had two tongues in your mouth,
and lost the first one, the mother tongue,
and could not really know the other,
the foreign tongue.
You could not use them both together
even if you thought that way.
And if you lived in a place you had to
speak a foreign tongue,
your mother tongue would rot
rot and die in your mouth
until you had to spit it out.30
Written in Gujerati and in English 'Search For My Tongue' bears witness to the issue
of language and power in the shadow of Empire. The poem's protagonist faces not a
schizophrenic identity-choice but the potential annihilation of her native culture by
that imposed by imperialism. In the African imperial context Ngugi Wa Thiong'o
refers to the destruction of native culture and language as a 'cultural bomb', the
weapon,par excellence, in imperialism's arsenal.
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The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names,
in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their
unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their
past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance
themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that
which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other people's
languages rather than their own."
The cultural bomb is intent on making the mother tongue 'rot and die', on making its
users 'spit it out'. In Bhatt's poem the protagonist is silenced by the loss of her native
tongue: 'I can't speak. I speak nothing. Nothing' (p. 63) Although the Gujerati is
translated within the body of the poem the poem resists the incorporation of the one
tongue by the other. The poem thus tesitifies to the losses of translating into English:
I think:
(aakash, suraj)
and then: sky, sun.
Don't tell me its the same. I know
better. (p. 67)
A little girl is observed carrying a black clay pitcher, selling water at the station:
She filled her brass cup with water,
stretched out her arm to me,
reached up to the window, up
to me leaning out the window from the train,
but I can't think of her in English. (p. 65)
The gulf between the two languages is mirrored by the distance between the
protagonist and the girl reaching up to her: English stretches out and ultimately fails
to reproduce the Gujerati scene. In the context of the Caribbean, Grace Nichols's
'Epilogue', from 'I is a Long-Memoried Woman', speaks of the irretrievability of the
'mother tongue' for the African slave.
I have crossed an ocean
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I have lost my tongue
from the root of the old one
a new one has sprung32
The new, Creole, Nation language, a resistance to the imposition of the language of
the coloniser, takes the place of the 01d.33
None of this is to castigate Ward Jouve for not dealing with the entire and
complex history of language.and imperialism; it is rather to point up the gap between
her intentions and practice. In justifying her self-investigation as being relevant to
'women', in addition to professing a concern with colonialism, Ward Jouve
nevertheless perpetuates an entirely Eurocentric view of bilingualism. This would be
less of a problem were it not for Ward Jouve's legitimation of her project through
appealing to its broader relevance. Despite its preoccupation with the personal and
the particular White Woman Speaks ... cannot give up the pursuit of the big picture,
the view from above, the general. While ostensibly disdaining the objective view,
Ward Jouve nevertheless reinstates it, rerouting it via the particular, the personal.
This is evident in the ease with which the text moves from the particular to the
general:
Still, about connections: what is odd is that you may work on, discover,
something that seems totally private, even eccentric, in a state of total
isolation - and it turns out to have an unexpectedly political, a public, face...
. More pretentiously, let me say that the writing of fiction (which is
supposedly 'private', imaginative) can tum out to be the expression of
something much larger, more impersonal. (pp. 32-3)
In the place of a consideration of issues of power, language and translation, the text
makes euphemistic reference to the way in which 'mobility, in terms of place,
culture, speech, imaginary projection of self, affects more and more women' (p. 17).
The use of the word mobility implies a degree of choice that glides over the facts of
the forced migration of a large proportion of Africa's population, for instance.
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This neglect is produced in part by Ward Jouve's construction of colonialism
as solely the epistemological habit of objectivity. White Woman Speaks ...
relentlessly pursues acts of critical objectification and equates them, falsely, with
colonialism. Objectivity is thus constructed as colonialism's essence, and by
extension, subjectivity emerges as the anti-colonial stance. The problem with this
equation is that it first, it denies the myriad ways in which the various colonial
powers achieved domination of various areas of the globe, in addition to foreclosing
upon the need for further investigation as to the specificity of each colonial project.
If colonialism can be reduced to an epistemological mannerism or even an attitude
of mind then anti-colonialism becomes a mere matter of therapy or individual
retraining. This is not to deny the connections between the objective construction of
the world and Empire but instead to complicate it. It is to heed Edward Said's
comment that 'no one overarching theoretical principle governs the whole imperialist
ensemble'34 whilst recognising within the patterns of imperial domination the dense
particularity of its manifestations. If objectivity eased the production of
powerlknowledge which served the causes of domination: authorising the
taxonomies of race, the geographical division of the world, the recording of
observations, Empire cannot be reduced to objectivity per se. To do so is
simultaneously to deny an entire history of Western global domination along with the
colonial/imperial inheritance which white Westerners to greater or lesser degrees
continue to trade off today. The extent to which colonial discourses continue to
circulate, or litter, British culture can be seen in the casual way in which they are
picked up, assumed in the most unexpected circumstances. 35
This elision of the colonial and the objective pervades Ward Jouve's
discussion of Doris Lessing's work. In an essay on Lessing's Children of Violence
sequence the critic discusses 'what [she] find[s] wrong with the language ofa woman
[she] admire[s]' (p. 119) and in doing so attempts to exposes her own role in the
reading process. Laying her 'own head on the chopping block' (p. 119) she presents a
sustained examination of Lessing's textual politics. Tracing the significance of the
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image of mud through the novels, it is argued that: 'The disappearance of mud .. .is
bound up with the disappearance of the home.' (p. 124) and in turn the disappearance
of home is linked to the loss of significance itself. This escalating loss in the text is
connected to the grand losses that mark the twentieth century, the losses that signify
the crises that inhere with modernity: 'Mud is lost. Leaving the children of violence,
a prey to violence, the 'forces' of two world wars, the splitting of the atom, the Cold
War, madness. (p. 127) The sequence's heroine, Martha Quest, journeys in the
direction of mud to void, home to loss of home, Africa to Europe, and in doing so
becomes a thoroughly modem subject. However, even as Lessing takes on the big
themes of twentieth century life she does not extend them into her mode of
representation or narrative; Ward Jouve's quarrel with the author is over her
continued use of a form of fictional writing that continues to 'put the sky at the top of
the picture'(p. 175 ). In presenting Martha's radical doubt alongside the falling away
of certainty about the world in general, Lessing, in Ward Jouve's view, persists in
holding onto a means of representation that shores up the very fictions she seems to
be exposing. In short, the 'twentieth century' content of the fiction is betrayed by its
'nineteenth century' form. So, 'Martha may at the end of The Four-Gated City
discover that her consciousness of reality had been false: but the manner in which she
is led to make that discovery in itself perpetuates that falsity.' (p. 174) In addition to
eschewing the personal in favour of the universal ('The ambition informing Lessing's
work, and especially the last volumes of The Children of Violence is absolute. It is to
evolve from 'I' to 'We', carrying into 'We' all the old 'I's of the Bildungsroman.', p.
135), Lessing via the 'A to Z principle', the 'subject-verb-object routine', the
'detached observer', and what is more, 'the most comforting ... sense that there is no
more than what there is'(p. 160-1), fully orients the reader in the text. Nothing is not
known. Even as Martha experiences doubt or uncertainty the authorial voice is
unwavering. So, as well as putting the sky at the top of the picture, the writing self
remains at the text's centre; characters' thought processes are explained, dreams
interpreted, feelings described, progress is made, chronologically, developmentally.
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Ward Jouve's main quarrel being that this coincides with and indeed lends support to
a colonial world view that relies on notions of distance, objectivity, and
transcendence: 'It pretends, with colonial simplicity, that because you're not really
'involved', you are, you can be, 'objective'. 'all-knowing'. Which is yet another,
unrecognised fiction.' (p. 177)
The critic also takes issue with what she identifies as Lessing's partitioning of
race in her texts. In the Children of Violence sequences the black characters are seen
to appear as barely more than ciphers for awareness of racial prejudice, or ideas or
causes to be fought for. At the same time as writing the sequence, Lessing was
producing, in Ward Jouve's view, the more racially explicit work of her African short
stories. This act of splitting is all the more problematic for Ward Jouve given the
sequence's pretensions to objectivity: 'the 'totalising' ambition of the texts', (p. 145).
'How' she asks, 'could [Lessing] hope to represent an inclusive consciousness in the
character of Martha when all the time she made her blind - I don't mean ideologically
blind, I mean blind where it really matters.' (p. 145) By way of answering her own
question Ward Jouve speculates as to Lessing's position as an author, concluding:
'Presumably the author is not herself aware of this particular partitioning, for if she
were, how could it still affect Landlocked, published three years after The Golden
Notebook?' (p. 146)36
Intentional fallacy aside, such speculation is interesting when considered
within the general frame of Ward Jouve's argument. In pursuing the idea of
inclusivity, in asking for a more representative view of Rhodesia, for example, with
its perceived ten blacks for every white, as a means of criticising Lessing's textual
politics, Ward Jouve is demanding of the author the very coherence she not only
equates with a colonial world view but also refuses for herself. To return briefly to
her statements around the issue of translation:
I realise then that I need the partition, the cut between the two. I am perhaps
not so far away from schizophrenia as I'd like to think. I can live as two
people. I'd go mad if the two were forced to acknowledge each other ...
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Ward Jouve never considers the possibility that Lessing may be inhabiting such a
divide, as a white settler in Africa, for instance, nor indeed any other textual
possibility.
When it is considered that Ward Jouve's 's project, from the outset, is to
never forget race (,No-one who writes today can or should forget their race and their
gender', p.vii) there is remarkably little mention of race in the text. For instance, in
her reading of the Children of Violence texts their criticism of white supremacy is
largely neglected. Martha Quest's journey of loss and the novel-sequence's
movement is summarised in wholly deracinated terms: 'two world wars, the splitting
of the atom, the Cold War, madness'. To this list could be added the dismantling of
Empire, the falling away of colonial rule: a key theme of the texts. What is more the
the argument pertaining to Lessing's partitioning of race in her texts takes place itself
in a separate, partitioned, section. Subtitled 'Africa' Ward Jouve' s critique
reproduces the very problem it seeks to diagnose in bracketing off race as a concern.
Elsewhere, there is scant reference to race in any specific form. Rather the emphasis
appears to be one of dissociation from the particular manifestations of racial
inequality. Throughout her essay on translation, for example, a distinction is formed
between English and French in terms of the constructed and the natural. Living in
England Ward Jouve continued nevertheless to write secretly in French: 'And so,
paradoxically, English rendered me the service of making my French more 'natural'
(in the sense of less and less conscious and controllable, cut off from models and a
context, with "roots" even further away from sight).' (p. 25) Hidden, cut off,
unconscious, maternal French is a language of innocence in Ward Jouve's personal
universe. A childhood in France means having
... none of the instinctive knowledge, the intimate relation to - green and
water and 'long summer days' and the Battle of Britain and Monday wash
and Thursday baking and 'Grammar' versus 'Comprehensive' and miner's
cottages and terraced streets and pop music and India - which growing up in
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England in the 1940's and 1950's and early 1960's would have given me. (p.
19,)
Conversely, an adulthood in England has meant missing out on May '68, as well as
'everything that' s been happening to France in the twenty or so years from
Pompidou to Simone Weil and the resurgence of racism and the expansion of
ordinateurs and vacance de neige . . .' (p. 19) In her culturally divided existence
Ward Jouve also implies having missed out on belonging to a racist and imperialist
culture as is the fate of the singularly English or French citizen. Had she spent her
childhood in this country the connection to Empire is implied as inescapable: an
'instinctive knowledge' of India, and all that it stands for, would have been the
critic's fate. Had she stayed in France the resurgence of the New Right would have
informed her adult life. This evasion along with the construction of her native
language as one of innocence, deeply compromises Ward Jouve's professed anti-
colonial intention.
In saying all of this I am less concerned with either making an issue out of the
contradictions themselves, in settling these particular questions, than I am with
addressing the bigger question of what it says about the pursuit of a self-reflexive, or
rather non-objective, relation to a text or event. The self-reflexive gesture, as it is
construed by Ward Jouve, seems concerned with installing herself at the scene of
writing in order not only to disrupt the fantasy of a clear view of the text but also to
achieve, paradoxically, a more honest reading. The critical self's inscription in the
text, the relentless self-questioning, the twists and turns of each argument, the shuttle
movement from assertion to the undermining of assertions are all poised to arrive at a
final reading which gets it right, which achieves the truth of the text. So, the
sequence of novels is reduced to single truth: the fact of their own internal
contradiction. And that truth is achieved by completing the critical picture through
extending the frame to include the self that writes. In 'daring' to expose herself in the
act of creating meaning Ward Jouve's ambition is to do it all at once, so to speak, to
present an absolute meaning even as it is delimited in an exaggerated gesture of
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critical responsibility. Somewhat defensively, (or as Oprah might say 'passive
aggressively') Ward Jouve puts herself on the line, her neck on the chopping-block
thus constructing the reader of White Woman Speaks ... in an aggressive relation to
her text. Should the criticism fail the reader can always take an axe to its author.
While this is not to totalise the potential effects of Ward Jouve's text: it also, like
Miller's proceeds in a spirit of exploration and experiment, there is an abiding sense
that her self-revelations, indeed the experiment itself (here are my investments, this is
what I'm doing) are structured around a demand for a greater truth; the ease with
which the text moves from the personal/individual to the general/universal is one
such betrayal of this ambition.
Conclusion
Much of the work ,and the biggest problem, of writing this chapter has been
in deciding how to approach the material given the traps set up by the texts: the
construction of objectivity as a colonial stance, for one, the positioning of the reader
as violent for another. As I agreed with the initial premises of much of these writings
( the privilege of the neutral observer/critic over the native/text) criticising them
produces its own problems. To assess the material from outside would seem to
replicate the very position that is under scrutiny. However, as I have argued, there are
also problems with some of the assumptions that self-reflexive positions make. Not
least that of being able to somehow represent the self that writes. My first effort at
this chapter was written in a Ward Jouvian/Milleresque style as I tried to incorporate
myself into the metacritical scene. As I went slowly cross-eyed in the attempt I came
to realise some of the problems of this method, that is, problems of representation are
far from resolved by deciding to include an analysis of what one can only ever
presume to be, one's own position or transference material. It seems that there is a
distinct limit as to how 'knowing' I can be about myself, how in charge of my own
relation to the text I can be. What is more, I would now dispute the extent to which
self-reflexivity can offer a means of relinquishing critical mastery, in the way Ward
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Jouve supposes in her assertion of the homely and the modest. As I 'exposed' my
reading position, tried to step outside of myself in ever decreasing circles of self-
analysis, it felt less that I was 'letting go' of mastery than I was attempting to reassert
it, albeit in another guise. Jane Gallop airs similar suspicions in her Irigarayan
reading of Irigaray's work in The Daughter's Seduction. Seeming almost dizzy from
rigorous self-questioning Gallop observes parenthetically:
(In all this talk of correct narrative position, staging one's own transference,
risking one's identity, I begin to feel less and less sure of what might be the
'correct position' for me, of whether I, like Irigaray, am trying to regain self-
mastery by the best ruse of all. ... But then, this parenthesis itself seems at
once the most and the least unsettling gesture of all. It is a last-ditch attempt
to regain the correct position, the correct position here being to be unsettled
from any position. The real risk avoided here is the risk of being wrong.r"
In other words taking up a position of 'not knowing' seems an entirely 'knowing'
thing to do in that being seen to choose, self-consciously, the position of 'not
knowing' is far from being found to not know. To put it another way staging my own
'not knowingness' or confessing to 'non-mastery' is a more comfortable position to
adopt than it would at first appear. Transferential reading, then, at least as it is
practised here, ends up recuperating, through its reassertion of the idea of the correct
position, the notion of non-mastery as mastery.
There is a further way in which self-reflexivity can be seen to gain the
theoretical upper hand. Contrary to the intention of de-authorising the text through
the personal it could function to reconsecrate the writing as highly prestigious and
hence authoritative in that it is the most privileged of agents who get to flout
convention, break the epistemological rules. If a critic decides to blow the
gaffe/expose the logic of the field in which she is operating her success depends upon
her standing (the amount of symbolic capital at ther disposal) in the intellectual field.
If the risk pays off the critic stands to gain massively rather than lose recognition,
consecration, capital. My decision to not participate in the risk is in part a reflection
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of the degree of capital at my disposal (relative to already established critics in the
feminist critical field): those who are socially disposed to play the game can afford to
dispense with its rules.38
In pressing so hard upon the practice of self-reflexivity however, I do not
wish to imply that auto critique is automatically regressive or 'colonialist'. Rather in
highlighting some of the hidden effects of self-reflection, of acknowledging
whiteness for the white critic, I question its use as a guaranteed means of ensuring an
anti-colonial relation to the 'raced' text. This is not to say that self-reflexivity is
worthless as a critical method. It is instead to suggest it as 'a weapon against
yourself, an instrument of vigilance, [a way of] realising the limits of one's vision'J?
as opposed to a final correction; a process and not an answer.
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Conclusion: Ending Innocence
In an essay concerned with the reception of postmodern philosophies within
feminist thinking Jane Flax offers a sustained critique of the 'dream of innocence"
that she sees as haunting current feminist theory. Singling out the Enlightenment as
the source of innocent knowledge-claims (Le. those based in truth or universal
benevolence or the greatest good) Flax traces its influence in Marxist, liberal and
empiricist, feminist thought. 'The End of Innocence' stresses the 'dangerousness' of
these assertions of innocence in feminism and argues for 'a radical shift of terrain' (p.
457):
. . . there may be more effective ways of to attain agreement or produce
change than to argue about truth. Political action and change require and call
upon many human capacities including empathy, anger, and disgust. ... Once
we begin to make claims about gender injustice, we have irrevocably entered
the realm of politics. We need to learn ways of making claims about and
acting upon injustice without transcendental guarantees or illusions of
innocence. (pp. 458-59)
The end of innocence marks the beginning of politics. The innocent, unmarked
ground of truth gives way to the contested territory of the political. With this shift
comes the necessary assumption of responsibility. As opposed to what is construed as
the child-like posture of those who hold onto Enlightenment notions of authority
('We remain children, waiting, if our own powers fail, for the higher authorities to
save us from the consequences of our actions', pp. 459-60) the relinquishing of
innocence is one of responsibility.
To take responsibility is to firmly situate ourselves within contingent
and imperfect contexts, to acknowledge differential privileges of race, gender,
geographic location, and sexual identities, and to resist the delusory and
dangerous recurrent hope of redemption to a world not of our own making.
(p.460)
Donna Haraway makes a comparable appeal in her work. In 'Manifesto for Cyborgs'
for instance, she notes how: 'White women, including Euroamerican socialist
feminists, discovered (i.e., were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the
noninnocence of the category "woman.t" Like Flax, Haraway is suspicious of
feminism's Enlightenment inheritance, particularly in its manifestation as universal
knowledge or truth. A crucial aspect of a commitment to noninnocence is the
assertion of 'situated knowledges': a 'shorthand term' for the logic of the
'ungraspable middle space' and 'contradictory moments' that govern the complex
category 'woman' (p. 111). By way of an illustration of noninnocent criticism
Haraway presents, in Simians Cyborgs, and Women, a reading of the work of
BritishlNigerian writer Buchi Emecheta.' Paralleling Nicole Ward Jouve's assertion
- white writing is 'never innocent' - the critic makes her own interests and stakes
explicit: 'the potent ambiguities of Emecheta's fiction and of the fictions of her life'
(p. 121). In declaring both her reading position ('as a Euro-American, middle-class,
university-based feminist') and critical investment Haraway fulfils the other related
requirement of noninnocence: the critic's necessary accountability for the meanings
that are produced. Critical responsibility is a crucial part of non-innocent reading
The declaration of the end of innocence is then a necessary move and
constitutes a means of realising the harm that lies at the centre of the feminist' dream
of a common language'; the good and the obvious; a way of extinguishing the 'old
dream of non-partisanship at the heart of feminist politics". The era of noninnocence
is one without transcendental guarantee, without exterior authority. It necessitates the
recognition that readings of texts and events 'are also mis-readings, re-readings,
partial readings, imposed readings, and imagined readings of a text that is originally
and finally never simply there' (Simians, p. 124). It is the acknowledgement of
reading as a compulsorily contested activity.
As it has been shown throughout this study many of the problems that
obstruct white feminist readings of black writings arise out of the tendency to want to
establish, from the outset, some secure ground from which to proceed to read. It is in
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attempting to seek an automatic or transcendent solution to the so-called 'problem' of
reading that creates problems. The notion of noninnocence would seem to be
especially pertinent here: the embrace of the necessary partiality of reading is the
undoing of critical imperialism. The acknowledgement of the potential for reading
strategies to backfire undermines the capacity for white feminist appropriation.
Having said that, to assert the end of innocence is not to dispense with its influence.
Both Flax and Haraway proceed as if innocence can be eradicated by decree, and
while I agree with their diagnoses of the effects of innocent knowledge claims in
feminist discourse I am less confident that they can be theorised away. A source of
this doubt is the persistence of moments of innocence in both critics' assertion of
noninnocence.
First, in Flax' case, the movement toward non-innocence is constituted via an
act of symbolic violence', In the place of a politicised argument or theory here Flax
offers reasoning based in the matter of taste and propriety as grounds for giving up
the pursuit of 'innocent' knowledge. Non-innocence is the mature choice. The
childish pursuit of innocent ground to be relinquished in favour of the more adult
game of politics. The assumption that to foreground politics is to take care of
innocence, to herald its demise, however, is to underestimate the degree to which
politics itself can operate as an unexamined, and hence in some cases, innocent term
in feminist discourse. Diana Fuss argues 'paradoxically, politics often occupies an
apolitical position in our thinking - a position of unquestioned power and privilege."
Circulating as essence, politics can function as a reassertion of innocence in feminist
thinking.
In making the end of innocence a matter of renouncement Flax also commits
an act of violence toward the feminist past, and implicates herself in a narrative that
writes off feminist intellectual history as childish and naive in relation to an ever
more sophisticated present. With this Flax fails to take account of the extent to which
feminist theories are influenced indeed shaped by the discursive field in which they
are circulating and are hence strategic and euphemised, and thereby cannot
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incorporate the idea of strategic essentialism into her discourse. As Haraway points
out, highlighting the strategic moment of feminist thinking, 'Binaries, rather suspect
for some feminists I know, can turn out to be nice little tools from time to time' (p.
111). What is more, the Enlightenment itself circulates as essence, as an innocent
term in Flax's account. The source of some of the West's more pernicious ideological
projects the Enlightenment is the unequivocal negative to postmodernism's positive.
Oppositional logic aside, in recommending the wholesale abandonment of
Enlightenment philosophy Flax essentialises a complex historical phenomenon.
Bourdieu suggests a different approach:
I think it is better to call universal reason itself into question, resolutely
accepting the fact that reason is a historical product whose existence and
durability are the product of a determinate type of historical conditions, and
are determining what those conditions are. There is a history of reason; that
doesn't mean that reason can be reduced to its history, but that there are
historical conditions for the appearance of social forms of communication that
make the production of truth possible .... To say that there are social
conditions for the production of truth is to say that there is a politics of truth,
an action constantly exercised in order to defend and improve the functioning
of the social universes in which rational principles are applied and truth
comes into being. (pp. 31-2)
As opposed to Flax's journey, via acceptance of the postmodem dictum of radical
disillusionment, Bourdieu stresses the already political and historical nature of
innocent categories, reason, the universal etc. Through indicating the social genesis
of supposedly groundless foundations, the role of history as a means of challenging
foundational logic is emphasised. Instead of greeting all aspects of the Enlightenment
with suspicion and focusing, critical energy on avoiding or excising its logic,
Bourdieu asks, 'who has an interest in the universal? What is its history?,7
In contradistinction to Flax, Haraway acknowledges the role of history in
thinking or working through contingent differences. If Flax asserts responsibility
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achievable through a willed disillusionment with the fictions peddled by the
Enlightenment, Haraway chooses a different route. To reiterate, noting the
embeddedness of some binaries in Western culture, Haraway invokes their usefulness
echoing Spivak's concept of strategic essentialism. Haraway therefore, refuses to
simply rule out or invalidate the use of categories or formulations on the grounds of
their Enlightenment inheritance. Preferring phrases such as 'working through'(p.
124) the end of innocence for Haraway, may usher in the beginning of politics but it
also necessitates the beginning of history.
That said, Haraway's noninnocence, too, has its moments of innocence. There
is a point to which her self-consciousness with regard to her own investments and
motivations, serves to push against Haraway's claims to relinquishing innocent
ground. In Bourdieu's phrase, 'Non-naivety does not exclude a form of innocence",
The degree of knowingness displayed concerning her non-innocent stance, its almost
scientific presentation with its declaration of location and interests, can read as a re-
assertion of innocence. As I argue in chapter 6, the adoption of a self-reflexive stance
can function as a retrenchment of mastery and knowingness, an escape from
accountability, in Jane Gallop's words, the 'best ruse of all,9 Self-criticism can
function defensively, to deflect the attention of the reader and so maintain the
innocence of the critic even as it appears to be being relinquished. By being my own
critic I can close off my text to the intervention of other reader.
The reappearance of innocence in both texts is readable not merely as
theoretical error but rather as evidence of the impossibility of non-innocence as a
pure stance or theoretical position. Which is to say that critical or theoretical
innocence, like seeing or essentialism, cannot be dispensed with, banished, outlawed,
through pronouncement. To privilege politics is not to automatically counter claims
of innocence. Non-innocence or 'politics' or 'reading' or 'anti-essentialism' needs
constantly to be re-asserted, not merely declared. Flax's worry about the issue of
foundations in feminist criticism, while well warranted, cannot be resolved through
recourse to theory alone; it cannot be reduced to the status of a merely theoretical
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'problem' which can then be solved by formulating a bigger, better brighter theory,
(for example, postmodemism). Rather, with Bourdieu, I would argue that, like the
question of foundations, the question of how to read needs to be answered
empirically, historically, and 'cannot be raised in absolute terms.l'"
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